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"THE 1ST REGULAR DIVISION
IN THE
BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINES"

by
MAJOR ALFREDO M. SANTOS, Inf, PA
7 June 1947

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The 1st Regular division in the battle of the Philippines, by Maj A. M. Santos, Philippine Army. CGSC. 1946-47.
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"THE 1st REGULAR DIVISION IN THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINES"

by

ALFREDO M. SANTOS
Major, Infantry
Philippine Army

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OUTLINE FOR

"THE 1ST REGULAR DIVISION (PA) IN THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINES"

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INTRODUCTION

The last global conflict has conclusively proven the controlling influence of LOGISTICS in modern warfare.

In the preparation of this analytical study, I have two purposes in mind: (1) to present a perfect demonstration of the failure to appreciate the necessity of exhaustive logistical planning in peacetime preparation for war and, more important, of providing the means necessary to execute such plans; (2) to show the unsoundness of unbalanced planning in which the logistical side had not been as thoroughly and carefully planned as had the strategical and tactical side.

The Philippine Campaign of 1941-1942 was a colossal failure of LOGISTICS,- a strategic and tactical attempt to do something with logistical nothing. It is a failure from which, surely, we can all learn a lesson -- that of PREPAREDNESS. It is unbelievable that America which raised , trained, equipped and maintained an army of 8 million men to victory, the "arsenal of democracy" from which the suffering peoples of the world, and the armed forces of the United Nations drew sustenance, power and support, could not have done similarly to 80,000 fighting men who defended her flag during those fateful months after Pearl Harbor. It was not, therefore, a question of not having the supplies and equipment at all, but rather, that they were not there when needed. Those in the Philippines could not be blamed for the inadequacy of supplies for this catastrophe,- they did their very best under the circumstances. They fought with what they had, little as it was. For their sufferings, their sacrifice and their anguish most of them are now dead.

Motivated by the sincere desire not to see again the calvary of Bataan and Corregidor repeated, I have endeavored to picture the terrible plight of these gallant defenders and the tremendous handicaps under which they fought, in the hope that it would help to crystallize in the mind of the reader the vital necessity of exhaustive logistical planning and adequate stock-piling in peacetime preparation for war.

THE 1ST REGULAR DIVISION (PHIL.ARMY) IN THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

I. THE PHILIPPINES

A. History and Geography[1]. The Phlippines was discovered on March 16,1521 by Ferdinand Magellan who claimed it for Spain. Colonization work was begun in 1565, when Legaspi, the first governor of the Philippines, captained an expedition to the Philippines. Manila, the capital, was not occupied until 1570. The Spaniards governed the Philippines until 1898, that is, for a period of about 370 years. In 1896 the Filipinos rose in revolt and for a time controlled the country.

In 1898 shortly after the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, an American fleet under Admiral Dewey sailed for the Philippines and won a decisive victory over the Spanish naval forces in the famous Battle of Manila Bay. For a time the insurgent forces and the American Army cooperated against the common enemy. Shortly afterwards the entire country passed under the control of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, and a war of liberation was fought by the Filipinos for over two years. Superior force compelled the Filipinos to accept the sovereignity of the United States.

As a sequel, civil government was established in 1901. Political autonomy was gradually and progressively extended to the Filipinos, the tendency prevailing throughout the American regime being towards self-government and eventual independence.

Beginning with the Treaty of Paris in 1898 clearly defined steps in that direction have been taken, such as President McKinley's instructions to the Commission (1900), the Philippine Bill (1902), the Philippine Autonomy Act or otherwise known as the Jones Law (1916), which promises eventual independence, and culminates with the Tydings-McDuffie Law (1934) which in turn provides that ten years after the Constitution of the Philippines has been approved by the Filipino people and the President of the United States, the Commonwealth Government organized, and the President and other officials have been installed, the Filipinos will enjoy complete political liberty. The Commonwealth Government was established on November 15, 1935.

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[1] War Department Pamphlet No. 31-3 "Facts and Figures About the Philippines" 24 November 1944, pp. 1-6

In accordance with the provisions of the Independence Act, the Commonwealth Government was inaugurated with Hon. Manuel L. Quezon and Hon. Sergio Osmeña as first President and Vice-President respectively. In 1942 the Philippines was overrun and occupied by the Japanese forces. After the liberation of the country in 1945, the Commonwealth Government was reestablished by General MacArthur; and on July 4, 1946, as previously agreed upon, the Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated with Hon. Manuel Roxas and Hon. Elpidio Quirino as first President and Vice-President respectively.

The Philippines lies a few hundred miles to the southeast of the great continent of Asia, north of the Dutch and British Island of Borneo, and south of the island of Formosa. It consists of 7,100 islands extending in the form of a huge triangle 1,152 miles from north to south and 688 statute miles from east to west. Only 2,773 of the islands have names. The northernmost island, known as Y'Ami Island, is 65 miles from Formosa; while the southernmost island, called Salwag, which is 4°40' north of the equator, is only 30 miles east of Borneo. The total land area of the country is about 115,600 square miles or 299,404 square kilometers[1]. This is larger that the combined area of the States of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware. It is about two-thirds the size of Spain; around 7,000 square miles smaller than the British Isles; 5,000 square miles larger than Italy; and more than twice as large as either Java or Cuba. The Island of Luzon alone is as large as Denmark, Belgium and Holland combined; and Mindanao is about the size of Portugal.

B. Climate and Population[2]. Lying within the Tropics, the Philippines has a truly tropical climate--warm days and usually cool nights. The most delightful months are November, December, January, February, and March. The days are clear sunny, and dry, with a mean average temperature of 78°F (25.5°C), and the minimum temperature early in the morning is 17°F (9.5°C) lower than the maximum in the afternoon.

The climate of the Philippines is among the best in the Tropics. Generally speaking, it is agreeably warm, with beautiful early mornings, pleasant late afternoons, and cool nights, although there are some places in the country which

[1] Census Atlas of the Phil.(Vol. V Census of the Phil.1939)Manila 1940 p.11

[2] War Dept. Pamphlet No.31-3."Facts and Figures About the Phil",24 November 1944,pp. 6-9.

cannot strictly be so described. December,January, February, and March are months nearly so ideal. Even in the months of April and May, many parts of the country,especially Manila, enjoy a cool breeze during some hours of the day. The rest of the year is rainy.

During the hot season the months are dry and warm with a maximum day temperature of 91°-92° F (33°-34° C) and a minimum night temperature of 70°-73° F (21°-24° C). Sunstroke is unknown in the Philippines.

The total population of the Philippines was 7,635,426 according to the census of 1903 and 10,314,310 according to the census of 1918. The population in 1935 has been estimated at 13,000,000. The present population has been estimated by the Census Commission to be about 18,000,000.

On the basis of the above figures, the average density of the population per square mile was 67 in 1903, 90 in 1918, and 132 in 1935. The population, however, is unevenly distributed throughout the provinces and ranges (1935) from a density of 628 per square mile in Cebu and 576 in Iloilo to 15 in the Province of Agusan,Mindanao, and 13.5 in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya,Luzon. The Provinces of Pampanga and Pangasinan in the central plain of Luzon have a population density of 361 compared with 34 for the entire island of Mindanao. The Filipinos as a people have settled chiefly in areas along the coast rather than in the fertile valleys in the interior.

According to 1935 estimates the foreign population of the country are as follows: Chinese, 100,000; Japanese, 18,000; Americans, 8,000; and Europeans,6,000. The Europeans are largely Spanish and English.

Three general racial types--pygmy, Indonesian, and Malay--inhabit the Philippines. The pygmies are probably the aboriginals, but at present there are comparatively only few of them--perhaps about 60,000--and they are living in rather inaccessible places throughout the Islands. The Indonesians are settled principally in the islands of Luzon and Mindanao and number approximately 200,000. The Indonesians are also a pagan, tribal people, though less primitive than the pygmies.

The major portion of the population in the Philippines consists mostly of Malayans. On the basis of their religious belief, the Filipinos of Malay stock may be divided into three groups--pagans,Mohammedans, and Christians. Several pagan tribes of semicivilized Malays, numbering about 200,000 inhabit the mountainous regions of northern Luzon. The Moros, or Malays who are adherents of the Mo-

hammedan religion, are concentrated chiefly in Mindanao and in the Sulu Archipelago. They are estimated to number around 500,000.

The Filipinos of Malay extraction who are adherents of the Christian religion constitute over 93 percent of the total population. They are the dominant people in the Philippines, and from their number are derived most of the agricultural and industrial laborers, the business and professional men, the educators, and the social and political leaders of the country.

C. Language, Education and Religion[1]. English and Spanish are the languages universally used in the country. As a general rule, however, a tourist who speaks English can travel in any part of the Philippines without the necessity of knowing any other language, because all of the officials and employees of the Government speak English or at least understands the language.

For the purpose of carrying out the constitutional mandate enjoining the adoption of a national language based upon one of the existing native tongues, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 184 which provides for the establishment of the Institute of National Language. After making an exhaustive study of the numerous Philippine tongues, the Institute recommended Tagalog, a dialect widely spoken throughout the country, to be the basis of the national language of the Philippines. On December 30, 1937, the Tagalog dialect was officially proclaimed by the President as the basis for the adoption of the national language of the Philippines. The Institute of National Language is at present busy preparing a Filipino language dictionary and other materials needed for teaching the national language. It will not be very long before this new national language will be universally spoken for it is being taught in all schools in the Islands.

The oldest university under the American flag is found in the Philippines. In 1611 there was established in Manila the Pontifical University of Santo Tomas, the first one of its kind in the Far East. It is twenty-five years older than Harvard University, the oldest university in the United States.

There are eight universities in the Philippines: the government-owned University of the Philippines, with branches in Baguio, Cebu and Vigan; the University of Santo Tomas which is run by the Dominican Friars; the University of Manila; the National University; the Centro Escolar University; the Philippine Women's University; the Far Eastern University; and the Silliman University operated by the Protestant Mission. There are 744 private schools, 60 of which are

[1]War Dept Pamphlet No.31-3,"Facts and Figures About the Phil"24Nov1944pp.9-18

in Manila.

The ramarkably efficient system of public education established in the Philippines since the beginning of the American administration has steadily advanced, and English is now spoken in every nook and corner of the country. There were 9,489 primary public schools, 1,316 intermediate schools, 114 secondary schools, and 5 junior colleges, or a total of 10,924 public schools, which had an annual enrollment in 1938 of 1,738,868 children taught by 28,485 teachers. The primary enrollment for 1936 was 999,769 as compared with 979,693 for 1935, and the intermediate enrollment for 1936 was 201,905 as compared with 193,894 children for 1935. In 1936 there were in the Philippines 137,187 children enrolled in private schools, making a total of 1,876,055 representing 54 per cent of the school population. Since the enrollment in the primary grades is much greater than in the higher grades, about 67 per cent of the children of primary school age are now enrolled in the schools.

For the purpose of eliminating illiteracy and giving vocational and citizenship training to the people above school age, the Office of Adult Education was created in 1936 and adult schools were opened in many parts of the Philippines immediately thereafter. Instruction in such schools is given in eleven major dialects. Practical education in home-gardening, home-making, poultry-raising, sanitation, hygiene and citizenship has done much to improve the social conditions of the people and elevate their moral standards.

Textbooks and other reading materials for the diffusion of cultural and vocational information to the people are given free. Books were prepared especially for men and women who have had no opportunity to attend the regular schools. The teaching of adults is handled by public-spirited citizens who voluntarily offer their services to conduct classes.

Part of the campaign to reduce illiteracy is the instruction in home-making and child-rearing given to the women in an effort to teach them the duties and responsibilities attached to their positions as mothers, wives and housekeepers. There are at present approximately 100 special classes for women with a total enrollment of nearly 2,500.

At the end of December,1938, there were 2,057 adult schools established throughout the Philippines, with a total enrollment of 125,783 taught by 28,940 volunteers teachers. Besides these adult schools, 107 cadres of the Philippine Army also conducted adult classes among illiterate trainees in 1938. As a result of the instruction given in such classes, 5,579 illiterates have been made literate.

D. Agriculture and Commerce[1]. The Philippines is primarily an agricultural country. The country is favored with soil and climatic conditions which are adapted to the growing of agricultural products. The principal crops are rice, abaca (Manila hemp), sugar cane, coconut, tobacco, corn, and maguey. About 80 per cent of the goods exported from the Philippines are agricultural products, mainly sugar, coconut products, abaca, and tobacco products.

Sugar.-The Philippines is one of the major sugar-producing countries of the world. This country follows India, Java, the Japanese, and the United States in the order of their importance. In 1936 the total area planted to sugar cane was 250,750 hectares. The production of centrifugal sugar by the sugar centrals during 1935-1936 was 876,983 long tons. The production for 1936-1937 is estimated at 1,004,449 long tons. The quota of 973,000 short tons allowed by the Tydings-McDuffie Law represents roughly 65 per cent of the normal milling capacities of the centrals. At present , sugar is the leading export product of the Philippines, the value of sugar shipments representing 35 per cent of all Philippine exports. It has been extimated that 2,000,000 people are dependent upon the sugar industry, in which the capital invested is placed at around P450,000,000, and contributes about 40 per cent of the total revenues of the Government.

Coconut.The Philippines is the second largest producer of coconut in the world, being excelled only by the Netherlands East Indies, and is the world's principal exporter of coconut products with about one-third of the world copra trade to its credit. The coconut palm is grown in every province, and for the year ending June 30, 1937, 635,940 hectares, or around 25 per cent of the cultivated area of the country, were devoted to this crop. In point of area under cultivation, the coconut industry ranks second in importance, being surpassed only by rice. Philippine coconut products are at present exported to 24 countries. There are about 4,000,000 people dependent upon the industry, in which more than P 300,0000,000 is invested. Revenues derived from the industry have estimated at P 7,000,000.

Abaca.- The Philippines still enjoys a virtual monopoly of abaca production in the world. The plant has been introduced into several countries that are tropical, but no fiber produced in any other country has yet equalled the

[1]War Dept Pamphlet No.31-3"Facts and Figures About the Phil" 24 November 1944,pp.21-26.

best Philippine grade. In 1937 the Philippines had 502,710 hectares planted to abaca, and the fiber rpoduction for the year amounted to 200,627 metric tons. Although about 15 per cent of the country's cultivated area is devoted to abaca culture, it ranks third among Philippine exports, it being surpassed only by sugar and coconut products. About 2,500,000 people are directly or indirectly dependent upon the industry, and the investment in the business total P95,000,000. The industry gives the Philippine Government an average income of aboutP2,000,000 annually.

Tobacco.-Introduced into the Philippines by Spanish missionaries, the tobacco industry grew rapidly in this country. Late in the 18th century it became so important that the Spanish government made a monopoly of it. It was then the greatest source of revenue, yielding practically one-half of the income of the colonial government. Although the monopoly ended in 1882, the industry continued to grow, and Manila cigars have become very popular in the tobacco world. At present over 600,000 people are dependent upon the tobacco business in the Islands. Investments in the industry amount to approximately P30,000,000. While 2 per cent of the cultivated area of the country is planted to tobacco, tobacco continues to be the fifth leading item in our export trade. The Philippines ranks seventh among world tobacco producers, supplying tobacco products to over 40 countries. In 1937 the country produced 725,000 quintals of tobacco leaf (a quintal is equivalent to 46 kilos) from an area of 74,040 hectares. In 1937, 319,393,533 cigars were produced, of which 188,791,471 were exported to the United States and to other countries 18,253,242. Shipment of cigarettes during that year totalled 38,004,750 and of tobacco leaf, 11,138,560 kilos.

Rice.- Rice constitutes the staple food of the Philippines. The area at present cultivated to rice, which amounts to approximately 2,000,000 hectares, represents 48 per cent of the area planted to leading crops. Palay is grown in every province of the Philippines, but principally in the Provinces of Nueva Ecija and Pangasinan. During the year 1937 a total of 55,015,730 cavans of palay was produced and it was valued at P134,395,190. But due to the insufficiency of local production, rice had to be imported from abroad.

Corn.- Corn largely supplants rice in the diet of the people of Cebu, Bohol, Oriental Negros, Western Leyte and northern Mindanao. Over half a million hectares are annually cultivated for the production of corn. In 1937, corn production amounted to 7,678,080 cavans valued at P17,983,350.

Maguey.- The cultivation of maguey was begun during the Spanish regime. Maguey is produced chiefly in the Ilocos provinces, Cebu, and Bohol. In 1937 there was a total production of 424,840 piculs valued at pl,969,260.

Other Products.-Other agricultural products grown in the Philippines are the following: bananas, sweet potatoes, mangoes, cassava, lanzones, cacao, pineapples, papayas, coffee, rubber, peanuts, kapok, lumbang, pilinuts, mandarin, sugar apples, oranges, pomelos, chicos, soursops, custard apples, cotton, castor beans, and Irish potatoes.

Vegetables.- More than 100 varieties of vegetables are grown in the Philippines. Among the most important are the following: tomatoes, eggplants, cabbages, radishes, pechay, lettuce, cauliflowers, onions, and beans. The local supply of vegetables is not yet sufficient to meet the big demand. Importation of vegetables amounts to around two million pesos annually.

Foreign Commerce.-The overseas trade of the Philippines has been progressing rapidly during the four decades under the American administration. The peak was registered in 1929 when the total trade aggregated P623,214,234, of which P328,893,685 represented the value of exports, the highest on record, and that of imports, P294,320549. Imports reached the highest mark in 1920 when they registered P298.876,565. On account of the extremely low prices of Philippine staple products during 1938, the total trade amounted to only P496,805,649. The value of exports, including gold, totalled only P231,590,554 compared with that of 1937 of P302,532,500, or a decrease of 23.4 percent Imports, on the other hand, amounted to P265,215,095 as against P218,051,490 the previous year, or an increase of 26.1 per cent.

The greater portion of the trade is carried on with the United States. Ever since commercial relations between the United States and the Philippines began, the former has been an important outlet for Philippine exports. Free trade with the United States which was established in 1909 stimulated the export trade of the Philippines, so that the American market is today, as ever, the most important outlet of Philippine products. Being mainly and industrial and manufacturing country, the United States is an excellent export field for raw materials and other tropical products of the Philippines. It is not surprising, therefore, that around 81 per cent of the Philippines annual export find their way to that vast and profitable market.

The value of Philippine imports from the United States totalled, in 1938, P180,714,457, or the third highest in the history of Philippine-American trade relations. The annual average value of the imports for the last five years from 1934 to 1938 is P129,549,482. The United States in 1938 supplied 68 per cent of the total imports, the highest percentage on record.

The value of Philippine products exported to the United States in 1938 amounted to P178,889,989, which was very much lower than the annual average of P193,796,977 during the five-year period 1934-1938 inclusive. Exports to the United States made up 77 per cent of the total export to all countries.

Thus the Philippines ia not only a good source of raw materials for the United States but also a valuable and growing market for American goods. The increasing sales of Philippine exports in the United States have made possible the remarkable increase in the importation of American products to the Philippines. It is evident, therefore, that the United States plays a dominant role, not only in the export trade of the Philippines, but also in the import trade.

The principal exports of the Philippines to the United States and the corresponding values in 1938 are sugar, P100,005,372; coconut oil, P20,706,682; copra, P16,209,171; embroideries, P10,140,052; desiccated coconut, P7,621,299; abaca, P4,863,229; tobacco and tobacco products, P6,335,251; canned pineapples, P2,129,466; copra meal, P1,574,857; lumber and timber, P1,558,711; and cutch, P728,743.

