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Defense of the Philippine Islands, Anyasen and Silaiim Points, Bataan, by Lt Col H. K. Johnson, Inf. Command and Staff College. 1946-47.

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1946 - 1947

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DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

ANYASEN AND SILAIIM POINTS,

BATAAN

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(Personal experience of a Regimental S-3)

57th Infantry (PS)

Type of Operation Described: Reinforced Regiment in Attack.

Lieutenant Colonel Harold K. Johnson, Infantry

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MAP (Reproduced in part)
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1:200,000

MAP (Reproduced in part)
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3254 III NW, NE.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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DEFENSE OF THE PHILLIPINE ISLANDS

Battle of ANYASEN and SILAIIM POINTS--AGALOMA BAY

As far as I have been able to determine the following extracts from communiques issued by Headquarters U. S. Armed Forces in the Far East in February 1942 are the entire available record of an action by the Japanese that, had it been successful, would have ended organized resistance in the Philippines in January 1942, at least on Luzon. I quote from communique No. 88 dated 2 February 1942 which states: "Attacks were launched on the east and west sectors by the 16th and 65th Japanese divisions under command of Lieutenant General Nara. These assaults were coordinated and timed to take place simultaneously. Headlong thrusts were made on the west coast, aimed at what the enemy mistakenly thought to be our flank and rear. Picked groups known as TATORI executed simultaneously attacks at several points along the west coast line, like the fingers of a clawing hand. Captured aerial maps showed the Japanese plan and the urgent character of the mission. There was savage fighting in the underbrush. Our infantry, supported by artillery and mortar fire, forced the invaders back to the coast. Those who attempted flight by sea were drowned. The others were destroyed or captured. With reference to the fighting on the west coast, General MacArthur said: 'All enemy thrusts on the west coast have now been completely mastered. The enemy troops employed in this desperate venture were his best. They were shock units especially trained and selected. They have now been entirely destroyed. They resisted with the courage which is characteristic of Japanese troops but at the end were glad to surrender. They are being treated with the respect and consideration which their gallantry so well merits'." One more quotation from communique No. 90 dated 3 February 1942 will round out official cognizance of this action. "Two Japanese attempts to land troops on the west coast of Bataan were broken up during the night of February 2, 1942. The first raid by the TATORI group of special shock troops was made early in the evening. This was frustrated by our artillery fire. A second and more serious attempt was made at midnight. A large number of barges under naval escort approached the coast. The raid

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was discovered by a few of our night-flying pursuit planes which immediately attacked the convoy with light bombs and machine gun fire. As the enemy troops approached the shore, our beach defense force suffered heavy casualties in men and boats. On the following morning a number of disabled barges were found along the beaches. Some of these were burning and others were adrift. None of the invading group reached shore." 2

It is my purpose to elaborate on the communiques that have been quoted in part above. Needless to say that by the time each succeeding echelon of command had added its note of color to the initial report of the troops in contact, there will be little resemblance between what has been quoted and what took place in the sector which I propose to describe.

Bataan is a province on the Island of Luzon bordering Manila Bay on the west and northwest. Its southern tip is some two miles from Corregidor which guards the entrance to Manila Bay. The peninsula is divided by the ZAMBALES MTS. running the length of the west coast of Luzon north of Manila Bay and terminating in MT. MARIVELES overlooking both Corregidor and Manila Bay. Numerous streams rise on Mt. Mariveles and wind into the China Sea on the west and Manila Bay on the east. Their sides are precipitous for the most part and constitute a formidable obstacle despite the fact that they are dry during the month of January. Undergrowth is not particularly heavy, although the majority of the west coast of the peninsula is heavily forested. Malaria is very prevalent in Bataan and constituted a major hazard, especially as there was a shortage of quinine. One road circled the southern tip of the peninsula and while it was reasonably good on the east coast, new construction on the west side resulted in blinding clouds of dust from the heavy traffic and travel was difficult. There were a few access trails from the main road to the shore line on the south and west of Bataan, but not many. There was only one lateral road and the main line of resistance ran along that route, with part of its length in our hands and part in the hands of the Japanese, denying it effectively to both sides. The limited network of trails and roads posed a major logistical

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problem both for supply support and troop movements. The terrain was a major obstacle to the employment of tanks in mass. The tremendous growth of the forest reduced the effectiveness of artillery support since the light artillery was equipped with the 75 mm gun and could not render close support without having 50% tree bursts over the heads of friendly troops. The forest had the same adverse effect on the employment of mortars. The growth overhead was so heavy that it was difficult to find a hole through which to shoot the mortar. With the limitations imposed by the terrain, the action on the west coast devolved into a rifleman's fight.

