In order to relieve the blockade pressure and in an endeavor to permit passage of supplies from Cebu to Corregidor, I prepared prior to my departure plans for an air attack of B 17s from here to Mindanao and thence to Mission Destination. I am now preparing its prompt execution. This effort is a critical one due to the lack of Air Force available here. I have only twelve serviceable B-17s, many of which are approaching exhaustion. I believe there is fair hope for blockade runners from the U.S. to reach destination if approached by the route of northern Luzon. Their speed will give them an excellent chance to get through as the enemy is concentrating his patrols on the routes from Visayan waters and the entrance to Manila Bay is not yet mined by the enemy. I believe also that the supplies on Bataan will last beyond the date of April 15th. I am in addition diverting submarines sufficient for the purpose to ferry food supplies from the Southern Phillippine Islands to Corregidor. The supply should be ample for maintenance for an indefinite time. When I left on March 11th, it was my estimate that serious shortages would not develop at the earliest before May 1st., allowing sufficient time for arrival of blockade runners from the U.S. It is of course possible that with my departure the rigor of application of conservation may have relaxed.

I am utterly opposed, under any circumstances or conditions to the ultimate capitulation of this command (Bataan) as visualized in General Wainwright's radiogram. If it is to be destroyed, it should be upon the actual field of battle taking full toll from the enemy. To this end, I had long ago prepared a comprehensible plan to endeavor to cut a way out if food or ammunition failed. This plan contemplated an ostentatious artillery preparation on the left by the I Corps as a feint artillery preparation on the left by the I Corps, then a sudden surprise attack on the right by the II Corps. This movement to be made in conjunction with the full tank strength and with the maximum artillery concentration with heavy guns running forward under cover of darkness the night before, so that their fire would reach and cover an infantry advance as far as possible toward the Dinalupihan-Olongapo Road; this road to be seized and the II Corps to thrust with all speed and force due West taking the enemy's Subic Bay positions, simultaneously with a frontal attack by the I Corps. If successful, the supplies seized at this base will rectify the situation. This would permit them to operate in Central Luzon where food supplies could be obtained and where they could still protect Bataan and the Northern approaches to Corregidor. If the movement is not successful and our forces defeated many increments there or after inflicting important losses upon the enemy, they could escape through the Zambales Mountains and continue guerilla warfare in conjunction with forces now operating in the north.

Simultaneously aggressive action within their capabilities would be launched by both the Visayan force and the Mindanao Force. I had not informed General Wainwright of this plan as I feared it might tend to shake his morale and determination. I shall however, in view of his radiogram to you, inform him there-of in the near future. I would be very glad if you believe it advisable to attempt myself to rejoin this command, temporarily, and take charge of this movement. The pressure on this situation could be immeasurably relieved if a naval task force, with its own air protection, could make some kind of threat in that general direction. The long series of disasters in the Pacific Theater can be traced basically to one cause: the unopposed control of the sea lanes by the Japanese. Until this condition is remedied, these disasters will continue. Line of communications control is fundamental either on land or sea. Enemy control has been complete up to the present time. I know how desperately you are pressed for reinforcements and supplies in all areas and I do not, repeat, do not intend to harass you by requisitions that cannot be accomplished. It would however tend to relieve the dangers here, if without delay, a small force of say nine B-17 bombers could immediately be made available instead awaiting the normal flow as now anticipated. Please inform me as soon as possible of any modifications you may desire in the plan I have outlined.

Several days ago I informed General Wainwright about the contemplated air attack but will not convey further instructions until I hear from you.
I have complete and instantaneous communication with General Wainwright and all the forces in the Phillipine Islands and I believe that greater rapidity of action and more complete coordination of command can be achieved if he routes his communications, except for routine administration matters, through my headquarters rather than direct to the War Department.

I have no doubt that efficiency and speed will be accomplished if a clear channel of communications is established from Wainwright to MacArthur, and then to Washington.

I am still operating under my old designation as Supreme Commander of the United States Army Forces in the Far East and will continue to do so, until I receive your directive with reference to the Southwest Pacific Area.

My relationships with the Australian authorities are of the utmost cordiality and they are adopting, without reservation, all suggestions I make. Their forces are being reorganized and regrouped and every possible step within the means available in being taken to place this area in a posture of secure defense.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur
Supreme Commander
United States Armed Forces of the Far East
(USAFFE)