The leading imports of the Philippine and their values in 1938 are as follows: iron and steel products, P45,792,343; cotton goods, P43,812,099; automobiles and trucks, including accessories and tires, P16,238,169; mineral oils, P15,818,175; tobacco products, P15,866,881; paper and its manufactures, P10,378,349; electrical machinery, apparatus, and its appliances, P7,607,766; chemicals, drugs, dyes, and medicines, P8.881,410; meat and dairy products, P11,979,278; wheat flour, P10,263,300; fruits and nuts, P3,449,635; and fertilizers, P2,967,146.

Japan is the second leading market as well as the second principal supplier of imported goods of the Philippines. The value of exports during 1939 amounting to P15,026,342 made up 6.49 per cent of the total exports. The annual average value of Philippine exports to Japan for the five years from 1934 to 1938 was P14,216,950. Imports of the Philippine from Japan in 1938 totalled P25,414,083, which represented 9.58 per cent of the total imports. The annual average during the last five years was P25,836,424.

The leading exports of the Philippines to Japan, in the order of importance, are abaca, iron ore, lumber and timber, copper ore, manganese ore, tobacco products, maguey, canton fiber, and ramie fiber.

In exchange for these products, the Philippines imported from Japan cotton goods, silk and its manufactures, iron and steel manufactures, vegetables, fish and fish products, glass and glassware, coal and coke, cement, hats and caps, and India rubber and its manufactures.

Great Britain is at present the third leading buyer of the Philippines and the seventh among the important sellers to the Islands. The value of the exports to Great Britain totalled only P6,017,116 in 1938 compared with twelve million over (P12,456,196) in 1937. The 1938 figure is very much below the annual average value for the five years from 1934 to 1938 inclusive which was P7,493,108. Imports during the year amounted to P5,432,927 as against the annual average value for the last five years of P4,666,020.

The Philippines exports to Great Britain abaca, lumber and timber, hats, maguey, tobacco and its manufactures, canton fibers, gums and resins, and shells and its manufactures. The leading imports of the Philippines from that country are the following: cotton goods; iron and steel manufactures; spirits, wines and liquors; vegetable fibers and its manufactures; wool and its manufactures; and silk goods and oils.

Netherlands is the fourth leading market of the Philippines and ranks sixth among the suppliers of Philippine imports. Exports to that country were valued at P5,082,032, or nearly doubled that of the annual average value of P2,848,116 of the 1934-1938 period. Imports from that country totalled, in 1938, P5,833,732 compared with the annual average value of the last five years of P3,661,795.

Among the leading products exported to Netherlands may be mentioned copra, copra meal, abaca, coconut oil, tobacco and its manufactures, maguey, lumber and timber, and knotted hemp. The principal imports of the Philippines from Netherlands are dairy products, fertilizers, cotton goods, meat products, paper and its manufactures, electrical machinery, diamonds and other precious stones, iron and steel goods, flavoring extracts, and spirits, wines and liquors.

France ranks fifth among the leading markets of the Philippines although she occupies only the twelfth among the principal suppliers of the Philippines. The value of the exports in 1938 reached P3,184,007 as against an an-

nual average value of the 1934-1938 period amounting tp P3,065,275. Imports from that country during the year 1939 amounted to P2,104,958 compared with annual average of P3, 465, 276 of the period of 1934 to 1938.

France imports from the Philippines abaca, copra, tobacco and its manufactures, maguey, copra meals, gums and resins, hats and canton fiber. The Philippines, in turn, buys from France cotton goods, iron and steel manufactures, perfumery and other toilet preparations, diamonds and other precious stones, silk and its manufactures, spirits, wines and liquors, and paper and its manufactures.

The other leading buyers of the Philippines are Germany with an annual average value of P2,862,136 for the five years of 1934 to 1938 inclusive; Spain, P2,419,413; China P1,956,107; Hongkong, P1,475,430; and Italy, P1,226,224.

Germany ranks third among the leading exporters to the Philippines. The value of Philippine imports from Germany in 1938 amounted to P8,309,238 which is greater than the annual average value of P7,185,464 of the 1934-1938 period.

China occupies the fourth position among the principal suppliers of the Philippines. The value of Philippine purchases from China in 1938 totalled P6,150,669 compared with an annual average value of P5,924,394 for the five years from 1934 to 1938.

The other principal sellers to the Philippines are the Dutch East Indies of which the annual average value of Philippine purchases for the last five years was P4,070,271; British East Indies, P4,069,052; Australia,P3,922,787; and Belgium, P2,147,403.

Sugar constitutes the most important export of the Philippines, the value of which amounted to P100,044,047 in 1938, or made up 43 per cent of the value of all exports. The annual average value of sugar during the last five years was P106,597,720. Around 99.9 per cent of the total annual export are shipped to the United States.

The other nine leading exports of the Philippines with the corresponding values in 1938 and the annual average values for the last five years (in parenthesis) are as follows: copra, P24,512,028 (P25,133,181); coconut oil, P21,532,910 (P25,685,281); abaca, P20,218,347 (P27,609,197); embroideries, P10,215,802,(P8,325,569); tobacco and its manufactures, P9,929,279(P10,555,250); desiccated coconut, P7,632,715, (P8,310762); lumber and timber,P5,650,541, (P5,820,462); copra meal, P5,495,086,(P4,067,121); and iron ore,P4,080,645, (P2,154,885). Gold bullion exports in 1938 amounted to P60,875,883 compared

with an annual average of P27,056,126 during the last five years.

The other important exports of the Philippines worth mentioning are copper ore, cordage, chrome ore, lard and butter substitutes, manganese ore, cutch, maguey, hats, gums and resins, buntal fiber, hides and skins, shells and its manufactures, knotted hemp, distilled spirits, fish and fish products, fruits and nuts, and molasses and syrup.

The Philippines ia a great importer of manufactured products. The twelve major imports, together with their corresponding value, in 1938,compared with the annual average valuefor the last five years (in parenthesis) are as follows: iron and steel and manufactures thereof,P45,792,343,(P32,300,935); cotton goods,P43,812,099,(P34,219,698); mineral oils, P15,818,175,(P14,411,017); automobiles and trucks including accessories and tires,P16,238,169,(P11,827,052); tobacco products, P15,866,881 (P8,624,551): paper and its manufactures,P10,378,349 (P7,489,506); wheat flour, P10,263,300 (P7,465,437);dairy products,P8,948,784 (P7,300,044); chemicals, drugs, dyes,and medicines,P8,881,410(P6,029,876);electrical machinery, apparatus, and appliances, P7,607,766 (P5,788,165); and silk and its manufactures, P6,530,109 (5,589,053).

It may be mentioned in passingthat the Philippines is among the best markets for American products. This country is first in the consumption of United States cotton manufactures, dairy products, cigarettes, canned sardines, wheat flour, toilet preparations, and automobile tires. The Philippines is also the fourth customer of the United States in total leather and manufactures, and in vegetables and preparations thereof, and third in rayon goods and its manufactures. It is also among the first ten buyers in other items, like meat products, natural silk andits manufactures, fruits and nuts, iron and steel manufactures, medicinal amd pharmaceutical preparations, and paints, pigments and varnishes.

The Tydings-McDuffie Law, contains provisions which limit the exports of Philippine sugar, coconut and cordage to the United States. Sugar exports are limited to 50,000 long tons (refined) and to 800,000 long tons (unrefined), while cordage and oil shipments are limited to 3,000,000 pounds and 200,000 long tons, respectively. The quota for cordage was, however, increased to six million pounds by a subsequent Act of Congress amending the limitation on cordage free of duty. The Independence Act also provides for the imposition of an export tax on Philippine exports to the United States after the fifth year of the Commonwealth.

The Philippines is fortunate, however, to be assured of a preferential treatment in the American market even after the date of independence. This assurance is based on the report of the Joint preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs. Appropriate legislation based on the recommandations of the JPCPA were enacted by Congress. An important deviation from the provisions of the Independence Act is to be found in the recommendations which would exempt some exports like cigars, scrap tobacco, cigar ends and filler tobacco, embroideries, and coconut oil from the present export tax. The Committee, however, has recommended, except in the case of embroideries, the refusal of free quotas, while the quota on cordage after the expiration of the Cordage Act on May 1,1941, would be no longer absolute and should be exclusive of twine. For statistical purposes and for other reasons as well, the export taxes are to go into effect on January 1, 1941, instead of November 15, 1940, as provided for in the Independence Act.

Commercial Possibilities.-The Philippines, because of its strategic position in the international commercial routes in the Far East, can serve as a convenient distributing point for the Asiatic trade expecially of the United States. It lies in the very center of the Far East--the important countries from Australia in the south and Japan and Siberia on the north form almost a semicircle with Manila in the middle.

Fishing is one of the most important industries in the Philippines, but the methods of fishing, preserving, and transporting the fish products are still crude. Along the coasts food fishes are found in abundance. Almost 2,000 kinds of fish , most of which are edible, are found in Philippine waters. The fishing industry would be highly profitable if scientific deep-sea fishing and modern methods of fish-canning and preservation be adopted.

The Philippines is rich in minerals. Among the more important minerals and mineral products which occur in greater or lesser quantities are the following: gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, iron, manganese, chromium; coal, petroleum, asphalt, and related bituments; asbestos, gypsum, mineral waters, gauno and phosphate rock, salt, sulphur, cement, clay products, lime, and building and ornamental stone. At the present time, gold is by far the most important of the minerals produced.

Fish, vegetable, and fruit canning are developed to a certain extent, though the excessive production of fish, vegetables, and fruits at certain seasons, not to speak of the greater production that would doubtless result through the development of the canning industry, would be sufficient to maintain several

large canneries.

Marine products, such as pearls, coral shells, sponges, trepangs, and many others, all of which are found in abundance in Philippine waters, are little developed.

Soil and climatic conditions make the Philippines an ideal place for the cultivation of rubber. It is believed that the extensive areas suitable for growing rubber in Mindanao and in the island of Basilan can supply the entire world demand for rubber. At present the rubber is barely developed. More capital is needed to develop the extensive potential rubber plantations of the Philippines.

Lumber, rattan, gums, resins, and other minor forest products offer great opportunities to investors.

Domestic Trade.- Although no exact data on the annual total value of the domestics trade in the Philippines is available, it has been extimated that it falls between P2,000,000,000 and P3,000,000,000, which is more than three times greater than the annual value of the export trade. The domestic trade in this country consists principally of three activities: (1) the assembling and moving of local crops, like abaca, copra, tobacco, sugar, rice, and other products from the places of production to the export centers; (2) the distribution of imported articles; and (3) the selling of domestic products and native wares to local consumers. So the merchandise which enters into the domestic commerce consists chiefly of domestic products for export, import products for domestic consumption, and domestic products for domestic consumption. The first two groups make up the bulk of domestic commerce although domestic products for local consumption are rapidly becoming an important factor.

Manila is the principal distribution center for all classes of supplies and merchandise with the ports of entry (Cebu, Iloilo, Legaspi, Davao, and Zamboanga) as minor centers. Between these places and the provincial centers goods pass eitherfor the foreign market or for local distribution.

The three channels of distribution are controlled by foreigners, particularly the Chinese who handle approximately seven per cent of the total volume of local business. They have built up an extensive commercial organization consisting of importers, wholesalers, middlemen, retailers, and buyers that practically covers the entire country and which seems to preclude successful competition.

Generally admitted as a weak point in the economic system of the country is the predominance of aliens in the retail merchandising field. The present Fi-

lipino participation in the retail business of the country is variously extimated to be from 15 to 20 per cent.

Various suggestions have been advanced to increase Filipino participation in retail trade. The latest measure intended to increase Filipino share in the retail business is the organization of consumers' cooperative association. Under the initiative and auspices of the Bureau of Commerce, the Consumers' Cooperative League of the Philippines has been organized to push thru the consumers' coopetative movement in the country. Recently Congress of the Republic of the Philiip-pines passed the following bills:

(1) The Labor Nationalization Bill requiring Chinese nationals to hire Filipinos to fill 60 percent of the jobs in Chinese firms.

(2) The Retail Trade Nationalization Bill which places in the hands of Filipinos the bulk of the retail trade in the Philippines.

(3) The Republic Act No. 37 which gives preference to Filipino citizens in the lease of public market stalls.

Manufacturing Industries.The Philippines is still in its industrial infancy. Outside of Manila and perhaps Iloilo City and Cebu City, the industries are generally of the household type with a few small factories.

At present Manila and to a limited extent Iloilo and Cebu boast of fairly large factories and industrial plants with all the modern equipment and facilities for mass production. Sugar centrals, rope factories, cigars and cigarettes factories, desiccated coconut factories, coconut oil mills, lumber mills, rice mills, vegetable lard and margarine factories, soft-drink factories, furniture factories, gold-producing plants, candy and confectionery establishments, embroidery shops, ice and electric plants, cordage factories, machinery and foundry establishments, shoe facories, soap factories, bakeries, and printing shops had been established in the last few years.

Fiber Hat Industry.- The hat industry, utilizing a number of Philippine fibers, is a million-peso unorganized household industry. The "Calasiao" hat made Pangasinan, the "Buntal" hat made in Baliuag and Lucban, the "Talibon" hat in Bohol, and the "Arayat" hat in Pampanga are derived from the buri palm. Other kinds of hats made from Philippine fibers are "pandan", "sabutan", rattan and "guinit" army hats. Exports of hats in 1938 amounted to P634,807 as compared with P933,190 in 1937.

Vegetable Lard and Butter.- The vegetable lard and butter(Oleomargarine) industry is still in the formative stage of development. At present there are

four or five firms manufacturing lard and margarine from coconut oil. The value of the exports in 1937 amounted to P1,523,689 and in 1938 it rose to the tune of P1,525,689.

Pearl Buttons.At present there are four factories manufacturing buttons from mother-of-pearl she;;s. The average production of buttons is placed at 1,000,000 gross (one gross equals 12 dozens). Exports in 1937 amounted to P549,020 but in 1938 the value dropped to P425,831.

Candy and Confectionery.- The candy and confectionery industry has grown gradually in this country and there are now fifteen candy factories in the City of Manila (before the war), three of which manufacture high-grade sweets and candies. A large variety of candies and confectioneries are being made locally and a bright future for the industry is seen, considering the abundance of sugar here.

Pineapple Canning.Only one pineapple-canning factory has been established so far. It is a branch of a big canning plant in California. It exported in 1937 P3,345,697 worth of canned pineapples and P2,129,480 in 1938.

Cutch.The Philippines has only one cutch factory. It is located in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, and has an average annual production of 6,000 tons. Exports in 1938 totalled 5,207 metric tons valued at P728,812 as against 5,586 metric tons worth P695,778 in 1936.

Embroidery.- Some thirty embroidery establishment in Manila have a total investment estimated at P8,000,000. The largest establishments are controlled by Americans, whose investments amount to P6,000,000. Exports in 1938 amounted to P10,215,802 as compared with P7,377,606 in 1937.

Cordage.- The five cordage factories have a spindle capacity of 57,024,000 pounds and actual capacity of 17,385,000 pounds of fiber. In 1938 the Philippines exported cordage totalling 6,947,136 kilos, as compared with 7,461,370 kilos in 1937.

Shoe.- There are in the Philippines four leather shoe factories, which are located in the City of Manila (before the war), and around 350 small shoe shops in the provinces. The factories have an investment of P8,000,000. Five rubber shoe establishments have so far been established and these have a capacity of 2,000,000 pairs annually.

Match.There is only one match factory in the Philippines and this produced 1,590,333 gross boxes in 1937, as comparedwith 1,312,827 in 1936.

Paints and Varnishes.-There are four establishment of paints and var-

nishes in the Philippines with a total outlut of approximately half a million pesos a year.

Rattan Furniture.- The manufacture of rattan furniture in this country saw substantial progress during the last two years. Exports of the product to United States, Panama, Hawaii, Canada, Australia, Guam, and other countries jumped from zero to P180,685 in 1936 and then to P374,020 in 1937. In 1938 the value amounted to P383,666.

Spirits, Wines, and Liquors.-The outlut of distilled spirits (alcohol) in 1937 amounted to 85,571,106 proof liters, of domestic wines (still) and imitation wines, 810,698 gauge liters, and of fermented liquors, 4,089,600 gauge liters.

Mining.-The Philippines is rich in minerals, both metallic and non-metallic. These minerals, occurring in greater or lesser quantities within the confines of the Archipelago, are as follows: gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, iron, manganese, and chronium; coal, petroleum, asphalt, phosphate rocks; asbestos, gypsum, mineral waters, salt, and sulphur; clay, limestone, and building and ornamental stones. Gold production in the Islands increased from P187,647 in 1907 to P2,645,784 in 1917 and to over P64,000,000 in 1938. The production of base-metal ores rose considerably in 1938, as shown by the increase in exports of iron, chromite, manganese, copper, and other ores. Copper ore exports jumped 6,054 kilos valued at P1,704 in 1936 to 15,413,540 kilos valued at P656,451 in 1937 and to 24,199,947 kilos valued at P1,283,301 in 1938. Chrome ore shipments ascended to 69,855,605 kilos valued at P1,542,452 in 1937 from 11,890,602 kilos valued at P307,518 the previous year. In 1938 chrome ore shipments totalled 66,910,869 kilos valued at P1,576,845. Manganese mining also showed considerable development in 1937 when exports totalled 12,206,278 kilos valued at P337,716, as compared with 254,972 kilos valued at P6,020 in 1936. In 1938 manganese ore exports jumped to 49,359,149 kilos valued at P999,189. Iron ore exports declined slightly from 654,455,921 kilos (P2,868,427) in 1936 to 601,188,220 kilos valued at P2,652,078 in 1937, but in the following year shipments rose to 910,952,276 kilos valued at P4,080,645. Lead ore shipments to Japan in 1937 amounted to 23,575 kilos valued at P2,700. In 1938 the United States took all of the lead ore exports amounting to 216,447 kilos valued at P11,611.

Lumber and Timber.- The lumber industry is one of the major industries of the Philippines, its rank being fourth in value of production and fifth in capital invested The total forest area of the Islands is estimated to be at over

17,757,000 hectares, or approximately 57 per eent of the total area of the country. Forest resources are developed undera license system The standing commercial timber is estimated at 464,470,000,000 board feet, the bulk of which consists of exported species, namely, "Tangile", Red Lauan", "Taiong", "Almon", "Bagtikan", "Mayapis", White Lauan", and "Palosapis", which are known abroad as PHILIPPINE MAHOGANY. Thirty-five years ago, the total timber production was only 46 million board feet, whereas in 1937 the timber cut was over the one billionth mark. About 77 percent of the annual production is consumed locally. In 1937 there were 131 sawmills in which P31,000,000 was invested. About 420,000 peolple are dependent upon the lumber and timber industry. The government derives an average income of over P2,000,000 from the lumber business.

Government Industrialization Program.- The Government is at present working out a program of industrial development of the country which was begun during the Commonwealth period but was interrupted by the war. To this end the administration created the National Economic Council, a body that is entrusted withthe functions of advising the Government of economic matters and financial problems and of formulating an economic program tending toward the stabilization of the national economy. To implement the schemes mapped out by the National Economic Council, the Government has reorganized the National Development Company, making it a public corporation with an authorized capital stock of P50,000,000, and empowering it to finance or establish industries that are necessary or important for the common welfare.