For defense and control purposes, the rear area of Bataan had been placed under the control of the old Philippine Department Headquarters which acted as a Base Section. Part of the area was the responsibility of the Navy. That service had a sub-tender tied up at Mariveles which serviced the remaining fleet elements around Luzon and provided some skilled technicians for Army maintenance units. They had no force with which to defend the area, however. The forward area had been divided up into sectors, each assigned to a provisional Corps. The I Corps on the west had sub-divided its area in turn to provide separate commands for the front and for the coastal flank. The sub-sector with which we are immediately concerned was called South Sub-sector and had as a garrison one constabulary regiment and odd elements activated after the outbreak of war consisting principally of ROTC cadets and some Philippine Army Air Corps, without planes.

Adopting tactics which were proving so successful on the Malay Peninsula at the time, the Japanese mounted a water borne force from Subic Bay and landed at three points on the west coast of Bataan. The first landing, as nearly as can be determined, was made on 23 January on Longoskawayan Point, in the Navy sector. The landing was unopposed and was discovered only when some enterprising Nip fired on the main road from the vicinity of Mt. Pucot prior to the time his commander was prepared to start his advance. Navy, Ordnance, Chemical, Quartermaster,

Marine, and Air Corps elements were rushed to the scene. No attempt to advance was noted on the part of the Japanese. The defender was not capable of driving out the landing force, and a stalemate developed for a period of several days until the second battalion, 57th Infantry (PS) was assigned the sector on the afternoon of the 27th of January and cleaned it up on the 30th. In the meantime, additional landings had been made at Quinauan Point, Anyasen Point, and Silaiim Point to the north. With beach defense forces consisting mostly of listening posts and observation posts on the beach with a few machine guns to support them, and a mobile reserve held inland, the Japanese experienced little difficulty in landing. The beach posts had hastily withdrawn, leaving the machine guns in most instances, and destroying the communications equipment. The reserve was not as mobile as could be desired, and the problem of launching an attack with troops with little or no offensive training was an insurmountable one. The 45th Infantry (PS), upon its withdrawal from the Abucay line where it was part of the shell and later occupied an intermediate delaying position, had been marched some forty miles, non-stop, and disposed to meet the threat. The first battalion had withdrawn at once and turned around to the front to block a penetration there. The third battalion was committed on Quinauan Point. They quickly stopped the enemy advance, but progress in driving him into the sea was slow. The northern landing was opposed by the second battalion, 45th Infantry (PS). In conjunction with the 17th Pursuit Squadron, without benefit of planes, they stopped the advance in this sector. On the 28th of January, one rifle company of the 57th Infantry (PS) was attached to the 3d battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) and remained with that battalion until Quinauan was cleaned out. A second rifle company was attached to sub-sector headquarters to patrol the west road, the only road leading to I Corps Headquarters and the north. Some enemy troops had advanced to the road, and were sniping at traffic on the road.

This is the broad picture on the evening of 30 January. The subject and

principal point of this discourse is the repulsion of the northernmost landing. It is not possible to determine which was the principle effort. It is doubtful if the southern landing could be so considered, as the force landed there was incapable of taking and holding much territory. The other two landings were close enough together to be actually considered as one, although they were not treated that way.

The 57th Infantry (PS) had been withdrawn from the sector of II Corps and placed in Army reserve just north of Mariveles on the morning of 27 January. Part of the unit was disposed as indicated above. The balance of the regiment was held under the direct order of the Theater Commander.

On 30 January a call came from the sub-sector headquarters assigned the responsibility for the defense of the west coast beaches requesting one officer to report to that headquarters. Upon arrival, the officer was informed that some three miles of beach were open, that the effort to close this gap was not coordinated, and that it was essential that the hostile landing force be cleared from the rear of I Corps. Troops in the area at the time were the first battalion, 12th Infantry (PA), second battalion, 45th Infantry (PS), 17th Pursuit Sqadron, American, consisting of 125 men, one constabulary battalion, and two companies of a second constabulary battalion, plus the company of the 57th Infantry (PS) charged with guarding against enemy snipers on the main road. There was a dearth of information. An aerial mosaic of the west coast had been turned in that afternoon by one of the combat units. This was intended for the Japanese but had dropped within our lines. It indicated that a landing in three places had been made, with the ultimate objective of seizing the west road. The directions of attack agreed with what little was known of the enemy situation, and the two southern thrusts were now contained. The second battalion, 88th Field Artillery (PS) had been assigned the sector some days earlier, but had supported defending forces against the southern landings. This battalion was directed to support the defense against the northern thrust and the

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subsequent counter-attacks. They had little wire, and the radio equipment at that time did not perform satisfactorily in the jungle, so communications were a major problem. During that afternoon, the 30th, an enthusiastic but misguided staff officer at sub-sector headquarters had called for artillery support for the second battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) which was slowly advancing toward the beach against stubborn resistance. There were no forward observers, and no observation post that could observe the fire. By the time the fire was lifted one platoon had been decimated, and the urge to attack had been destroyed for the entire battalion.

Interrogation of the unit commanders disclosed that all of them believed themselves in contact with the enemy, they did not know just where, nor did they have any idea of what the enemy capabilities might be. There was no indication of enemy strength in the area. He was known to have small field pieces, and he was receiving some air support.

There were several immediate problems, not the least of which was the urgency of the commanding general, sub-sector, to see results. During the night the rifle company, 57th Infantry (PS) was relieved of its mission patrolling the road and assigned the mission of contacting the enemy on Anyasen Point, where there were no friendly troops at all. The other elements were told to hold in place pending a daylight reconnaissance. At the moment, communications were almost unknown. It was not possible to keep in touch with all elements from any one place under existing conditions, so a precious part of 11 miles of wire available were laid to tie in all units to one central point, with the exception of the company assigned to Anyasen Point. Following this unit with wire could involve too great an expenditure, in fact would, since the Field Artillery would have to be supplied eventually if we were to use them at all in support. A radio was assigned to the Anyasen Point force, but it was not portable and in order to maintain communication, it was necessary to operate it from the road and use runners between the company and the radio position. As the distance from the road increased, information received was less and less.

Reconnaissance at daylight the next morning revealed little. The jungle denied observation over an appreciable area from any one point. The first battalion, 12th Infantry (PA) on the north was faced almost due south with its right flank resting on the coast. They were directed to pivot on that flank and sweep in to the beach. In the center of the area, where the resistance appeared to be greatest between the Anyasen and Silaiim rivers, the second battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) was directed to proceed down the Silaiim river with a minimum of one platoon and close in on the beach. The Constabulary battalion was directed to do the same thing along the Anyasen River. The 17th Pursuit SQUADRON was directed to hold in place. Rushed to the sector when the landing was first observed, this unit had contacted the enemy the hard way. Armed with rifles, and carrying two air cooled .50 caliber machine guns that had been salvaged from a wrecked plane they had proceeded down a jungle trail single file, with the lead man carrying one machine gun on his back. Immediately behind him was the gunner. The gun carrier was to stoop, pointing the gun in the general direction of the enemy and the gunner was to fire. They walked right into a Japanese machine gun nest, but the Nip gun was sited too high, and by the time the necessary correction had been made, the Air Corps troops were on their faces, and there they stayed, a stalemate. Some of the men had had an opportunity to fire five rounds with their rifles, others had not fired at all. Obviously these troops were not going to be particularly helpful in an assault.

Three hours after directing the initial reconnaissance, the 45th Infantry battalion reported that they had reached the beach. The first battalion, 12th Infantry (PA) on the north was closed in on the beach, and about one of the three miles of beach was closed. The 17th Pursuit Squadron was disposed along the trail leading to the beach to keep it open. The Constabulary battalion was not so successful. They had advanced some 100 yards and stopped, and there they stayed. There was no report from the south. A hasty estimate indicated that there was little possibility of driving out any enemy with the force at hand. One company of the 45th Infantry (PS) battalion had been badly mauled in the withdrawal from the Abucay line a few days before, while a second company