The National Development Company has established a highly flourishing cement factory. It has also established the National Rice and Corn Corporation, which has successfully stabilized the rice industry, and the National Produce Exchange, which aims to facilitate the marketing of Philippine staple products. It has created a subsidiary corporation , the National Food Products Corporation, which has for its purpose the development of fish, meat and dairy, and vegetable and fruit-canning industries. A fish-canning factory has been established in Guagua, Pampanga, where there are many fishponds. A can-making plant has been installed by the company. The National Development Company has also constructed a cotton-spinning plant for the purpose of producing cotton yarns for use in the home-weaving industry.

B. The Republic of the Philippines.- Article XVII, Section 1, Constitution of the Philippines (approved by the President of the United States on the 23rd day of March, nineteen hundred and thirty-five) provides: "The government esta-

blished by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignity of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines. Philippine independence was proclaimed, and the Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated on 4 July 1946. The government is republican in form based on the principle of the separation of powers which, under the Constitution , are the legislative, executive and judicial. Sovereignity resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. The executive power is vested in a President, the legislative in a Congress, which is bicameral, and the judicial in a Supreme Court and courts of inferior jurisdiction. At the head of the government is the President who exercises an all-embracing power over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, including provincial and municipal governments. In case the President dies, resigns, or is removed or unable to serve, his powers devolve upon the Vice-President who, like the President, is elected by the direct vote of the people. The President holds his office for four years with the right of reelection but cannot serve for more than two consecutive terms or eight years. The executive departments are those of Foreigh Affairs, Interior, National Defense, Finance, Public Instruction, Justice, Agriculture and Commerce, Public Works and Communications, and Labor, at the head of which are the Department Secretaries who are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress. Other executive offices are the General Auditing Office at the head of which is the Auditor General, the Bureau of Civil Service headed by the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Budget Office headed by the Commissioner of Budget, Census Commission headed by the Commissioner of Census, the Philippine Sugar Administration headed by the Administrator, and the Institute of National Language headed by the Director. All these officers are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

The legislative power of the Republic is vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The Senate is composed of twenty-four members who are elected at large by the direct vote of the people and serve for a period of six years. The House of Representatives is composed of not more than one hundred and twenty members, apportioned by provinces according population, who serve for a term of four years. The Senate is presided by a President while the House of Representatives by a Speaker.

The judicial power is lodged in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts

of First Instance, justice of the peace courts, and the municipal courts of chartered cities. All the justices and judges of these courts are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission of Appointments. The Philippines is divided into provinces and each province is divided into municipalities. The governing body of the provincial government is the Provincial Board composed of the Provincial Governor and two members who are all elected by the direct vote of the peolple in the province. The Municipal Council is the legislative body in a municipality, consisting of the Municipal Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and Councilors, whose number depends upon the class to which the municipality belongs. Like the Provincial Governor and the Board Members, the municipal officials are elected by direct vote of the qualified electors in their municipalities pality, and they hold their offices for three years.

Aside from the provincial and municipal governments, there are also under the Republic chartered cities, the governing body of which is a Municipal Board composed of councilors and a Mayor. The mayors are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission of Appointments, whereas the councilors are either elected or appointed depending upon the provisions of the charters.

II. NATIONAL DEFENSE.

A. The National Defense Act[1].-By virtue of the National Defense Act, enacted by the National Assembly on 31 December 1935, soon after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines on 15 November 1935, the Philippine Army was organized as a measure against foreign aggression. There are five basic principles embodied in the National Defense Act. These principles define the whole concept of the National Defense Act and reflect the spirit which motivated its enactment[2]:

First Basic Principle: Every citizen is obligated to the nation's defense, and that all individual and national resources may be used by the State in the interest of self-preservation. A provision is included that "no profit incident to war shall accrue to any individual, corporation, association or partnership".

Second Basic Principle: The national defense system nust provide actual security. "Security"is a relative term. President Quezon expressed it as follows: "Our program of national defense must serve notice upon the world that the citizens of these Islands are not to be subjugated; that conquest of this

1 Commonwealth Act No. 1 of the Philippines, 31 December 1935.
2 Joseph Ralston Hayden, "The Philippines", Chapter XXIX, and that, that

nation cannot be accomplished short of its utter destruction, and that, that destruction would involve such staggering cost to an aggressor, both in blood and gold, that even the boldest and the strongest will unerringly mark the folly of such an undertaking".

Third Basic Principle: That of current and future economy. This principle precludes "for the present at least" the development of a battle fleet and, in the opinion of the President, emphasizes the "passively defensive character" of the Philipiine military program.

Fourth Basic Principle: The necessity of a gradual rather the sudden growth of the required defense establishment. "Starting immediately, we must build economically and gradually, but steadily and surely, so as to attain within the time permitted us the highest possible efficiency at the lowest possible cost".

Fifth Basic Principle: The need for skillfully moulding the Commonwealth's security arrangements to fit the particular needs of the Philippines, to be accomplished by grant of wide administrative authority to the Chief Executive in carrying out the expressed purposes of the National Assembly.

In compliance with the provisions of the National Defense Act, the Philippine Army, with the Philippine Constabulary as nucleus, was organized. The country was divided into ten Military Districts in accordance with territorial groupings and in proportion to population. In the early part of January 1936, young men 20 years of age allover the country were required to register. By the middle of 1936 compulsory military training for the first batch of 40,000 young men started in full swing in training cadres established in the ten Military Districts.

B. The United States Armed Forces in the Far East.(USAFFE).-The United States Armed Forces in the Far East were composed of the regular United States Army with some units of the National Guard and Marines stationed in the Philippines, the Philippines Scouts, the Asiatic Squadron, and the Philippine Army.

The Philippine Army.-The Philippine Army consists of the Regular Force, the Reserve Force, the Offshore Patrol and the Air Force. The Regular Force is composed of the Infantry, the Cavalry, the Field Artillery, the Coast Artillery, the Engineer Corps, the Signal Corps, and the General Staff Corps. The Reserve Force consists of citizen-soldiers between the ages of 21 and 50 who have been trained for military service for which a conscription system has been followed

to insure a well-trained reserve citizen army in case of national emergency. The peacetime strength of the Regular Forse is placed, at present, at 1850 officers and approximately 35,000 enlisted men; in January 1941 there were 466 officers and 3,666 enlisted men. In January 1941 the Reserve Force was 132,000 men or approxiamtely 13 infantry divisions all trained under competent officers of the Regular Force and borrowed officers from the United States Army. The Reserve Force is to be augmented every year by 40,000 men who had received five and one half months military training. At the end of 1937, two semi-annual classes of trainees, numbering 36,601 selected by lot from a register of all men twenty-one years of age had been trained and transferred to the reserve. During 1938, 32,247 additional reserves were trained. In January 1940 General MacArthur stated that 30,000 trainees would be trained each year; that by 1946, the "citizen army" would be some 40 divisions or approximately 400,000 men , and that in the ensuing twenty years it would reach its presently intended maximum of 90 divisions of almost 1,000,000 men, allocating 9 divisions for each of the ten Military Districts comprising the whole country. By the spring of 1941, 40-60 planes had been acquired by the Philippine Army, mostly training ships, and two patrol Q-boats. The organization plan called for 100 trained military pilots by 1946 and 30 patrol Q-boats.

During the early part of 1936, the Philippine Military Acadeny patterned after West Point was established in Baguio, and by June of the same year it started functioning. It absorbed the senior class of the Philippine Constabulary Academy and admitted its first batch of cadets. Simultaneously, ROTC units were organized in all universities and colleges. Graduates of the Philippine Military Academy, graduates of the advanced ROTC units, and those of the Reserve Officers' Service School and the School for Reserve Commission, together with the officers of the Philippine Constabulary who were transferred to the Army, formed the Officers' Corps.

Under the National Defense Plan, P160,000,000 were to be appropriated during the proposed ten years of operation, costing the government P16,000,000 yearly and training 400,000 trainee-soldiers after the ten year period. No amount had been set aside for the organization of a navy in view of the enormous expense involved in such a project, although the Government realized its necessity for the protection of its territorial waters.

At the head of this organization is the President of the Philippines

who, under the Constitution, is the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces under the Republic of the Philippines. He directs the armed forces of the Philippines through the Secretary of National Defense and through a staff composed of the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, the Deputy Cief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, the Commanding General of the Military Police Command and the Commanding General of the Military Training Command. Under this staff are the various divisions which carry out the administrative functions of the Philippine Army.

The United States Army.-In point of number the United States Army in the Philippines was small indeed. At the end of 1939 the United States troops stationed in the Philippines included 509 commissioned officers, 54 warrant officers and 4,330 enlisted men, and the Philippine Scouts of 44 commissioned ofi-cers and 6,386 enlisted men.[1] In addition to the 31st Infantry, there were a couple of other regular army regiments in Bataan, and three National Guard outfits, recently arrived from the United States. They were the 192nd and the 194th Tank Battalions, drawn from Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, California and Washington, and the 200th Coast Artillery which came from New Mexico. Also in Bataan were the Fourth Marines, withdrawn from Shanghai and later transferred to Corregidor, and several battalions of sailors who had been stationed at Cavite and Olongapo. When Bataan finally fell there were nine thousand Americans among the thirty-six thousand troops on the peninsula whom Secretary of War Stimson described as "effectives".[2]

The Asiatic Squadron.[3]- Prior to 1939, the Asiatic Squadron (or "Fleet") had normally consisted of a heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, a dozen destroyers and about the same number of small submarines, a few naval airplanes together with auxiliary vessels and a number of gunboats on coastal waters and rivers. Since 1939 this force had been augmented by an aircraft carrier, a number of long range bombing planes and a number of large, modern submarines. The main United States Fleet, based upon Pearl Harbor, is 5,000 miles from the Philippines. Later the British and Dutch naval authorities agreed to the use of Singapore and similar places in the Netherlands East Indies by the United States Navy in the event of an emergency, so as to diminish the handicap of basing the United States naval vessels 5,000 miles away.

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[1]Catherine Porter,"Phil. Enlarging Preparations for National Defense", Far Eastern Survey, Vol. IX March 13,1940

[2]Fred S. Marquardt,"Before and After Bataan", Chapter XVII p.254

[3]Joseph Ralston Hayden,"The Philippines", Chapter XXIX

C. The Quezon-MacArthur Plan of Defense.-Immediately after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, President Quezon was able to solicit the services of General Douglas MacArthur as Military Adviser in the preparation of the National Defense Bill and the organization of the Philippine Army. In this gigantic task, MacArthur had with him as able assistants, the then Lieut.-Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower and the late Lieut.-Colonel James B. Ord. In recognition of his invaluable advice and service in this position of great responsibility, Quezon appointed MacArthur a Field Marshal in the Philippine Army, the first American to have been conferred such an office.

The Security of the Philippines[1].-Before signing up MacArthur, Quezon was supposed to have asked him just one question: "Can the Philippines be defended?" And MacArthur's answer was supposed to have consisted exactly of one word,"Yes." As a matter of fact it probably was not so simple as that. MacArthur was always careful in speaking of Philippine defense, to make it clear that he was talking of relative, rather than absolute, security. He planned to make the conquest of the Philippines so difficult that it would cost a foe, a million men, a billion dollars and three years to subjugate the Islands. Whether he would have succeeded will never be known.

The core of MacArthur's defense force for an independent Philippines was to be a small, compact, hard-hitting army of professional soldiers, perhaps ten thousand in number. To start with, he had five thousand Constabulary soldiers, members of a corps with traditions and service records comparable to those of the Canadian Mounted Police and the Texas Rangers. After the United States left the Philippines he presumably could count on some ten thousand Filipino Scouts, a thoroughly trained native division of the United States Army.

But the burden of war in the Philippines, under the MacArthur plan, was to be carried largely by a reserve army of 400,000 men, trained in the use of arms and ready to report for duty on an instant's notice. This group was to be composed of graduates of the compulsory military training program, plans having been made for forty-thousand Filipinos to be given six months of training each year, then placed in the reserve corps where they could be called upon when needed.

Because a navy was out of the question, due to the Commonwealth's limited budget, General MacArthur planned to confine his sea-going force to an Offshore Patrol. It was to contain a number of small, fast, easily manueverable torpedo boats which would harass any enemy fleet entering Philippine waters.

[1] Fred S. Marquardt,"Before and After Bataan" Chapter XVI

"A relatively small fleet of such vessels," said MacArthur,"manned by crews thoroughly familiar with every foot of coastline and surrounding waters, and carrying in the torpedo a definite threat against large ships, will have a distinct effect in compelling any hostile force to approach cautiously and by small detachments."

The third arm of MacArthur's defense forces, supplementing the army ashore and the torpedo boats in the sea, was an air force. The general planned for a fleet of small, fast bombers, based at army airfields, and working in close cooperation with the torpedo boats. A good start toward building an air corps had been made when the outbreak of the war appeared inevitable, and it was the firat unit of the Philippine Army to be absorbed into the United States forces.

Putting firat things first, MacArthur immediately began to train his civilian army. Begiining with 1936 from 20,000 to 40,000 twenty-year old youths were called up each year for six months of military training. No favoritism was shown in the draft, and the sons of the sugar barons drilled under the tropical sun along with boys who had never worn a pair of shoes before. Each received five centavos (2 1/2 cents) pay a day.

The American Grand Strategy in the Pacific[1].-From 1910 to 1939 American Grand Strategy in the Pacific was predicated on unilateral warfare between Japan and the United States. The small Asiatic "Fleet" was expected to fight a hit-and-run campaign against the Japanese armadas invading Philippine waters, inflicting as much damage as possible and then returning to continental United States probably by way of Australia.

In the meantime, the United States Army force in the Philippines were to fight a delaying action on Luzon, retiring gradually to Corregidor and its satellite forts at the mouth of Manila Harbor, and holding the protecting shield of Bataan Peninsula. In three or four months, it was reckoned, the United States battle fleet would seek out the Japanese navy and destroy it in a showdown fight somewhere in the northern Pacific.

After 3 September 1939, it became evident that the old strategy would have to be revised. The European conflict had changed things. If Japan and the United States went to war, it was now clear, the war would not be localized in the Pacific. It would, inevitably, be merged with the European War into a true World War. The United States, in such a World War, would not be able to bring its en-

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[1] Fred S. Marquardt,"Before and After Bataan"Chapter XVII p. 247

tire military weight against Japan. We would have an Atlantic coast line to protect, and we would be forced, for our own safety, to pour men and material to the European Theater. At the same time we would not be fighting alone in the Pacific. We would have friendly bases, naval bases, to use for an offensive against Japan. We might also, under this new concept of a global war, be forced to help defend these friendly bases.

The studied military opinion that Japan would be a push-over was, of course, based in part on a considerable underestimation of Japanese fighting power. But it also was predicated on two assumptions:

(1) That the United States Fleet would fight as a whole unit, presenting its entire strength in one unbroken battle line; and,

(2) That the Fleet would go into action with its strength unimpaired.

Neither of these assumptions materialized.

In the first place, the Lend-Lease policy - which meant we had to deliver the goods to the democracies, as well as produce them, necessitated the maintenance of a very substantial part of our Navy in the Atlantic. So, early in 1941, the Navy transferred almost half of its strength from the Pacific to the Atlantic, thus upsetting the assumption that the Fleet would not be divided.

The second assumption went overboard when the Japanese bombers crippled the portion of the battle fleet which had been kept in the Pacific. Until 7 December 1941, our Pacific Fleet might have been strong enough to take on the Japanese navy. Not until our damaged vessels had been repaired and many new ones had gone into service could we dare to challenge the Japanese fleet openly.

Even before Pearl Harbor, the realities of 1941 had altered United States strategy for a war with Japan in other respects. It was understood, regardless whether it was explicitly agreed, that the United States would be given the use of the great naval base at Singapore. Six months before the war started, American, British and Dutch military authorities held conferences in Manila, and they were not talking about the weather.

In view of the new world situation, and especially after Russia entered the European War, the United States discarded the old blueprints for a Pacific war, which embraced the strategy of a delaying action in the Philippines followed by a decisive naval encounter in the northern Pacific. We, decided, instead, to hold the Philippines, basing as much of our fleet as was available

on Manila and Singapore, and attempting to confine the Japanese fleet to its own waters and the China Sea. Meanwhile we hoped the real issue of the war would be decided in Europe, and Japan could be attended to after Hitler had been disposed of.

In keeping with this new Pacific strategy, a desperate attempt was made during the latter half of 1941 to the make the Philippines impregnable. General MacArthur was called back to active duty, and Secretary Stimson announced that the Philippines had top priorities on any supplies.

Exactly how strong our defenses in the Philippines were when the Japanese struck is , of course, something which only the War Department knew. Whether Manila could have been held if our fleet had not been dealt such a terrific blow at Pearl Harbor is a question which probably never can be answered.

Shortly before the war started MacArthur seemed to think that the trick could be turned. "The United States has ordered me to defend these islands," he said, " I propose to defend them".

But this ability to defend them was handed a resounding wallop four or five hours after the war started, when his own air force was badly crippled at Clark Field. A little later the Japanese came over and destroyed Nichols Field, near Manila, to all intents and purposes. As long as he had a few big bombers left, MacArthur was able to keep the Japanese from the Philippines. But once his air force had been shattered, with no reinforcements in sight, MacArthur had to fall back on the original United States Army strategy of fighting a delaying action.

III. THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (8 December 1941-7 May 1942)

A. The Attack on Pearl Harbor[1].-On the morning of 8 December 1941, on receipt of the news that Hawaii had been attacked, General MacArthur issued the following statement: "The American command here has been alerted and all populations are in readiness for defense". War was on.

B. Simultaneous Enemy Action in the Philippines[2].-On the same day the enemy launched a series of air attacks on Clark Field, followed on the 9th by an early morning raid on Nichols Field. This was the prelude to an enemy attack with land troops supported by naval elements and air forces, and on 10 December the enemy appeared in heavy force off the north coast of Luzon extending from Vigan to Aparri and began landing operations.

As the first week of military operations came to a close, the situation, both on the ground and in the air, was well in hand. The enemy had carried out

1 & 2Col. Andres Lopez,"The Fall of the Philippines"Mil Review Aug 1946 p.10

fourteen major air raids on military objectives in the Philippines, but had paid dearly in the loss of transports, planes and troops, and at least two battleships badly damaged as a result of action by our air and ground forces. An enemy landing attempted in the Lingayen area was repulsed by a Philippine Army division, but unopposed landings in limited numbers were effected at Vigan, Legaspi and Aparri. Enemy naval units, troops and materiel on the ground were bombed effectively by our air force in the Vigan and Aparri areas, hampering landing operations, sinking four enemy transports and seriously damaging three off Northern Luzon. Individual deeds of heroism and bravery on the part of American and Filipino ground troops and air units marked the week's operations. The total enemy air losses from all causes during the week was not less tha forty planes actually accounted for and probably many more which could not be verified.

The Japanese bombing technique was perceptibly deteriorating. Their original effort was superior in every respect but, under the heavy punishment they received, a growing tendency towards mildness in the discharging of their bombs was apparent.

The splendid morale of our military forces and of the entire population was most commendable. As the war progressed, activity on the northern and southern fronts increased as Japan sought to gain a foothold in the Philippine Archipelago. Ground and Air Commands of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East struck back with increasing fury at the invaders. Heavy fighting was in progress in Davao, on the extreme southern front, where the enemy had landed in force, and on 21 December 1941 the entire headquarters of the Philippine Army was inducted into the service of the United States, placing all military units in the Philippines under the direct control of General MacArthur.

The enemy's plan was beginning to develop. Enemy air activity increased in spite of the gallant efforts of our reduced air force and it was apparent that we were confronted with a major expeditionary drive aimed against the Philippines.

C. The 1st Regular Division (PA).[1]-On or about 15 December 1941, Colonel Fidel V. Segundo,PA, Superintendent, Philippine Military Academy, was appointed Division Commander, 1st Regular Division (PA) and promoted to Brigadier General. The University of Santo Tomas was designated as Division Headquarters. The reorganization of the skeleton 1st Regular Division stationed at Camp Murphy, Quezon City, started soon after. The Infantry Regiment in the camp was rapidly expanded into two war strength regiments with the assignment of officers formerly with the

[1] Maj Alfredo M. Santos,"After-Battle Reports to Adj Gen,PA",29 Dec 1945.

Philippine Military Academy; the newly graduated and commissioned 1st and 2nd Class Cadets; and also the induction into the service of thousands of volunteers from all walks of life. In view of the lack of artillery pieces and equipment, no artillery regiment for the Division was organized. The two newly formed infantry regiments were designatedc 1st Infantry and 3rd Infantry, due to the fact that the skeleton 2nd Infantry of the Division was then stationed at Camp Parang, Cotobato, Mindanao Island.

Major Alfredo M. Santos,Inf (then Captain), Assistant Commandant of Cadets, Philippine Military Academy, was designated Regimental Commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment, while Captain Vivencio Orais, PC was assigned Commanding Officer of the 3rd Infantry Regiment. The reorganization was done under intense and continuous enemy bombing and strafing. The utter unpreparedness and lack of arms, ammunition, equipment and supplies contributed much to the difficulties of the situation. The Division suffered scores of casualties, both officers and men, as a result of enemy bombing and strafing while still reorganizing in Camp Murphy, Quezon City, its home station.

Under such difficult circumstances, and before complete reorganization, equipping and supplying of the men could be finished, the 1st Infantry Regiment with the 1st Engineer Battalion under the command of Major (then Captain) Adamin A.Tallow,CE, was ordered to leave Camp Murphy by truck at 2000 hours for its battle positions on the eastern coast of Tayabas Province in the vicinity of the Lamon Bay area, relieving some detachments of the 51st Division. Having no organic transportation of its own, the Division used the trucks of the Raymundo Transportation Co., a private concern, to accomplish this movement.

In the early morning hours of 22 December 1941, the column reached the town of Pagsanjan, Laguna Province. Major Alfredo M. Santos had a brief conference with the Division Commander, Brig-General Fidel V. Segundo, as to the mission of the regiment and the disposition of the troops in the defense sector. As a result of this conference and based on the estimate of the situation which was made by Major Santos after a personal reconnaissance two days previous, the troops were disposed as follows: the 1st Battalion,under the command of 1st Lieut. Godofredo F. Mendoza,Inf was given the mission to oppose the landing at Mauban, Tayabas Province; the 3rd Battalion, under 1st Lieut. Felicisimo Aguinaldo,Inf was assigned to defend the Infanta-Tignuan (Tayabas) beach; while the 2nd Battalion, under Captain Honorato Ramos, Inf,was designated the Regimental Reserve, and to be bivouac in the vicinity of the woods at RJ LUISIANA-LUCBAN

and LUISIANA-MAUBAN Roads; the Command Post of the 1st Infantry Regiment was also located in the same vicinity. The Division CP was located in a schoolhouse in the town of Pagsanjan, Laguna Province. The Division Commander, together with Major Santos and Majors Rumbold and Dumas, American Advisers, made a hurried personal reconnaissance of the Mauban beach sector in the afternoon of 22 December 1941. The 3rd Infantry Regiment was left in Camp Murphy to complete its reorganization. It should be noted that the 1st Regular Division was composed of only two infantry regiments with no organic artillery.

In the morning of 23 December 1941, Major Alfredo M. Santos with the Regimental G-3 and Captains Eugene Laird and Kassell, American instructors, Captain H. Ramos,CO, 2nd Battalion, made another personal reconnaissance of the Infanta-Tignuan sector, returning to the Regimental CP at about 2130 hours the same day. There was no signal communication system established within the units of the 1st Infantry Regiment, and that of the latter and the Division Headquarters due to lack of signal equipment. Between the 1st and 3rd Battalions was a 60-Km of undefended coastline. There was no road along the coast, so there was no alternative but to use the long, round-about way,-that of the TIGNUAN-SINILOAN-PAGSANJAN-LUISIANA-MAUBAN road. Messages were sent to the Division CP by means of trucks. The government telegraph service between Mauban and the town of Lucban was utilized to transmit messages from the 1st Battalion to the Regimental CP by utilizing runners stationed at Lucban. The men were poorly clothed, armed and equipped. Not a single steel helmet was issued. The Combat Company, under 2nd Lieut. Arcadio Mayor, had mortars but had no mortar shells; there were .50 Cal. MG ammunition but there were no .50 Cal. MG's. There was no time even for officers and men to get acquainted before actual combat ensued. Many volunteers never fired a gun in their life, but their spirit, patriotism, fortitude and devotion to duty were indeed very commendable. There was no time to construct beach defenses; even the materials and equipment needed to construct them were not available. With no artillery regiment of its own, not attached to it, and no air support whatsoever, the 1st Infantry had to depend solely on its .30 Cal. MG's, automatic rifles and other small cliber weapons to repel the landings.

At about 2330 hours 23 December 1941, a message was received from the Battalion Commander at Mauban that unidentified ships were passing southward off Mauban coast. The Regimental Commander alerted the Regimental Reserve and

a message was sent by courier in a truck to the Division Commander at Pagsanjan, informing him of the situation. Shortly after midnight, another message was received from the 1st Battalion Commander that several ships, calculated to be 37, with a strong naval escort, dropped anchor off Mauban coast, and started landing operations without any preliminary bombardment and preparation of the beaches. By 0130 hours 24 December 1941 the first waves of landing barges raced towards the shore. Utilizing the element of surprise to the utmost degree, and firing with uncanny accuracy, all available weapons opened fire at close range sinking most of the landing boats before reaching the shore. The enemy realizing that the beach was defended, contrary to their previous information, started terrific bombardment of the Mauban beaches with their naval guns, causing numerous casualties on the numerically-inferior and inadequately equipped gallant men of the 1st Battalion. Fighting tooth and nail against tremendous odds, the men stuck to their posts until 0700 hours when enemy naval planes strafed and bombed our position without mercy. Hand to hand fighting on the beaches was the order of the day. The enemy tried to envelop both flanks of our line, and almost succeeded in doing so had it not been for the timely order of withdrawal by the Regimental Commander who decided that to fight further on the beaches against such overwhelming force meant complete annihilation in the hands of the Japanese whose march toward the interior would be unopposed for there was no other defense line behind the beach defenders. So the remnants of the 1st Battalion after suffering heavily withdrew to the town of Sampaloc about 12 Kms west of Mauban having inflicted severe losses in men and equipment on the Japanese invaders. The enemy, according to their admission later, lost in the Mauban landing, scores of ranking officers including regimental commanders and staffs, and hundreds of men, not to say arms, ammunition, supplies and equipment.

In the meantime, fighting was going on in the north. On 22 December 1941, a huge enemy fleet estimated at eighty transports appeared off Lingayen Gulf, and on the 23rd, several transports were sighted off Batangas. In the Lingayen sector heavy fighting, including tank combat, developed in the vicinity of Santo Tomas. At one point enemy destroyers and transports were driven off by our heavy guns and a landing prevented.

During the heat of battle on Mauban beaches, the Regimental Commander decided to commit the Regimental Reserve so as to stem the tide of invasion, but could not do so for failure of civilian trucks to arrive in time. The second bat-

tle position was hurriedly organized on the forward slopes of the hills east of Sampaloc town, astride the Mauban-Sampaloc Road, with the 2nd Battalion (Regimental Reserve) forming the backbone of the defense. The bombing and strafing of our new position were intensified. The enemy expanded its initial beach head, landed its field artillery pieces and other automatic weapons which were used to soften our position at Sampaloc. During the intense bombing, Capt. Honorato Ramos, 2nd Battalion Commander, with members of his staff, received direct bomb hits and were blown to smithereens. The enemy pressed on relentlessly; our men stood their ground and fought back savagely. At about this time, our Division Commander with his staff was ordered to proceed to San Fernando, Pampanga with the 3rd Infantry Regiment which had completed its reorganization. The 1st Infantry was temporarily removed from his command and was attached to the 51st Division under Brig-General Albert M. Jones.

At 0300 hours 25 December 1941, Major Santos upon receipt of the order to withdraw from higher headquarters, withdrew his troops to Luisiana, Laguna. The men started to dig in. At about 1730 hours of the same day, Brig-Gen Jones came in person and gave orders to counter-attack the Japanese who were then entrenched astride the Mauban-Luisiana Road near Barrio Piis, about 9 Kms. west of Sampaloc town. Under the personal leadership of the Regimental Commander, the counterattack was launched with great difficulty due to some degree of disorganization and the weakened physical condition of the men who were in continuous close combat with the foe since the early hours of 24 December without eating and resting.The counterattack was slowed down by rain and darkness but was vigorously resumed the following morning with the assistance of five American light tanks. These tanks were completely knocked out by Japanese anti-tank guns, and their crews killed outright, within half an hour after entering the fight. With the loss of these tanks and the overwhelming superiority of the Japanese not only in number but in equipment and support from the air and the ground, the counterattack was stopped and finally fizzled out. The Filipinos were again forced to withdraw and organize another defense position in Barrio Kabalete at the RJ Mauban-Luisiana and Lucban-Luisiana Roads. At about 1130 hours 26 December 1941 more than 300 men of the Philippine Scouts from Fort McKinley under the command of Major McKea came in Manila taxicabs to assist the battered 1st and 2nd Battalions. Together, they put up a gallant stand but to no avail; the enemy was very much stronger. At about 1400 hours same day, withdrawal to Luisiana town was ordered. Because of the information that a strong Japanese column was going across

the mountains toward the town of Cavinti on 27 December 1941, it was deemed necessary to organize a battle position there so as to prevent the Japs from striking our rear. The Japs apparently had split its main body into two or three columns with the intention of enveloping our flanks, To delay the enemy from crossing the Botocan River, the cable acroos that stream to the Botocan Electric Plant was ordered cut. The operations here consisted mainly of strong patrol activity on both sides with its resulting casualties. All dead bodies which could be recovered were buried and the wounded taken to the Laguna Provincial Hospital at Santa Cruz. All the bridges along the route of withdrawal were blown up, and installations, supplies, equipment, supplies, gasoline and other materials which could not be removed or saved were either burned or destroyed.

The general situation in the Philippines at this time was as follows:[1] During the succeeding few days the enemy increased the tempo of the attack on both the northern and southern fronts and, though our troops offered a stubborn resistance, fighting against great odds and greatly outnumbered, the enemy continued to land reinforcements. Enemy air activity continued with bombing especially concentrated on the Manila Bay Area. In order to preserve the city from the ravages of war and to increase the possibilities of defense in the outlying areas, Manila was declared an open city on December 26. However, it suffered another air bombardment on the 27th. It is worthy of note that prior to this, the Japanese did not attempt to attack civil installation from the air, but as soon as the Army , including anti-aircraft protection withdrew, they immediately raided, hitting all types of civilian premises. On 31 Decmber, after a day of relative quiet, the enemy launched a general offensive driving in great force from both north and south and using great quantities of tanks and armored units. Dive bombers practically controlled the roads from the air. Our lines were pushed back.

In order to prevent the enemy's infiltration from the east from separating our forces in Southern Luzon from those in Northern Luzon, the southern force had for several days been moving north and, on 1 January 1942, successfully completed a junction with the northern force in spite of hostile mechanized efforts to prevent the junction. This movement uncovered the free city of Manila which had been completely evacuated by our forces and had no practical military value. However, the entrance to Manila Bay remained completely covered by our forces its use denied to the enemy.

Let us go back to the beleaguered 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 1st

Infantry Regiment. Receiving information that another strong Jap column was moving toward Majayjay, Laguna with the intention of joining the Japanese forces, which landed at Atimonan, Tayabas, in the vicinity of San Pablo City, thus cutting off our withdrawal along that direction to the north, the troops were again transferred to Calauan town, Laguna at about 1000 hours 28 December 1941; organized defense position at probable avenues of approach and sent out strong reconnaissance and combat patrols to every sensitive locality.

At 2130 hours 29 Decmber 1941, we were again ordered to withdraw our men from positions occupied in the Calauan area and to proceed without delay to Pampanga. Using all civilian trucks at our disposal, we left Calauan for Pampanga avoiding the open City of Manila by using the Pasig-Mariquina-Balintawak Road. We reached the town of Minalin in Pampanga on 30 December 1941 and bivouaced in the nearby bamboo groves. Having been detached from the 51st Division of Brig-Gen Jones, Major Santos went out as far as Bataan for the purpose of contacting his Division Commander and to receive new orders. He met Brig-Gen Segundo in his CP at Km 146 Pilar-Bagac Road and was ordered to bring the regiment to Bataan without delay. It must be remembered at this juncture that the 3rd Battalion at the Infanta-Tignuan beach had so far not been engaged due to the fact that the no Japs landed in that area. So it was ordered, too, to rejoin the 1st Infantry Regiment in Bataan. In order to effecta short-cut in the movement to Bataan, Major Santos tried to get "cascos" (wooden cargo boats) to ferry the troops across the Guagua swamps, but no cascos were available at that time. Starting at 1900 hours 31 December 1941, the regiment hiked all the way to Bataan because all its trucks, except those for supplies, were sent back to the south by superior orders to help with the withdrawal of other units which were harassed by the pursuing enemy. The whole outfit, or the remnants of it, was reported to the Division Commander in the afternoon of 1 January 1942. After the men had rested for a few hours, the 1st Infantry was again reorganized.

On 2 January 1942, the Japanese entered and occupied Manila; on the same day Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago capitualted too. Enemy air activity increased. Fort Mills, Corregidor was raided for five hours on the 3rd and the area north of Manila and Corregidor was heavily bombed on the 4th. Although he was sustaining material losses from our anti-aircraft, the enemy's activity in the air continued unabated.

On the ground, after a short relapse, the fighting was resumed in the north and, on Sunday morning, 5 January, the enemy launched a heavy attack in

which he was repulsed with an estimated 700 dead, the most serious reverse he had yet sustained. His pincer movement from north and south designed to crush our forces was closed but our troops were not in the jaws of the trap. His strategy in this respect failed completely.

The enemy's cunning deceit, exhibited in his air raids, which he apparently concentrated on military objectives to lull the people into false security, suddenly changed , and defenseless towns like Baler in Tayabas, Santa Rosa and Calamba in Laguna, and Tarlac in Tarlac were mercilessly bombed, razed to the ground with pilots strafing civilians in Arayat, Camiling, San Fernando and other towns.

After days of heavy fighting all along the front with our front lines bombed and strafed continuously, the intensity of the hostile attack subsided somewhat while the enemy moved troops towards the front in preparation for a major attack.

In the meantime, uneasiness on the part of the Japanese Military was beginning to show in exaggerations in their propaganda. Their comments with reference to military forces frequently contained little of the truth and at times were almost fantastic. Their attempt to suppress the use of private radios in occupied areas was a clear indication of fear of truth as broadcast from American and English stations despite great quantity of radio propaganda from Tokyo. The issuance of a proclamation by the Japanese Commander warning the population that any act resulting in injury or any attempt to inflict injury upon Japanese soldiers or individuals would be punished by death if found, or the holding of ten influential hostages, if not found, was a sharp contrast to the cajolery used in th propaganda prior to the occupation of Manila. They proclaimed that the war was to emancipate oriental peoples from white subjection, but their looting and devastation were systematic and countrywide. Wherever they went went they spread destruction, death and desolation. In Manila they closed the Philippine Commonwealth offices, ordered the Filipino judges not to try cases, placed public works and communications under their direction and assumed all government functions formerly exercised by Filipinos. In the occupied areas the Filipinos were already practically reduced to slavery. Examples of Japan's "new order" were everywhere apparent. Equipment was summarily appropriated, owners dispossessed, residents evicted, farmers formed into labor groups but deprived of their crops. The economic balance of the Philippines was completely disrupted by Japanese greed and avarice.

One of the most horrible features of the Japanese occupation was exhibited in the rape and violation of women. In the countryside this was completely universal. Japanese officers apparently made no attempt to restrain their men in this respect. In Manila a fair degree of control was at first exhibited,however after nightfall no woman was safe on the street.

American and English nationals in Manila were herded and crowded in a manner which would bring shame on any truly civilized nation. Forced into army trucks by the butts of Japanese guns, they were largely carted off to the concentration camps without notice. In the largest concentration camp in Santo Tomas University, over three thousand men, women, and children were crowded in a space poorly ventilated and equipped for twelve hundred. Families were separated. Sanitation and facilities for medical attention were deplorable. The homes of the interned were scientifically searched and looted. Certain prominent individuals were held incommunicado. The lot of these unfortunates was worse than that afforded prisoners of war of any other country. Not even the ordinary conventions of the Geneva agreement had been provided. On 15 January, Japan announced thru Switzerland, that she would abide by the international captured prisoners convention. Her brazen deceit in making this announcement to the world was illustrated on the battlefield of Bataan several times. After a successful counterattack by our troops on 12 January the body of a Filipino Scout was found in a stream where he had been thrown to drown after being bayonetted several times while his hands were bound behind his back. Other cases of this nature were reported.[1]

The Bataan Campaign.-At dusk on 2 January 1942, the 1st Infantry Regiment moved to its new defense position at Km 171 Pilar-Moron Road in Bataan. The 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion which had successfully rejoined the mother organization were placed in Corps Reserve, while the 2nd Battalion organized beach defense at Mauban Point, Moron, Bataan. "I" Company under Lieut. Daniel S. Ledda, Inf was established as advanced beach outpost at the town of Moron; another detachment under Lieut. Isabelo Castro,Inf established an observation post on the beach south of Moron. "K" Company under Lieut. Felicisimo Aguinaldo organized a defense outpost on the slopes of Mt. Silanganan with the mission of stopping enemy infiltration on our right flank. Due to the influx of many higher ranking officers, both Filipinos and Americans, to Bataan, it

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[1] Col. Andres Lopez,Inf,"The Fall of the Phil."Mil.Review Vol XXVI No.5 p. 11-12 August 1946.

was found necessary to reassign officers in the Division so that newly assigned higher ranking officers might occupy positions commensurate with their ranks and experience. Battalion Commanders were reassigned to command companies while new Battalion Commanders took their places. At this time the 3rd Infantry Regiment which had never been committed to combat before was on the Main Line of Resistance. From this time until about the middle of January 1942 our activity was confined to reconnaissance, beach observation, combat patrolling, organization of the ground; collection, evaluation, interpretation an dissemination of combat military information and watchful waiting for the next move of the enemy who was feverishly preparing for a major offensive on our front.