had been cut up by its supporting artillery the day before, as you will recall. The force in the south could not be expected to make any great progress. If there were no enemy in the area, the jungle would slow progress greatly. If enemy were present in any number, the size of the force would not permit it to advance, in all probability. With this state of affairs, a recommendation was made to the sub-sector commander that the 57th Infantry (PS) less one battalion and two rifle companies from another battalion take over the sector and all troops with the mission of driving out the hostile force. This recommendation was approved and the 57th Infantry (PS) took over on the morning of 1 February. It was expected that the second battalion would rejoin within 48 hours, which they did. One of the rifle companies detached from the first battalion was in the Anyasen sector, and the second was attached to the third battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) on Quinauan Point. The first of February was devoted to reconnaissance. A squad went down the Anyasen river bed, encountered no opposition until they reached the beach, indicating that the enemy resistance would be encountered on the trails, which proved to be true. At this stage of the war, cutting in behind enemy troops, at least the TATORI group, did not mean surrender. An attack was launched on the morning of 2 February with three battalions abreast, the second battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) on the north with its right resting on the Silaiim river, really a dry stream bed, at this season of the year, the third battalion, 57th Infantry (PS) in the center, and the first battalion, 57th Infantry (PS) (-) on the south. The Constabulary battalions were held in reserve, since their attack capabilities were estimated to be of little consequence and it was hoped that they might be utilized to block any enemy break through, if such a contingency developed. The first battalion, 12th Infantry (PA) continued on its beach defense mission and the 17th Pursuit Squadron continued to patrol the trail immediately in rear of the assault battalions.

The first battalion on the south had its greatest difficulty with the jungle, and did not establish contact with the enemy for four days. When contact was established, two elements were attached to the battalion,

a constabulary battalion on the north to maintain contact with the third battalion of the regiment and just occupy ground, and the Philippine Army Air Corps on the south principally to cover front and link up with the coast.

The principal action took place along the north bank of the Anyasen river. Little progress was made the first day, 2 February, although the hostile position was developed in this particular area. The third battalion, 57th Infantry (PS) and the second battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) bore the brunt of the assault. The advance was made cautiously and carefully. Casualties were few, probably not more serious because the high powered, small bore rifle employed by the Japanese did not inflict a mortal wound.

The second day tanks were requested and used. In conformity with doctrine at that time, at least as it was understood, the infantry was directed to follow the tanks at one hundred and fifty yards. The operation was not successful. One company of tanks was assigned to the operation consisting of three platoons of three tanks each. The next day a different system was devised by which four riflemen followed each tank with each responsible for a small area as it was uncovered by the advancing tank. In this way, Nips who dropped down in their fox holes to permit the tank to pass were killed before they could resume a standing position. The Nip devised quite a defense against the hand grenade. Initially his defense had been to hurl the grenade back from whence it came. When our troops delayed throwing the grenade after arming it, this defense was no longer practical, so the Nip altered the construction of his fox hole to conform to the design of an inverted bell. When grenades were used, he draped himself around the upper part of the bell and let the grenade roll into the bottom of his hole to explode harmlessly. Circumstances found a method to beat this defense when the supply of grenades was short. TNT or dynamite in a bamboo tube was so much heavier when it went off that any human in a fox hole could not withstand the detonation.

Tanks were used essentially as moving pillboxes in the jungle. They were restricted to narrow jungle trails and necessarily advanced in column. Mines were their biggest source of trouble. In some instances,

Nips ran out from the cover of trees and slapped a magnetic mine against the front of the tank. The restricted fields of fire of tank weapons in that type tank made the crew helpless. A second method of defense was to attach a mine to a string and drag it across the trail in front of the advancing tank. Usually the tank could stop in time and the accompanying infantry disposed of the man dragging the mine. Since terrain severely restricted the employment of tanks, only one platoon of tanks was used and the platoons were rotated daily. Maintenance was a tremendous factor. Tanks were withdrawn each evening to the tank bivouac where maintenance facilities had been established. The first day tanks were used, the Nips disabled one well in front of the lines, which could not be recovered. They set it afire, burning the crew, and later filled it with dirt. The tank was restored once that part of the Nip position was overrun.