On 11 January 1942 Major A. M. Santos made a personal reconnaissance of beach defenses on our left flank and in the vicinity of the town of Moron; on the next day he made another personal reconnaissance of the outpost positions on the slopes of Mt. Silanganan and Mt. Natib. On the strength of these reconnaissance reports, the Division Commander, Brig-Gen Fidel V. Segundo decided to strengthen the garrison at Moron and sent Major Santos to organise and strengthen further the position of "K" Company at Mt. Silanganan with the addition of "A" Company and "L" Company. Contact was effected with a battalion of the 51st Division which was in full retreat from the vicinity of Abucay Hacienda with a large Japanese force pursuing it.

On 17 January 1942 the Japs were reported to be landing troops at Barrio Mabayo about four kilometers from the town of Moron. The 1st Battalion was dispatched right away to help the other units of the Division and the remnants of the 26th Cavalry in the defense of Moron. Friendly artillery shelled enemy ships entering Subic Bay Bay in the vicinity of Grande Island. Combat intelligence confirmed the report that the Japs were about to attack Moron. A sanguinary battle for the possession of Moron followed with heavy casualties on both sides. Against a superior Japanese force our troops reluctantly withdrew from Moron after inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. The Outpost Line of Resistance and the Main Line of Resistance prepared for the inevitable blow that was to come. The more than fifteen kilometers of jungle front which was assigned to I Corps was to be defended by the 3rd Infantry and the battered 1st Infantry with some attached units. The sector was too wide and the men to defend it were too few and too ill-equipped. The right flank of our MLR, as a result of the paucity in men and materials, was hanging in the air for several kilometers

with no physical contact with the left flank of the units of the II Corps on its right. By 20 January 1942 the pressure all along the entire line increased steadily. The OPLR was split into two segments, swept back and then surrounded. Major Santos was given the special mission by the Division Commander to restore the shattered line at all cost. With a reinforcement of one company under Lt. Isabelo Castro,Inf, Major Santos led the counterattack, and by the afternoon of 21 January after a bitter struggle, the Japs were driven back and the OPLR reestablished. Japanese attacks came one after the other relentlessly day and night. The OPLR could not be held any longer, but would not withdraw without order. Seeing the helplessness of the men and their precarious position, they were ordered to withdraw to the MLR in the early hours of 22 January and by 1030 hours of that day the withdrawal was completed successfully under the very noses of the savage foe. The Japs pressed on harder and harder using all available weapons they could employ. During these heavy and bloody engagements, the Japs succeeded to infiltrate a strong force through the heavily wooded and steep slopes of Mt. Silanganan, beyond the undefended, hanging and open right flank of our line, way back to our right rear, and cutting off the Pilar-Moron Road at Km 173. They organized a strong position overnight astride this highway, thus sealing off our only means of supply and communication. For two successive days, the men in the fox-holes received no food, ammunition or supplies. Between the Division CP and the front lines were the stubbornly resisting Japs. General Segundo who was in the advanced CP directing personally the operations could not communicate with his rear echelon for the Japs destroyed all communication lines along that direction. He had to follow a round-about way along the beaches, avoiding the Japs, and rejoined his Headquarters and sent for help. In the evening of 22 January 1942, General Jonathan Wainwright, the commander of the I Corps sent a message exhorting all men to hold on for help was coming. All available force,weapons and power were employed to dislodge the Japs from the toehold they secured at Km 173 but to no avail. Attack after attack launched by our men was thrown back with fearful losses. Finally at about 1000 hours 23 January 1942, General Wainwright ordered a general withdrawal along the beaches to the south toward Bagac town. There was much confusion in this operation; in some instances it had the appearance of a rout. Without food and rest for days the men marched and marched; swam part of the way moving away from the clutches of the enemy. Major Santos was given the mission to cover the withdrawal of his Division. At 1500 hours

24 January he met General Wainwright with Lt-Col John R. Pugh,Cav, his aide, south of the town of Bagac. The general ordered Major Santos to report his unit to General Segundo several kilometers down the road. Atthe intersection of Trail 9 and Trail 5 at 1700 hours that day the rear guard of the 1st Regular Division was reported to the Division Commander. The men threw themselves to the ground from sheer exhaustion; canned foods were served and the men ate greedily for the first time in days. The next day the reorganization of all units started. The new battle position was immediately organized. Extensive reconnaissance and combat patrolling were done. On 28 January 1942 Major Santos went with the Division Commander to the CP of Brig-General Luther Stevens, 91st Division Commander,where a conference was held concerning mutual support and coordination as adjacent units. The new battle position of the I Corps comprised as follows: from the beach,about two kilometers south of Bagac, and extending toward the east was the 91st Division commanded by Brig-Gen Luther Stevens; followed on the right by the 1st Regular Division commanded by Brig-Gen Fidel V. Segundo; and followed on the right by the 11th Division commanded by Brig Gen William Brougher up to the boundary line between the I Corps and the II Corps.

The Bagac-Pantingan River Front.-A superior Japanese force, pressing the pursuit relentlessly, launched a determined attack southward on or about 25 January 1942 from a general line along the PILAR-BAGAC ROAD, swept our unprepared, newly established OPLR and penetrated our MLR in the GOGO-COTAR RIVER area, creating a 500-yard gap through which the enemy poured , for four days, hundreds of death-defying troops for the purpose of overwhelming our lines and crushing our stiff resistance. Major Santos was given the special mission to close the gap and annihilate the enemy who had infiltrated into our lines, endangering not only the 1st Regular Division but also threatening the defense of Bataan Peninsula.The strongly entrenched, superior Japanese forces between the gap were vogorously counter-attacked under the personal leadership of Major Santos at dawn on 29 January 1942. After severe fighting through the thick jungles for three long days, the 500-yard gap was closed late in the afternoon of 1 February, dealing the enemy, bewildered by the unexpected fury of the Filipinos, a crushing blow.

Strong combat patrols were sent out within the Division defense sector to ferret out groups of Japanese roaming about the MLR and RRL attacking CP's and other installations, cutting telephone lines, and hitting our troops in

the rear and sniping at our men. Finally these groups banded together, dugged in, forming a strong center of resistance which repulsed several desperate counterattacks. This center of resistance known as the "Tuol Pocket" was on a prominent hill which was bounded by the GOGO-COTAR and TUOL Rivers and densely covered with bamboo and other tropical vegetation. Major Santos was again given the mission to eradicate the "Pocket". After great difficulty due to the terrain, the vegetation and the determined resistance of the cornered Japs, the outer defenses of the perimeter crumbled one by one. Major Santos led the advance on the well-defended enemy stronghold, moving forward in the face of heavy machine gun, rifle, grenade and mortar fire, against a tenacious enemy who stubbornly contested every foot of the ground. After several days of the most bitter action, he finally directed his unit in closing in on the "Pocket" and led it in wiping out the foe to the last man on 8 February 1942. Among the captured articles were rifles, machine guns, two 37 mm guns, mortars, ammunition, food, maps, reports, personal diaries and other documents of intelligence value. On the other hand while these bloody encounters were going on, the Japs facing our MLR did their best to rescue their isolated comrades within our lines by an all-out attack on the MLR to divert our attention but they failed miserably. These attacks gained momentum and intensity day after day and night after night by using every weapon and means under their command. These attacks caused the Japs large losses in men and equipment and morale. Finally on 17 February 1942 the enemy ceased attacking and withdrew to the high grounds along the northern side of PILAR-BAGAC Road approximately 10 Kms from our position.

The period of "The Long Lull" started from this day 17 February until the beginning of the "All-Out Offensive". The activities of the Division during this time were active and aggressive combat patrolling, strengthening of the defensive position with the construction of more field fortifications, harassing the enemy by frequent raids on our part. For several days the enemy had been building up for a prepared attack on a certain point of our line, bringing in fresh troops under the protection of the navy. Their air preparations were heavy. Air action continued as usual against tremendous odds. Artillery action remained unusually heavy too.. The enemy also continued to land reinforcements in the Subic Bay and Lingayen Harbors. His heavy artillery emplaced in the Cavite area, presumably for the attack on Corregidor, maintained a constant fire on Forts Drum, Hughes, Mills and Frank, and was engaged by our batteries. Behind the Fil-

American battle lines in Bataan there were stretches of forests, farm lands, and rice paddies. Simple villages, which once peacefully clusterdd around grgying churches, were now in smouldering ruins shattered by Japanese aviation and artillery. The simple people, who once lived in those sleepy hollows were now huddled in refugee camps behind the lines. General MacArthur was fighting the war on two fronts: the military and the civilian propaganda fronts. On the latter he rigged several broadcasting stations and three times a day his news and propaganda flooded the Philippines. This propaganda was unique and had never been practiced before in any of the famous and extraordinary efforts which had been made throughout the world in this line. His concept was very simple and consisted of telling the truth and only the truth. The Japanese desperately attacked General MacArthur along this line by counter-propaganda and attempts to jam the air, showing their fear by the intensity of their resentment. Their failure to win the confidence of the Filipino people caused them to resort to the only solution they understood--force. The press was throttled under pain of severe punishment. No newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, etc. could be published without the authority of the military. All subject matter was censored by the military. From the start, Japanese propaganda indicated that the Japanese would have rather made friends of the Filipino than any other people they had attempted to subjugate. But actions speak louder than words; the invading hordes could not control their avarice and greed. This was particularly apparent in their appropriation of foodstuffs. Any amount, no matter how small, sooner or later fell into the hands of the grasping aggressor. Within six months the populace would be starving not theoretically but literally. Hundreds of thousands of Filipinos in the occupied areas were doomed if the attitude of the enemy was to continue. On 28 January President Quezon issued a proclamation announcing the loyalty of the Filipino people to America and their determination to continue fighting side by side with the United States until final victory. Weeks of hard fighting made veterans out of the Philippine Army soldiers. Their training in the difficult school of battle experience had steadied them and developed their resources.[1]

After 8 February 1942 Brig-General Fidel V. Segundo was relieved by Brig-General Kearie L. Berry as Division Commander and assigned to another position in the I Corps. There were also changes in the Division Staff and staffs of other lower units.

Meanwhile the Japanese casualties and sick list increased day by day. In

[1]Col. Andres Lopez,"The Fall of the Phil"Mil. Review Vol XXVI Aug 1946 No.5

the North Luzon front our mountain tropps had forced him to evacuate the Abra Valley from Cervantes to Benguet. His defensive attitude showed that his heavy lossed had shaken him. He was beginning to show signs of exhaustion. As the enemy continued on the defensive on the fighting front, his activity on the propaganda front was intensified, openly inciting the Filipino troops to turn against and kill their American comrades in arms and then surrender. This propaganda, however, fell on deaf ears, the morale and hope of the Philippine people remained undaunted and the civilian resistance against the invaders grew in intensity. The loyalty of the Filipinos to the cause of freedom and democracy remained unbreakable. to the enemy's defensive attitude General MacArthur reacted with an offensive and on 4 March his air force launched a surprise attack on Subic Bay sinking three transports and several smaller vessels with heavy loss of life and damaging enemy installations. President Roosevelt ordered General MacArthur to Australia by the middle of March to assume the new Southwest Pacific command for the United States. General Jonathan Wainwright, I Corps Commander, took over the command of the Philippines[1]. Brig-General Albert M. Jones took over the command of the I Corps in turn.

The Japanese All-Out Offensive[2].-In preparation for this battle, which was to close a little more than a month later with the collapse of all organized resistance in the islands, the Japanes moved into the Philippines and additional mechanized brigade equipped with the new medium tanks, about three heavy artillery brigades, and probably one fresh infantry division. In addition, both the Army and the Navy air forces were reinforced by numerous bomber squadrons, released by the fall of Singapore and the collapse of resistance in the Netherlands East Indies.

All preparations were carefully made, and it was clear that this time the fight was to be carried through to a finish. Gradually the patrol activity along the front became more intense; air reconnaissance gave way to increasingly fierce air bombardment of the dreaded Fil-American gun positions; and the morale of the Japanese troops,heightened by all these preparations, was raised to fever pitch by the news that General MacArthur had flown from Corregidor to Australia and "deserted his command on the eve of its most decisive battle".

Lieutenant General Wainwright who succeeded MacArthur, seems to have to have made a thorough estimate of the situation and to have made all dispositions possible to meet the expected attack. But even before the assault real-

1 Col Andres Lopez,"The Fall of the Phil"Mil Review Vol XXVI Aug 1946 No.5

2 War Dept Pamphlet MIS"Japanese Land Operations(from Japanese sources)8 Dec 1941-8 June1942.Campaign Study No.3 18 Nov. 1942.

ly began, it became evident that the constant pounding from the reinforced Japanese artillery, and from the bomber squadrons that seemed to fly at will over the Fil-American gun positions, was daily reducing the effectiveness of the defenders' strongest weapon--their magnificent artillery barrages.

In order to conserve their dwindling ammunition supplies, the Fil-American batteries remained silent under this rain of fire, except for occasional interdictory fire at night on important roads and a short but fierce concentration on the Japanese assembly areas as the troops were moving into position the evening before the attack.

The attack itself came in true blitzkrieg fashion just after dawn on Good Friday, 3 April 1942. The steady artillery fire, which had been increasing in intensity, rose to its maximum rate as the zero hour approached. The gunners poured a constant stream of high-explosive shells on the defensive strongpoints, and placed thick black smoke on the heights where the Fil-American artillery observation posts were located. As daylight came, all the Japanese bomber planes in the Philippines roared overhead and unloaded on vital objectives which the constant air reconnaissance of the previous month had carefully located: the last remaining airfield on the coast below Balanga; the defiles and bridges in the all-too-sketchy road net used for the movement of the defenders' reserves and supplies; the gun positions and ammunition dumps; and the assembly areas where the exhausted Fil-Americans were concentrating their scanty reserves.

Again the points of attack were the extremities of the line. But this the main effort was made on the Japanese left, where they hoped to smash their way down the East Coast road, cutting off the defenders in the hills inland, breaking them up into isolated centers of resistance, and mopping them up at leisure.

The first few hours of the attack were easy going for the Japanese. The heavy preparatory fire of the previous 5 days had forced the defenders to withdraw practically all troops from the outpost line and even, in some cases, from certain positions of the main line of resistance which had been subjected to particularly heavy fire. As the picked combat teams of infantry and engineers worked their way through the jungle, they encountered scarcely any resistance worthy of the name and found that even the defensive artillery barrages were unable to do more than slow their advance a little. Eventually they reached the first strongly defended points and set about the business of piercing the defense zone so as to open the way for their tank battalions. Here occurred

some of the fiercest fighting of the war. The struggle surged back and forth over the same ground for 5 days, with heavy losses on both sides. The Japanese objective was to open a gap in the main line of resistance through which they could pour their mechanized units and fan out in the rear areas, where they could disrupt communications, destroy supply and ammunition facilities, attack concentrations of reserves, and disorganize the Fil-American sector that any orderly withdrawal of the defending troops would be impossible.

In order to prevent such a disaster from occurring, the Fil-American defensive zone had been organized in great depth, with new centers of resistance one behind the other extending south for a distance of 6 miles. As the 5-day battle raged it became evident to the Japanese that a breakthrough was impossible in the early stages, and they settled down to the arduous and costly task of fighting their way through the strongly fortified zone, step by step, with their infantry combat teams. Day by day they pushed forward under terrific barrages of supporting artillery, consolidated their gains, and fought desperately to beat off the Fil-American counterattacks. These had been fierce at first and frequently succeeded in driving the invaders back to their jump-off positions; but as the days wore on, and the same depleted and exhausted Fil-Americans had to battle over and over again with an endless stream of fresh Japanese troops, resistance weakened, and the Fil-Americans gave up positions after positions without attempting to retake them.

By the afternoon of 8 April, the Japanese attacks on the west had created a salient about three miles deep, but the force of their drive had been spent and it appeared that the Fil-Americans had little to fear in this sector except a series of containing attacks to pin them down and to prevent the movement of troops to the other flank. On the east, however, where the road runs down the coast to Mariveles, the defenders' situation was much more serious. Here the last of the carefully prepared defensive positions had been pierced, and nothing stood before the Japanese mechanized units, brought up at last for the final thrust, but a few hastily prepared shelter trenches and barricades thrown up by what was left of the I Corps.

At 2000 hours 8 April the 1st Regular Division was ordered to withdraw to the southern banks of Saysayin River. The situation was very critical. Reports were received that there was a breakthrough in the Pantingan River area and that the lines in that sector were fast collapsing under the terrific pounding from the ground and air. Communications were cut off between the I Corps and

the II Corps. The II Corps which bore the brunt of the offensive, the main effort being through the Pantingan River, had been unheard of for more than two days. Due to the darkness and the rough, wooded terrain, the withdrawal was completed with great difficulty. The Japanese assault on Bataan was made against men worn down by months of siege, by malnutrition and sickness, and cut off, as we ourselves had known since President Roosevelt's speech of February 1942, from any possible relief.

The next morning, 9 April, the tanks jumped off; within an hour they had pushed through to Orion, halfway down the peninsula, and cut the east-west road, which was the Fil-American main lateral axis of communication and supply. Here a part of the mechanized force turned west across the peninsula, completely disorganized the rear area of the II Corps and the Philippine Corps, and bottled up those troops in a pocket from which they were never to escape. At the same time, detachments of Japanese infantry peeled off from the main column, which was following the tanks down the East Coast road, and, forcing their way through the jungles, took what was left of the positions on Bataan Heights in rear and flank, mopping up the last remaining isolated centers of resistance. The end was now on sight. After a conference with his commanders, General Wainwright decided that further resistance was hopeless, and on the same day 9 April 1942 the tattered and starving remnants of the Army of Luzon surrendered. The officers and men of the 1st Regular Division did not like to surrender; they did not relish the idea of giving up the fight but were finally compelled by an irresistable force to give way to the inevitable. So on 12 April 1942, three days after the formal surrender, Major Alfredo M. Santos, surrendered the remnants of the 1st Infantry Regiment to the Imperial Japanese Forces, somewhere along Trail 3, about 5 kilometers southeast of the town of Bagac. The officers and men were forced, under severe penalty or false promise of immediate release upon reaching Manila, to make the "Death March". Hundreds of Americans and Filipinos who fell on the way, due to sheer exhaustion and illness, were bayonetted, shot, or clubbed to death. The Japs were no respecters of rank. General officers and other high ranking officers were the subjects of abuse, maltreatment and humiliation as well as soldiers and civilians. Many a head of both Americans and Filipinos fell on the ground, cut off by sharp swords wielded by Japanese barbarians. It was the supreme test of will power, fortitude, never-say-die spirit of the soldier, courage and stamina to walk hundreds of kilometers under the hot, scorching rays of the sun

in the month of April with practically no food, water nor rest. We stopped at the town of Balanga, Bataan on the 12th; at Orani, Bataan on the 13th; at Lubao, Pampanga on the 14th; and entered the concentration camp at Camp O'Donnell,Capas, Tarlac Province in the afternoon of 15 April 1942 commending our souls in the hands of Almighty God.

Major General Edward P. King,Jr., who was in immediate command of Bataan surrendered a total of between 35,000 and 40,000 Fil-American troops, many of them wounded. In addition,there were about 25,000 civilians on Bataan nearly all of them Filipinos, at the time of surrender. Some 2,500 soldiers and marines managed to escape to Corregidor before the vanguard of the Japanese column entered Mariveles and all communication with the island fortress was finally cut off.

The Japanese claimed to have captured in this battle 60,000 officers and men, and large quantities of supplies and equipment. But the vast majority of the men were caught in isolated groups cut off from all support and supplies, and there did not appear to have been any mass surrender of organized bodies of troops capable of further resistance. The Japanese themselves admitted that practically all of the artillery pieces taken were damaged; and since they had never published any figures on the quantity of ammunition captured, it is unlikely that any large units surrendered until most of their combat equipment had been put out of action.

The Surrender of Corregidor[1].-The attackers lost no time in pushing preparations for the assault on the last remaining stronghold, the fortress of Corregidor. Within 5 hours of the entrance of the first troops into Mariveles at the tip of the peninsula, the Japanese were installing their heavy guns on the slopes of Mt. Mariveles in preparation for the great artillery duel that was to last more than a month and finally come to an end with the silencing of all of Corregidor's guns. Mopping up operations on the peninsula, and the movement of prisoners and captured materiel, were delayed until all the units to be used in the initial bombardment of the island were in position. No time was given the worn-out troops who escaped to the fortress to reorganize and recuperate. As evening fell on the day of the surrender of Bataan, the weary Fil-American prisoners, concentrated in groups throughout the peninsula, heard the opening roar of the artillery bombardment , which, in conjunction with daily bombings, was to continue day and night until the final surrender on 7 May 1942.

The surrender of Bataan sealed the fate of Corregidor and its satellite

1 War Dept Pamphlet,MIS "Japanese Land Operations"(from Japanese sources)8 Dec 1941-8 June 1942. Campaign Study No. 3, 18 Nov 1942.

fortresses in Manila Bay. Like Bataan, Corregidor was without air support. Unlike Bataan, it was subjected to extremely heavy plunging fire from 240 mm batteries emplaced in the mountains of Bataan Peninsula, as well as to the extensive air bombardment. A battle of thirty-three hours preceded the final surrender, with Japanese shock troops swarming across the narrow channel between Bataan and Corregidor during the night to land on the shell-torn beaches of the rocky islet. The beach defenses had been completely annihilated and heavy casualties had been caused by the intensive bombardment. For, contrary, to the previous impressions which were given, officers who escaped from Corregidor earlier in the fighting had now made it clear that practically all of the fortress' guns were emplaced in the open obsolescent mountings, that the famous tunnels in the rocks were virtually uninhabitable, and that in consequence the defenders of the fortress were constantly exposed.

And so the short-lived and disastrous Philippine campaign came to an end on 7 May 1942 as General Wainwright "haggard from lack of sleep and worry" as the Japanese described him, sought the Japanese commanders to ask terms. They were hard: unconditional surrender of all armed forces in the Philippines. Communications with the Philippines ended on 6 May 1942 and 11,574 soldiers, sailors, marines and civilians, Filipinos and Americans, became Japanese prisoners when Corregidor and its three companion forts fell.

The next night, under the terms of the surrender-agreement, General Wainwright broadcast a message to all remaining Fil-American troops throughout the islands directing them to cease resistance. No attention was paid to this order, and the few remaining units in Mindanao, which had been fighting the Japanese since the capture of Davao on 4 January, continued guerilla activities until they were all rounded up in May. The only other place where Fil-American troops were left was in Cebu, and when the Japanes got around to landing at that point, the two regiments of Philippine troops retreated into the jungle, where they carried on a short but sharp little campaign, finally capitulating when their ammunition was exhausted. The war in the Philippines was over. But was it really over? Only time held the true answer!

IV. LOGISTICS AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN

A. Supply.-One problem which plagued continuously the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) from the start to the end of the campaign, was that of supply. The entire trained manpower reserve of the Philippine Army of 132,000 men in 1941 could not be mobilized due to the lack of supplies and equipment to equip and support that large body of fighting men. The conduct of the field operations had to be modified time and again to conform with this inadequacy. Resistance in the Philippines against the Imperial Japanese Forces would have been prolonged very much longer, giving much more needed time for the harassed forces of democracy, and with the attendant much heavier losses to the enemy in lives and materials, had our fighting men been adequately and timely supplied, equipped and supported.

The Over-all Supply Situation.[1]-The story of the Philippine and Bataan Quartermaster Depots is a saga of "too little and toolate"-- a saga of supply when adequate supplies simply did not exist. But, at the same time, it is a story of stark heroism, not so much against enemy bullets and bombs as against overwhelming problems of supply. It is a story of which the QMC may well be proud.

When the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor, the Philippine Quartermaster Depot was located in the Army Port Area of Manila, near Pier No. 1. Lt. Col. (later Colonel) A. E. McConnell (deceased) was commanding, and had as his executive officer Major Frank Ignasewski,QMC (deceased). Captain (later Lt. Col.) A.B. Carlton,QMC (deceased) was the purchasing and contracting officer, and Captain Harold A. Armold,QMC was assistant P & C officer under Captain Carlton. The moment hostilities began, the primary objective of the Depot was to obtain and to transport to the troops all available supplies of all classes. In this endeavor local resources were exploited to the maximum. Particular emphasis was placed upon obtaining Class I supplies, as the higher echelons of command apparently realized from the outset that food would quickly become our most critical item. Large stocks of food supplies from the United States had previously been placed in war reserve at various strategic points on Luzon and Corregidor. The job given to the QMC was to augment these stocks, as well as those of all other classes of supplies, with locally obtained items.

Our first action was to make a quick survey of all stocks in Manila and determine their availability for Army use. All of the local food dealers were

[1]Capt Harold A. Armold,"The Lesson of Bataan",The Quartermaster Review Vol. XXVI No. 3 . Vovember-December 1946 pp.12-15 & 60-63.

contacted , and within a few hours a report was submitted to the depot commander. Every dealer contacted by Capt. Armorld agreed to turn over to the Army, on demand, all of his stocks of food at the November 30th inventory price. A written memorandum of this agreement was obtained in every case. This arrangement seemed fair, as the prices in Manila since 8 December had sky-rocketed, and the civilian populace had made great runs on all stores and were accumulating all possible stocks of food. This resulted in great inroads being made on the food stocks in the warehouses in Manila; however, vast quantities still remained untouched. At the time this survey was completed the Army was not yet ready to commandeer foods, and we continued to procure and contract only on requisition.

In the Tondo District of Manila were stored large supplies of rice, owned mostly by Chinese merchants. By operating fleets of trucks and labor gangs, much of this rice was obtained for the Army use, and was delivered to the Port Area for distribution to units in the field. This work was made very difficult because of the frequent, almost continuous, air-raid alarms. These air-raid alarms served to excite the native laborers and made it quite difficult to work with them. It was not uncommon to have an entire convoy of vehicles standed in the middle of Manila because all drivers and other workers had fled. The only way, then, to get the convoy"back on the road" was to round up enough new drivers and other workers from stray persons in the vicinity to operate the convoy. Despite these difficulties with laborers and with broken-down, dilapidated civilian trucks, thousands and thousands of Cavanes (125-lb sacks)of polished rice were delivered to the Port Area.

The Depot at this time became quite concerned with supplies of all sorts which were aboard ships of many nationalities in Manila harbor. Soon after the war began, a large-scale bombing raid was made on the shipping in Manila Bay. Fortunately, only one vessel was appreciably damaged. These ships were then brought into the piers and unloaded as quickly as possible. The supplies were stored in great heaps in the area surrounding the piers, and it was our job to supervise the loading, the handling, and the delivery to the Port Area, for disposition, of those supplies required by the Army. Attempt was made to classify, describe, evaluate and issue purchase orders, and obtain delivery receipts for all items, but due to the great confusion prevailing, no accurate record was actually made of the supplies taken by the Army. In this connection it should be noted that there are probably now many claims being presented to the Army for

payment, which claims in fact are neither true, just nor fair, as many of these supplies were taken by commercial concerns and by individual civilians. It might be well to say here that an agreement had been entered into by MacArthur's headquarters with the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines that the Army would receipt for only those supplies needed for its use. The supplies in the freighters and on the docks had not passed through the customs; checks of supplies were made by McConnell from ships' manifests only, delivered by ships' captains on demand. The supplies unloaded from these ships were of all types. To mention a few, there were large quantities of foods; there were automobile tires of all sizes; there were ladies' wearing apparel; there were medicines and drugs; and there were even some British armored reconnaissance cars. In my opinion, the only accurate accounting of these supplies can be had from the ships' manifests, but even they will not reflect with accuracy the amount of goods taken by the Army. However, it appears that, despite bombing raids and the confusion prevailing, all the ships were unloaded.

During the time when all the piers were full of ships and were busily unloading, the Japanese made their first vicious bombing attack on the Port Area. Many persons were wounded, many were killed, and a great deal of damage was done to the supplies lying in the open Pier 7 because of the flooding of the area by a broken water-main. This one water-main caused more damage than a dozen hits would have inflicted.

In the welter of activity all installations headquarters in the Port Area were moved, because of the extreme vulnerability of the area to bombing attacks and to fire. This included the Quartermaster Depot. All civilian employees were moved to San Beda College, Sampaloc, Manila, together with the office equipment and official records, because it was thought that operations could be conducted from there in comparative safety. The wisdom of this precaution was well borne out after the previously-mentioned raid of mid-December on the Port Area.

I do not know the exact amount of supplies obtained, sorted, and transported by the QMC from the time the war began until Manila was declared an open city, but have reason to believe that the following amounts of Class I supplies were delivered to the following advanced depots in Luzon: to Tarlac (North-Central), 17 train-loads; to Los Baños (South-Central), 11 train-loads; to Guagua (Central), 7 train-loads. These suplies consisted principally of American-type foodstuffs.

Large reserves of palay (unhusked rice) were located at the Cabanatuan town, Nueva Ecija, a Government rice central. I do not know how effectively distribution of this rice was made, but have reason to believe that the bulk of it was abandoned and was taken by the local population and by the enemy.

Late on the night of 24 December, 1941, the QM Depot moved to the Bataan peninsula. By this time the enemy had complete control of the air over Luzon and was rapidly advancing with his ground forces to converge upon Manila. Movement of all sorts on the highways and railroads was then difficult and hazardous. However, due to the brilliant leadership of General MacArthur, General Wainwright, and General Jones, evacuation of the American-Filipino forces into Bataan was satisfactorily completed . But this sudden change in the tactical situation created an insurmountable problem of supply: the large stocks of food still in Manila and those previously sent to Los Baños and Tarlac, and the millions of pounds of palay at Cabanatuan, were perforce abandoned by the Army and lost, leaving the beleaguered Bataan force to fall back upon the meager supplies at Guagua, those hastily shipped by water and highway from Manila when MacArthur suddenly shifted his supply base to Bataan in the latter part of December, supplies which had been brought in by various units in their own vehicles, and the very limited local resources of Bataan.

The Supply Situation of the 1st Regular Division.-At the outbreak of hostilities, the 1st Regular Division was only a division in name. It was really a regiment with peacetime strength stationed at Camp Murphy, Quezon City. Among the the infantry divisions which were activated and mobilized, it was the last to be expanded to full wartime strength. Consequently it suffered from the dirge of organizational supplies and equipment; it was inadequately equipped with leftovers if there were any. As was stated before it had no organic artillery for the reason that all available field artillery pieces were already distibuted to the units and there were no more left to equip the division. It went to war without any steel helmets. Even its organizational combat weapons were incomplete; it had mortars but had no mortar shells when it took up its battle position on the beach at Mauban, Tayabas. It had .50 Cal. MG ammunition but had no MG's for these ammunitions. It was only after it had withdrawn from the beach that it was able to be equipped and supplied with these vital items. At the start the division had no signal communition system for all signal equipment available were not even enough for the other divisions previously mobilized. Only two

pairs of khaki uniforms, two pairs of underwears, two pairs of socks and a pair of service shoes were issued to each man when he went to the front. Rations were carried in the division trains and after they were exhausted, the division depended mostly on local procurement and foodstuffs provided free along the way. Our native population took the responsibility of feeding groups in private dwellings whenever the division bivouaced, rested or garrisoned barrios or towns.

The Supply Situation in Bataan.[1]--Immediately upon arrival at Bataan, on Christmas Day, 1941, the QMCP was set up at Km Post 163.3, near the barrio of Limay. Dumps and distribution points for Quartermaster supplies were immediately established to service the various fighting and service units.

Rather chaotic conditions existed at first on Bataan, as the units from all over Luzon came streaming in and established their positions and headquarters. However, due to the skillful management, hard work, common sense of the top-ranking QM officers, commanded Brig-General C. C. Drake, supply was maintained, and few people went hungry or unclothed, despite the difficult situation.

After the first large-scale Japanese assault was thrown back at Abucay and the Hacienda, it became apparent that our position would be relatively static until relief arrived, and that we would be in for a long siege.

By the first part of January it was possible to inventory the supplies on hand and determine the requirements of the using units. To our dismay it was found that, with the American Army, Philippine Scouts, Philippine Army, and Filipino civilians, we had to feed and clothe over 100,000 people. The answer was obvious--drastically reduce the food ration. This was a very serious step, but it was the only thing which could be done under existing circumstances if we were to maintain ourselves for a period long enough for help to arrive. Accordingly, on 6 January, 1942, the ration was reduced to one-half of a ration per man per day; even then, many basic ingredients of this reduced ration were not to be had.

The fighting at the front soon became stalemated, so that for many weeks the primary concern of many of our troops was not enemy bombs nor bullets but FOOD. As food supplies got shorter, the men became hungrier and weaker, and a greta deal of pilfering of supplies occurred. Due to this situation, and the need for a very strict control of all issue of food, a considerable amount, including type C ration, was shipped to Corregidor, where it was believed that

[1]Capt Harold A. Armold,"The Lesson of Bataan",The Quartermaster Review Vol. XXVI No. 3. November-December 1946 pp. 14-15 and 60-63.

it could be stored safely, and from which point it could be distributed more fairly.

Early in January a large main QM dump was established near Little Baguio, at Km. Post 169 on the Mariveles Road. From this dump supplies were moved daily to the various ration distributing points, and from these there was a daily automatic supply to the consuming units. As the campaign wore on into February and March, fewer and fewer supplies were kept on Bataan. As a matter of fact, it was a policy to keep only a two-day supply of Class I supplies on hand at the main dump. This supply was replenished nightly with a one-day issue brought by barge from Corregidor. It is to the credit of the Water Transport Service of the QMC that every delivery from Corregidor was safely made, even though the enemy had complete control of the air and operated light naval craft in Manila Bay.

One of the first acts of the QMC on Bataan was to establish a bakery. By the early part of January, under the able management of Major Harry H.Hull, QMC, this bakery was operating, and so long as the flour supply lasted, turned out sufficient bread, of good quality, to supply all troops. The flour supply, however, failed to last as long as the siege, and during the last few weeks of the campaign the bakery was forced to close down.

With so many Filipinos to feed, rice, of course, was a very critical item. Soon after the first of the year our rice stocks reached a critical point, and it looked for a time as though we would be forced to surrender simply because we did not have enough rice. At one time--about the first of February--the rice issue got as low as two ounces per man per day. This was a very, very small ration and was not sufficient to maintain life, let alone maintain a fighting man in top condition. However, just at the point where things looked the darkest, some interisland boats from Cebu managed to break the Japanese blockade and reach Corregidor. These boats carried considerable stocks of rice, and enabled us to increase the ration.

Every effort was made to exploit local resources to the maximum. Bataan is a very poor province and consists mostly of mountains and forests. However, there is a small segment of the peninsula, near Manila Bay, on which rice is grown. At the time the war began, the rice in this area had been cut and piled in stacks, but had not been threshed. The QMC made every attempt to thresh this rice in the fields. This operation was very difficult, as much of the area was

under enemy artillery fire, and all of which was subject to repeated Japanese bombings and strafing attacks. However, over 10,000 cavanes of palay were collected from the fields of Bataan. Had the workers not been so frightened, or had we had even as much as a single American-type machine for threshing, at least ten times this amount of palay could have been recovered. However, imagine yourself working with a group of twenty-five ot thirty people out in the open fields where the nearest tree is a mile or so away; where there is no adequate cover close at hand; where enemy planes frequently drowse lazily overhead at altitudes ranging from 50 to 25,000 feet, without opposition of any sort; where these planes frequently bomb or strafe your group--then perhaps you can understand why Filipinos and Americans too, were frightened, and why the operation was difficult. Great credit is due to those few loyal and brave native souls who willingly risked their lives to garner in these few thousands bushels of palay.

At Orion and Balanga were rice mills. As the front contracted and these towns became a part of "No Man's Land", the mills were dismantled by the Corps of Engineers and taken to an area near the main QM ration dump, where they were reassembled. The palay taken from the fields was then brought to these mills for final milling and polishing.

This rice-gathering operation (perhaps in modern military jargon it would be known as "Operation Rice") was the responsibility of the Purchasing and Contracting Section of the QM Depot. This was perhaps a unique employment of the P & C personnel. To us it meant that, rather than stay with the rear echelons, they went forward with trucks and men, and by display of leadership and initiative induced others, mostly Filipino farmers and refugees, to perform highly dangerous work. Illustrative of this experience was the fact that, while engaged in this operation, Capt Armold's car was hit three times by bomb frags, had four trucks demolished, and lost seven men. From this the reader can get an idea that in at least one campaign P & C was not a rocking-chair rear-area job.

About the last of January it became necessary for our forces to withdraw from the flat lands of Bataan and set up new defensive positions. This put an immediate end to most of the rice-gathering operation and cut us off from the many thousands of bushels of rice still standing in stacks in "No Man's Land", around Orion and Balanga.

The QMCP was then moved to Little Baguio, as Limay had then come in con-

tact with enemy shells having come within artillery range. From this time on, QM activity was concerned almost entirely with distribution of supplies rather than with procurement, as there was little left to procure. The clothing-and-equipage dump was moved from Cabcaben and set up near the main ration dump, and issue was made from the meager stock to the most needy cases. A clothing-repair shop was established on the west side of Bataan , and civilian laborers were employed to mend and repair clothing. It seemed almost comic now, but one of the biggest problems of this operation was securing needles for the machines. A supply of new needles was finally "procured" from a Chinaman found living in a cave in the side of Mt. Mariveles. For this operation practically all the usable sewing-machines in Bataan were commandeered by the Army.

A salt-manufacturing plant(boiling sea water in large iron cauldrons) was set up near the seashore. By the end of the campaign enough salt was being produced to supply nearly all the salt requirements of the beleaguered forces, Only those who have ever eaten rice without salt can really appreciate the importance of this condiment in our ration, especially when there were no other substantial viands to go with the food.

From mid-February on, the situation on Bataan deteriorated rapidly, particularly because of lack of food and medical supplies. Besides the troops, there were tens of thousands of Filipino civilians who had to be cared for and provided with food, clothing, medical aid, and shelter by the Army. These people were a great but necessary burden to the armed forces. They were grouped together in various civilian camps throughout the peninsula, and to each group was assigned an American officer-in-charge. This officer drew supplies from the QM on requisition, the same as all military units.

Two such camps were organized and run as labor work camps by the QMC for a short period of time because laborers were needed to thresh palay, which had been transported in the sheath to the rear areas. Although this operation was highly inefficient, it did provide a few thousand bushels of rice while we would not otherwise have obtained. The straw from these threshing operations was baled by primitive hand methods, and the bales were turned over to the pack trains for feed. The laborers who threshed this palay wre not only fed by the Army but were paid on-the-spot- wages for their work. As soon as all the palay was threshed and and the straw baled, the camps were turned over to GHQ and removed from QM control.

Another operation undertaken by the QMC, working in conjunction with the Veterinary Corps, was the procuring and slaughtering of water carabao. Many hundreds of carabao had been abandoned by their owners in the face of the Japanese advance, and were running wild over all parts of Bataan. Accordingly a project was organized to obtain as many of these animals as possible for our use. A stock pen was set up, to which were taken all carabaos obtained. Whenever a carabao was commandeered for the Army, every effort was made to ascertain the identity of the owner and reimburse him, either in dash or by voucher, for his animal. Many of the owners, of course, could not be identified,as they had abandoned their property. These carabaos were slaughtered at the stock pen, and their carcasses were shipped to Corregidor, where they were placed in the cold storage plant for freezing and storage. Nightly delivery of the frozen carcasses was made from Corregidor to Bataan. As this supply of meat, however, was entirely inadequate to supply the forces, great difficulty was experienced in making fair and equitable distribution of such supply. As the food situation grew worse it became necessary to slaughter all the Army's horses and mules, except those of the pack-train. every effort was likewise made to make fair distribution of this meat, but "leaks" along the line of supply from the QMDP to the using units were difficult problems.

We had very few cigarettes and cigars, and very little pipe tobacco with us on Bataan, and it was found, much to our dismay, that many men would go hungry to get a "fag". The theoretical issue of tobacco throughout most of the campaign was one cigarette per man per day. With such meager issue it is not difficult to visualize the great leakage which existed along the lines of distribution. the problem of distributing cigarettes became so acute, even in the early stages of the campaign, that Colonel McConnell, Commanding Officer of the QM Depot, was forced to establish what he called a "special-issue counter", from which he personally issued all tobaccos. The number of items on this special-issue counter grew and grew as things became scarce, until McConnell was personally issuing at least two dozen items besides cigarettes.

As supplies became increasingly short, many complaints were made by receiving units. In order to protect himself the Quartermaster was forced to obreceipts from every requisitioning unit as to the amount of each item actually received. Scarcely a day went by in the latter part of the campaign when one or more general officers failed to make personal inspections of QM activities.

Thanks, however, to this system of receipts, and to a vigorous and honest QM adminitration, a minimum of complaint was seriously leveled at the Quartermaster. The leakages in supply apparently occurred, in most instances, lower down the line of distribution. It should be noted that the ration was determined by GHQ, and not by the operating QM. The QM function was merely to provide the ration to the requisitioning units in their pro-rata share.

As March drew to an end our situation on Bataan looked hopeless indeed. However, rumors were rife that help would soon arrive, and as a matter of fact, Sisiman Cove, across the North Channel from Corregidor, actually had been put in readiness by the Engineers to receive the supplies. The QM was organizing labor gangs to unload these supplies and disburse them to the various dumps. It was at this moment that the Japanese chose to launch their all-out attack on Bataan. Our men were weak from lack of food and sick from lack of quinine. The situation was simply untenable, and in a few short days our lines gave way before the vicious Japanese attacks and we were forced to capitulate to the enemy.

Heartbreaking it was indeed to learn, some years later, that those supplies which we were preparing to receive, and for which we had hoped and prayed so fervently, were actually aboard ship and at Cebu, waiting to come to Bataan under promised air and naval support, on the day of the surrender.

This, then, is the short story of the QM Depot activities in Manila and on Bataan. It is a story of supply, or, rather, the lack of it. It is a story of an attempt to do something with nothing. It is a story from which surely we can all learn a lesson-- a lesson of preparedness. Had we been adequately supplied in the Philippines, had we even had our required war reserves safely stored away on Bataan, the story would likely have been very different. Blame for the inadequacy of supplies in this campaign definitely cannot be laid on the doorstep of any of those in the Philippines--they did their best. They fought with what they had. It wasn't much. For their pains, their trouble, and their anguish, most are now dead. From General Drake down, every man did his part; it was the best we could do. But was it the best that the greatest nation on earth could do?

B. Evacuation and Hospitalization.-At the start of hostilities and during the large-scale fighting prior to the siege of Bataan, there were no military type hospitals established to support any specific division or unit. From the division clearing stations the wounded were evacuated to the nearest government

or private hospitals, most of which were filled to overflowing due to the heavy casualties sustained in various actions. In the Mauban sector, the wounded were taken to the Provincial Hospitals at Lucena, Tayabas and at Sta. Cruz,Laguna, and later evacuated to Manila upon the approach of the Japanese forces. The 1st Regular Division had no organic ambulances to transport the wounded away from the battlefields. Mr. Jesus Bautista, Governor of Laguna Province, seeing our plight, donated the provincial ambulance and the provincial station-wagon for our use. If the ambulance was not available, trucks, "carretelas", or carabao carts,and even sleds,were used to be able to give immediate aid to the most serious cases. In many cases the regular hospital doctors could not cope with the situation, when hundreds of surgical cases flood the hospitals,private doctors and surgeons had to pitch in with their own equipment and necessary drugs.

In Bataan, there was established at Limay during the early days of January a field hospital This was later transferred further south to Cabcaben, and converted into Base Hoppital No. 2 with the mission to support the II Corps. Base Hospital No. 1 was established at Little Baguio, near Mariveles, with the mission to support the I Corps. The large Red Cross signs over these hospitals afforded no protection against Japanese bombing and strafing attacks. In fact, these places were deliberately bombed and strafed several times, causing hundreds of casualties not only among the patients, but also among the medical personnel. The Chief Surgeon of the Philippine Army lost his life during one of these attacks. The installations were mostly of make-shift affair, mostly under tentage, and with very inadequate medical supplies and facilities. Lack of medical supplies and medical equipment greatly handicapped the personnel of the medical service. But it was remarkable how these people carried on until the end.

C.Transportation and Communication.- Transportation in Manila and throughout the provinces is by railroad, airplane, motor car, street car, bus, "carretela", and carromata.

There are at present 1,344 kilometers of railroad in operation. The Manila Railroad Company, which is owned by the Philippine Government, has 1,130 kilometers in operation. The Philippine Railway Company has in operation 214 kilometers of railway in the islands of Panay and Cebu.

The Philippine Aerial Taxi Company organized in 1931, and the Iloilo-Negros Air Express Company established in 1933, operated land and water planes in prac-

tically every point in the Philippines, Stinson and Waco ships were used. At present, these companies after reorganization are known as the Philippine Air Lines, Inc. with passenger and freight service to Hongkong, Shanghai and San Francisco,(California); the Commercial Air Lines,Inc. with passenger and freight service to Hongkong,Bangkok and Singapore; and the Far Eastern Air Transport,Inc. with passenger and freight service to Hongkong, Shanghai, Madrid (Spain) and San Francisco. All these air lines are owned by Filipinos, and using modern passenger planes. Manila was the eastern terminal of the Pan-American Airways clippers. The PAA clippers made weekly calls at Manila. The clippers made short trips to Hongkong, thus connecting the United States and the Asiatic mainland.

In 1937 there were registered 30,361 automobiles, 18,293 trucks, and 540 motorcycles. The garage cars, taxicabs, and motor buses are operated by private concerns.

Thirty-six motor transportation companies used to operate trucks and motor buses over Philippine highways.

The Manila Electric Company operated up-to-date, clean, and comfortable street cars in all points in the city of Manila and its environs, including Fort Wm. McKinley and Pasig, and these are augmented by a bus system before the war. At present the trend is to discard the rail system and just use buses to all the points mentioned above.

At the close of 1937 there had been constructed 17,711.8 kilometers of roads in the Philippines, classified as follows: first-class roads, 9,881.7 kilometers; second-class, 5,654.2 kilometers; third-class, 2,175.9 kilometers.

During 1937 a total of 618 vessels having an aggregate net tonnage of 2, 329,606 was engaged in the foreign trade of the Philippines There were recorded during the year 1,074 vessels that had discharged 1,871,071 tons of import cargo and 1,304 vessels loaded with 2,741,854 tons of export cargo.

The principal city and port is Manila, in the island of Luzon. The other ports open for tradeare Iloilo, in the island of Panay; Cebu, in the island of Cebu; Zamboanga and Davao,in the island of Mindanao; Jolo, in the island of Jolo; and Legaspi, Aparri and J. Panganiban, in Luzon.

Shipping facilities at the Manila harbor are excellent. There are four piers capable of berthing twelve overseas steamers at one time in the South Harbor, while in the North Harbor similar facilities are available. The newest pier (Pier 7) is one of the finest and most efficiently equipped terminal structures of its

kind to be found anywhere. The new pier is 1,400 feet long over all and 240 feet wide, having a berthing length of 1,290 feet and accomodating four of the largest vessels plying the Pacific. A fifth vessel may also be berth at the end. The pier is covered by a modern concrete and steep cargo and passenger structure 1,235 feet long by 150 feet wide, leaving open cargo aprons 40 feet wide on each side and at the end, and is piped for fresh water and bunker fuel oil.

The mechanical cargo-handling equipment in this pier is complete and modern, consisting of six electric heavy lift cranes of the jib type, of four and fifteen tons' capacity, mounted upon trackage on the aprons. Within the cargo structure is a flexible system of overhead electric hoisting and stacking cranes which move both longitudinally and laterally. These cranes are twenty-three in number and of five and one-half tons' capacity. Electric floor tractors, motor trucks and trailers, and hand trucks complete the efficient and elaborate cargo-handling equipment of the pier. This pier makes Manila the ranking port in the Orient as regards facilities for the prompt discharge of cargo.

Interisland shipping plays an important role in the transportation system of the Philippines due to the expanse of seas and straits that separate the islands from each other. There were 11 large steamship companies engaged in the interisland shipping trade with a total number of vessels of approximately 220.

The Bureau of Posts maintains a telegraph and wireless service with stations scattered all over the country. A very important development in communication in the Philippines is the establishment of long-distance telephone service, which links the Philippines with world-wide radiophone communication. This service is operated by the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company which also maintains modern telephone system in Manila, Cebu, Iloilo, and Negros. There are four private companies engaged in telegraph, radio, and cable service. Before the war there were three radio broadcasting stations in the Philippines, all of which were located in Manila. They were KZRM (Radio Manila), KZEG, and KZIB. Today, there are four radio broadcasting stations in Manila, namely: WVTM (operated by and for the Armed Forces of the U.S.), the KZPI, the KZRH, and the KZFM. Almost all the communication system in the Philippines were destroyed during the war. After the liberation of the country by the American Forces, the Army rehabilitated a considerable portion of the system. Because complete and efficient communication is vital to its functions, the Military Police Command of the Philippine Army has established a country-wide communication system.

The 1st Regular Division had no organic combat vehicles. The few organic trucks and station wagons it had were barely adequate to meet the requirements of peacetime garrison. The situatipn of the other reserve divisions which were mobilized was practically similar in so far as the transportation was concerned. To remedy this defect, a plan was evolved in which private transportation companies in the Philippines would supply the means of transportation for the Army's needs, in case of emergency. At the outbreak of hostilities, therefore, the USAFFE commandeered all available trucks and buses and driving personnel of these private transportation concerns and allocated them to the different units which were mobilized and ordered to take the field. It was not strange, therefore, to see in the combat area all assortments of color and type vehicles in each division. Our Division had the trucks and buses of the following companies: Benguet Auto Line (BAL); Raymundo Transportation Co. (RAYTRANCO);T.R. Yangco Transit (TRY TRAN); Halili Transportation Co.; Laguna-Tayabas-Batangas Transportation Co. (LTB); Pasay Transportation Co. (PASTRANCO); and others. When the 1st Infantry Regiment was having a hard time slowing down the advance of the Japs on the Kabalete Line in Tayabas, 300 MP troops of the Philippine Scouts, who went there to help us, came riding in taxicabs, commandeered in the streets of Manila,- a situation similar to the "Taxicab Army" which saved Paris from the Germans in World War I.

This setup of having no organic vehicles was not ideal, of course, for it created several difficult problems in dealing with the private transportation. Some of the civilian drivers who were commandeered with their vehicles, unnerved by the rigors of the campaign, left unceremoniously, but the majority remained with their vehicles, went with the Army to Bataan, and took their share of hardships in jungle warfare. At the end of the campaign, almost all of these vehicles were destroyed or unserviceable; others were recovered and repaired by the Japs. Claims for the loss, reimbursement and services rendered have been filed by the transportation companies concerned, investigated and adjudicated, while others are still pending settlement.

The 1st Regular Division, especially at the outbreak of the war and during the early phase of the Bataan siege, had practically no signal communication system, due largely to the utter lack of signal supplies and equipment. As a consequence the existing civilian telegraph and telephone system had to be utilized. If none was available, messages were sent by means of couriers and runners. There was a time in Bataan when my units had no single telephone nor radio set at all.

Much valuable time and effort were wasted by the "runner" system of transmiting messages to the different units.

Maintenance of equipment and replacement of parts were problems that taxed the resourcefulness and ingenuity of our ordnance officers. Again it was the lack of almost anything that was the crux of the matter. Or course, when maintenance failed, many vehicles broke down; and since there were no other vehicles or spare parts available to replace them, the number of deadlined and unserviceable vehicles increased, and conversely, the number of serviceable ones decreased to a point when a definite threat to the curtailed movement of supplies was formed. "Cannibalizing" had to be resorted to in many cases so as to place back into the service those vehicles which otherwise would have been useless for lack of some essential spare parts or assemblies.

D. Services.-The Quartermaster Corps did an exeellent job in the procurement and distribution of rations and supplies, in the utilization of local resources, and in making the best out of a difficult and hopeless situation.

The Corps of Engineers did splendid work in the blowing up of bridges, construction of road blocks and other demolition work during the retreat into Bataan, delaying the enemy considerably. In Bataan the engineers improved and repaired roads, trails and other lines of communication, helped much in the organization of the ground, construction of field fortification and obstacles, laying of mines and booby-traps, and bridging of the numerous streams in the defense sector.

After all the divisions had successfully retreated into Bataan, and regrouping of forces was accomplished, the Signal Corps undertook the hard work of constructing and integrating the entire signal communication system on the Peninsula. Redistribution of signal supplies and equipment was done to strike a balance in meeting the requirements of the different units. My division received its share of redistributed equipment and supplies so that the signal communication set-up was much improved.

There was an apprehension for sometime that the Japs might resort to the use of poison gas in their desperation to crack our lines after repeated attacks were repulsed, so the Chemical Corps was poised to use retaliatory measures. However, poison gas was not used by the enemy. In view of the jungle nature of Bataan there was also no occasion to use smoke to hide military activities.

Division Finance officers paid their men by battalions, including those in the front lines. Inasmuch as the siege cut us off from the outside world and, therefore, the use of money was not very necessary, the Finance Division encour-

aged every man to deposit their salaries with the USAFFE Finance Officer at Corregidor, which advice was followed by many officers and men. Those who did not deposit their money with Corregidor were very much distressed and saddened when the Japanese confiscated them after the surrender. Those who followed the advice and those who did not collect their salaries at all while in Bataan, had the satisfaction of getting their money back after the Philippines was liberated three years later. After the surrender of Bataan, millions of pesos worth of bills and coins were confiscated by the Japanese from the Division Finance officers or otherwise dugged from hidden caches in the jungles.

V. PERSONNEL ASPECTS OF THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN

A. Partial Mobilization.- In the earlier part of this treatise, I have endeavored to explain briefly the organization and composition of the various units which composed the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). At the outbreak of the war, the Philippines was in state of partial mobilization. Although there was a reserve pool of approximately 132,000 trained men, the short time between the calling of all the reserves and the actual opening of hostilities, in addition to the lack of supplies and equipment, prevented the total mobilization of the Philippines. The following reserve divisions were ,either, in training or in a state of alertness in their respective cantonment areas on 8 December 1941:

1st Regular Division--1 Regiment in Camp Murphy, Quezon City,Luzon; 1 Regiment in CampParang, Cotobato,Mindanao.
2nd Regular Division--Constabulary units stationed in the provinces surrounding Manila and Central Plain.
11th Reserve Division--Northern Pangasinan, Southern La Union, Cagayan Valley, Luzon.
21st Reserve Division--Eastern Pangasinan and Tarlac,Luzon.
31st Reserve Division--Western coast of Zambales,Luzon.
41st Reserve Division--Tagaytay Ridge, Batangas, Luzon.
51st Reserve Division--Eastern coast of Tayabas (Lamon Bay), Luzon.
61st Reserve Division--Iloilo, Panay and Negros,Visayan Islands.
71st Reserve Division--Camp O'Donnell, Tarlac, Luzon.
81st Reserve Division--Cebu, Visayan Islands.
91st Reserve Division--Nueva Ecija, Luzon.
101st Reserve Division--Mindanao.

A Philippine Army Infantry Division had approximately 10,000 men. But inasmuch as several of these divisions were not of war strength, there were only about 80,000 men mobilized at the time of Pearl Harbor. To complete the strength of these units, thousands of volunteers were drafted into the service. Thousands of reservists, though there was no time to call them to the colors, reported to dif-

ferent units and were taken in there. These volunteers and resrvists formed the source of replacements for the divisions in combat.

In Bataan, Military Police units were organized immediately. Straggler lines were established and stragglers were returned promptly to their respective organizations. Traffic control in rear areas was handled by the Military Police. Courts-martial were organized in the Philippine Army Headquarters near Mariveles. Officers and men, against whom charges were filed, were tried and punished.

Japanese fanaticism of "no surrender" accounted to only a handful of prisoners of war. The Japanese PWs were kept in a stockage in the Corps areas. Their small number presented practically no problem at all,

In most cases during the fighting on the beaches and plains, our dead had to be left behind for the enemy's attacks were relentless and vigorous. Later, civilians in the locality buried them in local cemeteries or in isolated graves. But in Bataan, after the campaign assumed the positional stage, our dead were buried in Division or corps cemeteries by some burial details from the Qaurtermaster Copps. Scattered all over Bataan are 53 known burial plots containing the remains of the USAFFE soldiers who died in the defense of the Peninsula. Recent reports state that General MacArthur directed PHILRYCOM to build at U.S. cost, a national cemetery for the FILIPINO war dead on a ten-hectare plot at the foot of Mt. Samat, Bataan. To this place will be brought all Filipino war dead scattered in Bataan cemeteries. The United States Army volunteered to build the memorial cemetery and turned it over, with graves properly marked, to the Filipinos on Memorial Day, 30 May 1947.

The matter of awards and decorations was not overlooked. Hundreds of officers and men of the 1st Regular Division were commended, cited, and awarded the DSC, DSM, Silver Star, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star and the Purple Heart. Officers and men who distinguished themselves in the field of combat for acts of gallantry, heroism and leadership were promoted not only in rank but also in position.

As previously stated, civilians were utilized in several odd jobs by the Army. Laborers, mechanics, drivers, farmers, tailors, and many others, did their alloted task. The majority of these civilian employees were war refugees, natives of Bataan or drivers of several transportation companies. They cast their lot with us and , later, many enlisted, too, in the USAFFE.

VI. INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN

A. Strategic Intelligence.-The Japanese intelligence activities, many years before World War II were thorough, extensive and of long duration. Scores of years

before 1941, the Philippines had been the hunting ground of Japanese intelligence agents. They came in the guise of peddlers who roamed around the countryside, looked into every nook and corner of potential areas, gathering military information about the topographical, sociological, political, historical and economic conditions of the Philippines, particularly the state of its armed forces. For many years the government was helpless in stopping the intrusions of fishing boats owned by Japanese nationals from Formosa in our territorial waters, With this means the Japanese were able to survey and produce charts and maps of our coastlines. they knew their way around in our inland waters, every cove or sound that could give shelter and cover to their patrol boats and submarines. They were not only able to reprint strategic and tactical maps of the Philippines made by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, but they were able to improve them. In fact the Japanese maps and charts we captured in combat were more accurate and up-to-date than our own maps and charts. Almost all Japanese who did business in the Philippines before the war were officers of the Army or Navy or persons of some consequence in their government. Much to our surprise, we saw Japanese ranking officers during the occupation whom we recognized as former salesmen in Japanese bazaars, or employeesin Japanese business firms in our big cities before the war.

On the other hand we knew relatively little about the Japanese armed forces, nor their strategic and tactical conditions. The Japanese government was so suspicious of foreigners, so careful in guarding their military secrets that, aside from knowing that Japan was a first-class power and a lurking suspicion that she had nothing good in store for us, we knew nothing of her military establishment and capabilities which could help us in our defense efforts.

According to the Japanese time-table, their estimate was that the Philippine campaign would be a push-over, and that by 15 January 1942 the whole country would be under their complete domination. But they failed to consider the Filipinos unswerving loyalty to the United States, their intense love for freedom, liberty and justice, and their firm belief in the democratic way of life. The Japanese were even taken aback by our stubborn resistance, and expressed surprise at our reluctance to side with them and failure to welcome them with open arms. Had they correctly analyzed our history, our long struggle as a people, they would have arrived at a different conclusion. Filipinos hate invaders. Magellan, the supposedly "discoverer" of the Philippines and first representative of modern imperialism, was killed by Filipino fighters on the shores of Mactan Island in 1521. During the more than 370 years of Spanish tyranny, we fought the Spaniards on every occasion,

staged more than 100 major revolts, culminating in the glorious Revolution of 1896 which broke the Spanish power in the Philippines. Then in 1898 America came. Misconstruing the motives of America in coming to replace Spanish rule, the Filipinos fought America,too, for three bitter years which required more than 200,000 American troops and the expenditure of millions of dollars to pacify the country. In World War I we offered 25,000 fighting men to the United States for combat in the European Theater, and donated, thru voluntary public contribution, the destroyer "RIZAL" as our humble share in the defense of democracy. So when the Japanese came to invade our land, the world expected, and rightly so, that we would give them a good fight.

B. Combat and Counter Intelligence.-Reconnaissance and combat patrols from our front line units resulted in the collection of valuable military intelligence. We learned that the Japanese were using firecrackers, especially at night, so as to scare our men with the thought that they were surrounded upon hearing the bursting firecrackers which were projected forward by the Japs behind our lines. We discovered also that the enemy was using noise-making devices to produce the sound of rattling machine-guns so as to entice our soldiers to answer the fire, reveal their position and waste ammunition. Our reconnaissance patrols also reported that the Japs dressed some of their men with Philippine Army uniforms and used them as decoys to our unwary scouts and patrols. Reports also were received that the enemy was constructing another road thru the jungles across the peninsula because they could not use the Pilar-Bagac Road which was dominated by our artillery. Combat patrols brought many captured Japanese maps, field orders, diaries, reports,personal papers and other documents of high intelligence value, including captured weapons and equipment which were sent to the rear for technical intelligence.

From Bataan many intelligence agents from our G-2 Division were sent across Manila Bay in boats to Manila so as to gather information of the Japanese activity, especially the High Command. Some of these agents were apprehended and were never heard from. Many were able to perform hazardous missions and reported back their information which were of incalculable value in the appreciation of our plight and the evaluation of the enemy. We sent out our men dressed in civilian clothes and posing as civilians who passed thru the lines for the purpose of disseminating false information to the enemy with the idea of confusing him and compelling him to make a false move. In one occasion the Japs got the information that all the streams in Battan were electrically charged which really scared many timid souls among them.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

A. Role Played by the 1st Regular Division.- Although the 1st Regular Division was among the last units ordered to take the field, it was among those to receive the first baptism of fire. Against overwhelming odds, numerically-inferior, poorly-equipped, and inadequately-supported, it pitted its puny strength against the Imperial Japanese Forces on the beaches of Mauban; surprised and confused, and caused considerable damage to tne enemy in in lives and materiel, and slowed down the rapid Japanese advance toward the capital city. From From 27 December 1941, when the advance on Manila from Lamon Bay and Lingayen Gulf began, all the efforts of the Japanese were directed towards bottling up the Filipino-American forces in the vicinity of Manila or the Central Plain, and preventing their occupation of Bataan Peninsula. Their two invading columns were ideally situated to accomplish this, for one was approaching from the east and another was pressing on Manila from the north, while the USAFFE had to withdraw to the west across the very front of the northern column. This entailed almost superhuman efforts on the part of the two small rear guards, which had the mission of delaying the Japanese advance until the withdrawal could be accomplished. They performed their work well, for the Japanese did not enter Manila until 2 January 1942, and the main Filipino-American forces, with the bulk of their equipment, were then safely in position on Bataan. The virtual annihilation of the 26th Cavalry and two battalions of the 57th Infantry in the north, and that of the 1st Infantry, 1st Regular Division in the south speaks well for gallant behavior and heroism of the rear guards which made this move possible.

On the start of the Bataan siege, at the time when units streaming into Bataan had to be reorganized and reequipped prior to taking up their battle positions, the 1st Regular Division defended the entire I Corps sector of 15 kilometers of jungles, absorbing the full force of the enemy's fury

Later, the gallant resistance and tenacity of the men of this Division, the annihilation to the last man of strong Japanese force in the "Tuol Pocket" contributed much to the heroic defense of the Bataan Peninsula, and helped greatly to bolster the morale of the beleaguered Filipino-American defenders.

B. Role Played by Bataan in History[1].-Was Bataan worthwhile? What did MacArthur and his "Gallant Handful" accomplish on that now historic bit of Philippine soil, smaller than an average American township? From the strictly military standpoint their achievements more than justify their losses. They held an army

[1] F. S. Marquardt,"Before and After Bataan",Chapter XVII p. 257-261.

estimated at two hundred thousand men for more than 5 months, when the Japanese needed their troops to the south and to the west. They tied up a large number of Jap supply ships, when those ships could have been carrying tanks and troops and munitions, to the other vital war fronts. Most important of all, they forced the Japs to use up a very substantial amount of hoard of war materiel, something which the Japanese industrial machine was not able to replace as rapidly as the United States could turn it out. In war, as in checkers, you can trade your enemy on even terms so long as you have greater resources to start with. On Bataan, the United States did better than trade on even terms.

The real significance of Bataan lay in its moral effect on the American people, not in the ledger book of profit and loss. A whole generation of Americans had been drugged by the false security of a peace which could not endure. American newspapers gloried in the fact that while Europe was thinking of war the United States was going to football games. Even after it was obvious that war could not be avoided most Americans refused to face the facts.

The isolationist press and the so-called non-interventionist groups had sold the entire country a bill of goods to the effect that this country could never be attacked. But besides persuading the American people that war would not come, the isolationist publishers and orators had convinced the Axis that the United States would be unable to rise to the challenge of war when it did come. They had made intelligent observers all over the world believe that the Americans were soft, split into irreconcilable factions and ripe for plucking. Just as the Spaniards believed in 1898 that we were a "mongrel" nation, lacking in "patriotism", so the Fascist countries believed in 1941 that we were a "decadent" democracy", unwilling and unable to stand up and fight.

In the days and weeks immediately after Pearl Harbor there was no way of knowing for certain whether the American people could survive the first awful shock of military disaster. No one could be certain that this nation softened by years of ease and peace, could get lean and tough quickly enough to meet a skillful, ruthless, powerful combination of enemies.

It required Bataan, with all its horror, to prove to this country and to the world that Americans had not, like many other peoples before them, grown too soft to stand up to the rigors of modern warfare no matter how great the odds.

If the defenses of Bataan had wilted under the first direct onslaught of the enemy, as did those of Hongkong, Singapore and Java, the United States

would have suffered seriously in the matter of morale in the early stages of the war. Nor would the rest of the world have any reason to doubt than an Axis victory in the war was an absolute certainty.

There was one other great gain for this nation , from the suffering on Bataan, less tangible perhaps than the heavy blows struck by the enemy and less important to the United States than the positive and convincing proof that American soldiers were still able to hold their own in any part of the world.

That was the heroic example of the Filipino troops, who not only established the right of the Philippines to a place in the concert of free nations but who vindicated once and for all the basic soundness of the policy of the United States toward the Philippines. For forty years foreigners had declared that the United States was entirely wrong in its avowed intention of preparing the Filipino people to govern themselves. And when the Philippine independence date was set for 4 July 1946, every colonial power in the world firmly believed that the Americans were utterly insane.

Yet when it came to war--the ultimate test in international relations--our Philippine policy of fair dealing proved to be eminently sound. Three out of every four soldiers on Bataan were Filipinos, and we have General MacArthur's word for it that " No army has ever done so much with so little. The Bataan force went out,as it would have wished, fighting to the end of flickering and forlorn hope".

C. Causes of Defeat of the USAFFE.-In my opinion they are the following:

1. Lack of Logistical Support.-Taking all factors equal, or almost equal, the human spirit alone may decide the outcome of the clash between two adversaries. However, spirit alone,without adequate support of numerical strength, weapons, food, equipment, supplies and facilities,would not be able to carry on for long. A skilled man without his tools cannot do much with his bare fingers. An army numerically-inferior, ill-equipped, inadequately-supported has very limited capabilities when thrown against an enemy who has all the advantages of long years of careful planning and thorough preparation. That was the crucial test which faced the Filipino-Americans during the historic months in 1941-1942. There is a limit to human tenacity and fortitude. Decimated by death, weakened by disease, emaciated by hunger, exhausted by unrelenting combat, attacked from the air and the ground with limited means with which to retaliate, MacArthur's "Gallant Handful" fought tooth and nail for months, sustained alone by that indomitable courage and never-say-die-spirit of the soldier. But with the lack of logistical support, the end was inevitable.

[1]The real cause of the defeat of the Philippine Army was the inadequacy of supply of critical items and the lack of means to maintain that supply. In 26 years of planning for this campaign its logistical side had not been as thoroughly and carefully planned as had the strategical and tactical side. As far back as February 1914 a maneuver was held involving, by direct artillery fire, the attack and defense of Corregidor. This maneuver proved conclusively that if Corregidor was to survive, Bataan must be held. Studies were made and elaborate plans prepared for the defense of Bataan. These plans were revised from time to time until what appeared to be the best possible solution from tactical and strategical point of view was obtained. Throughout this planning and revision emphasis was placed chiefly on tactics and strategy. Troop dispositions were given top consideration. However, the logistical consideration seemed to be summed up in the idea that the mission would be to hold for six months and help would arrive from the United States. Thus maintaining this planning up until 1940, no supply bases were established on Bataan, nor were there any elaborate plan for the same. The idea seemed to be that such supplies as could be moved would transferred to Bataan and there the final stand would be made.

2. Lack of Air and Naval Power.-No concept of modern warfare is complete without consideration of the strategic and tactical power of military aircraft. Fighting a war without air power is akin to disaster. Yet, that was what happened in the Philippines in 1941-1942. The puny, but heroic, little air force which attempted to repel the Japanese air armada suffered a crippling blow, from which it never recovered, three days after 8 December. The Japanese planes, to all intents and purposes were masters of the Philippine skies, bombing at will our positions, assembly areas, rear installations, our cities and towns; blew up bridges, roads and railroads, piers and harbors, and strafed troops and civilians without mercy. The Asiatic Fleet which was guarding the Philippine waters could do nothing but use hit-and-run tactics which simply annoyed the Imperial Japanese Navy. After the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Navy, too, was master of the Western Pacific.

With no air force and no navy to challenge their southward advance, the Japanese invasion forces proceeded to their objective areas practically unmolested with its striking power undiminished. Without any means to stop these depredations, the six months epic resistance of the USAFFE was indeed phenomenal, to

[1] Brig-Gen Clifford Bluemel,"Bataan", Logistics Magazine April 1947 p. 5-6.

say the least.

3. Unpreparedness.-Prior to the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, there was no serious attempt to really prepare the country against foreign invasion. After 15 November 1935, the starting date of the ten-year transition period preceding complete and absolute independence, the efforts of the both American and Filipino leaders were concentrated, for the first time, on the organization, equipping, training and maintaining of an armed force capable of resisting foreign aggressors. It was planned that at the end of the transition period in 1946, a well-organized, fully-equipped, properly-trained and adequately-supported force of 400,000 fighting men would be available to the Republic of the Philippines. But Japan struck five years earlier. The five, short years preceding Pearl Harbor, however, were not enough to prepare fully the country against the attack of a first-class power like Japan. America's frantic efforts to strengthen the Philippine defenses, particularly its air power, were not sufficient to stem the tide of invasion. From the military and the economic standpoint, the Philippines was utterly unprepared for war. The enemy's attack was so swift, so unexpected in time and place, that only the tenacious spirit of the people and the undying courage of the men in the fighting forces saved the country from complete and sudden collapse. Had defense preparations started ten years earlier than 1935, Japanese military successes in the Philippines might have been turned into serious defeats.

D. Possibilities of Future War.[1]-The world today is going through one of its critical stages. The future of our civilization, with all its development and progress, is at stake. Statesmen, realizing that force will not solve present problems, are striving for development of a mitigating solution that will forever banish misery and destruction from the earth.

Nevertheless, the powers of the world experience a secret distrust which is expressed in parliamentary action and public or secret military measures.

Meanwhile, diplomacy, cunningly and painstakingly, yields on some points and is uncompromising on others for the sole purpose of placing a country in an advantageous and convenient position in case of war.

Before the end of World War II, and during its most important phases, statesmen of the United States, Great Britain and Russia had to solve outstanding strategic problems that endangered their solidarity and victory. After vic-

[1] Lt-Col Eduardo P. Castro", Possiblities of Warfare"Mil. Review Mar 1947 p.96.

tory was achieved, differences of opinion, methods, common interests, military trends and strategic situations became more critical. The atomic bomb created one of the most crucial problems. A new era had started in which the employment of this destructive means of attack on a large scale would cause the complete annihilation of civilization.

The time it takes to start a war and determine the probable belligerents, theater of operation, arms and tactics to be used, cannot be definitely estimated. Nevertheless, based on the experiences of the war just ended, it can be said that a future war will be completely technical, and fought mostly in the air, rather than on land or sea. It will envelop the whole world. The future speed of aircraft, its high ceiling, the explosive it can carry, its immense destructive power, will be the main feature of future warfare. Jet propulsion, radar, aircraft, rocket bombs, and atomic energy will make possible the employment of weapons that will travel, without opposition, from the coasts of Europe and Africa to America and vice versa.

It is possible that in a new war there will be no victor or vanquished. All participants will be left in chaos, but there will always be a side that will be in better condition than the other. This side will be the one with the greatest scientific and military men, or one that is in position better than the rest.

The role of air power in World War II greatly changed the concepts formerly held on war. In general outline, they are as follows:

(1) Modern warfare , employing air as one of the leading arms, has increased the size of theaters of operation in such a way that they have surpassed national boundaries to include continents. The war of the future will be one between continents.

(2) Air warfare will be the principal system of combat in the future. Land and sea armies will exist for a while, with their present organization and fighting system, but the day is not far off when they will be transformed.

(3) The side having absolute supremacy in the air or having the ability to neutralize the enemy's air power, will achieve victory. The attainment of air supremacy, however, will require the development of an advanced air technique, a favorable geographical location. insular possessions or friendly countries that will provide adequate bases for the deployment of air power, and great developments in every field of industrial technique.

[1]It is easy to prophesy war, which according to the classic euphemism is nothing more than the continuation of a policy through other means. When the security systems (International Laws, United Nations Organizations, Peace Tribumals, Treaties) established to reconcile conflicting interests fail, the continuity of life in the world requires the use of violence. Prophecy of war is not based solely on appreciation of current events, examination of international forces, or geographical conditions. The thing that really determines war is human nature itself.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of past events and lessons learned from the last global conflict; in consideration of the chaotic, unstable and uncertain conditions prevailing in the whole world today, where ominous rumblings of diametrically opposed political, economic and ideological forces compel one to believe that it is much as hard to preserve the peace as to win the war; and also, in view of the fact that the United Nations Organization, for the present, is not yet in a position to guaranty, safeguard and maintain world security, therefore, I recommend:

(1) That all democratic countries, particularly the United States, institute a program and maintain a state of constant military preparedness for total war so that the PEARL HARBOR and BATAAN disasters will never be repeated; that aside from the universal military training of its entire manpower potential, there should be organized, equipped, trained and maintained the maximum peacetime military establishment which compels the respect of probable aggressor nations, and gives force to back up its international responsibilities and commitments. AD BELLUM PACE PARATI (Prepare in Peace for War).

(2) That hand in hand with the constant military preparedness should be a thprpugh, long-range logistical planning and an exhaustive, adequate logistical preparation for total war in any theater and at any time, with the integration and exploitation of the economic and industrial capabalities of the nation, and the mobilization of scientists and technologists for research so that scientific, technical and technological superiority can always be maintained.

(3) That the unification of all the armed forces be done as soon as possible to insure unity of command, planning, preparation, effort and objective.

(4) That all democratic peoples, particularly Americans, be made to fully realize their historical responsibility towards the rest of mankind to keep the forces of decay and destruction under control. Isolationism can no longer exist. The greatest duty of national policy directors is to recognize strategic

[1] General Lopez Valencia, "Evolution of Future Warfare", Mil Review, Apr 1947, p. 74.

values that will give groups or ideological blocks their greatest advantages.

(5) That an exhaustive and unbiased analysis be made of all the operations during World War II, both of the Allies and those of the Axis, and determine the causes of failures, errors and mistakes.

(6) That all obselete ideas, rules and traditions, outmodded methods and procedures be entirely discarded, and then build anew based on the concepts of future warfare.

Summarizing the conclusions and recommendations made above, I would like to leave the following thought as vividly expressed by General Douglas MacArthur in 1940:

> "THE HISTORY OF FAILURE IN WAR CAN ALMOST BE SUMMED UP IN TWO WORDS: TOO LATE. TOO LATE IN COMPREHENDING THE DEADLY PURPOSE OF A POTENTIAL ENEMY, TOO LATE IN REALIZING THE MORTAL DANGER, TOO LATE IN PREPAREDNESS; TOO LATE IN UNITING ALL POSSIBLE FORCES FOR RESISTANCE; TOO LATE IN STANDING WITH ONE'S FRIENDS. VICTORY IN WAR RESULTS FROM NO MYSTERIOUS ALCHEMY OR WIZARDRY BUT DEPENDS ENTIRELY UPON THE CONCENTRATION OF SUPERIOR FORCE AT THE CRITICAL POINTS OF COMBAT".

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