Utilizing the available artillery support to any extent was another big problem. The ground over which the action took place sloped toward the coast, but was heavily forested. There were no commanding positions upon which the artillery could be placed and still render close support. The principal piece was the 75mm gun and the projectiles burst more frequently in the trees over the heads of friendly troops than not. It was possible to bring fire to bear all along the coast and harrass any Japanese supply activities. One battery of 155 mm Howitzers was attached to the 75 mm gun battalion but they had no fire direction equipment of any kind and their fires were not too dependable. Lacking forward observers, infantry rifle company commanders observed fire and made corrections in front of their own companies. They had telephones well forward into the assault company zones in order to facilitate close coordination and the necessary supervision. This worked reasonably well. Since the Japanese had only two field pieces, the attack was primarily a rifleman's fight. Machine guns could be employed, but were not used a great deal, due to a combination of circumstances. First, there was no way of getting ammunition close to the using troops except by hand carry. Since the field of fire of the machine gun was so restricted,

the benefits gained by employing machine gunners as ammunition carriers outweighed the advantages of their supporting fires. Further, the problem of ammunition supply would have been accentuated if machine guns had been used. Mortars fell into the same category, but for a different reason. We had the 60 mm mortar in the rifle companies, but there was no ammunition in the Philippine Islands. Each Heavy Weapons Company had two 81 mm mortars but no 81 mm mortar ammunition. We had used and continued to use old 3 inch ammunition, but the range was limited and firing was highly inaccurate. In addition there were few positions that the mortars could be emplaced and fire through the trees. In a previous action some three weeks before, this particular regiment had a record of 64% duds with the 3 inch shell. Efforts were made at the same time to procure HE ammunition for the tank 37 mm guns. The Ordnance eventually reloaded some of the solid shot but it was not available until a day or two before the surrender.

About the best supporting weapon in the regiment was the old 37 mm gun M 1916. This was employed on sections of the beach after beach positions had been restored and was very effective against landing barges employed to either evacuate or resupply the Japanese force. In addition, once Quinauan Point on the south had been cleared, a platoon of these guns were emplaced that brought fire to bear on Japanese supply dumps on the beach, which was the objective of the 57th Infantry. In my opinion there is still a use for this weapon in some types of warfare, principally jungle, and possibly mountain.

After four days of fighting the jungle, the first battalion, 57th Infantry (PS) on the south established contact with the enemy and after one company fell back in the initial brush, they pushed on in the two succeeding days to clear the enemy from Anyasen point. With both flanks now secure the advance in the center speeded up. It was necessary to rotate battalions in the assault after the first five days. This was due primarily to the deficiency of the ration. At the time of this engagement the importance of the ration had not received sufficient attention, not so much from the point of view of morale, but from the

standpoint of physical condition and its corollary, willingness to fight. The 57th Infantry (PS) had been on half rations for a month when committed in this action. By standards on Bataan, their performance had been remarkable, yet their listlessness grew and it became increasingly difficult to initiate some forward action each day. Part of this difficulty was overcome, but never entirely. A grateful commander in the Navy provided additional rice and salmon to troops that had relieved his conglomeration of units at Longoskawayan Point. In addition, we had salvaged a busload of Class C rations from Fort Stotsenburg when that post was abandoned. We did not have sufficient of these rations to feed them as they were intended to be fed, but we did augment the ration of troops actually in contact with one can of wet rations each day. A ration problem from the standpoint of morale did not exist. The troops understood that there was little food available and they were receiving all that could be provided. There was little chiseling by kitchen personnel in the Scout units, and the few cases that were discovered were quickly stanped out. It was distinctly noticeable that the will to fight decreased in direct proportion with the ration. A prolonged period on reduced rations destroys the will to fight almost entirely, and as subsequent events proved, may even destroy the will to survive.

At this point we ran into another quirk of the Japanese defensive tactics. By mutual consent, the advance ceased as the sun started to settle, which was early, in the jungle. Just as the last traces of light were dying out, the Nips invariably launched a counter-attack. The first time such an attack was launched, we lost all the ground that had been gained that day. After the first day, the troops were prepared and had dug in. Whether the Filipino was different from other races in his antics at night I am not qualified to say. However, once darkness set in, he habitually fired intermittently throughout the night at the last known position of the enemy to his front. At times, this fire reached staggering proportions. Usually the Nip withdrew sometime during the night to a position from one hundred to two hundred yards in rear where he was well dug in by daybreak. The hazards of facing the defensive fires put up by

our own troops in the line precluded feeding during hours of darkness, so supper had to be fed before dark, and breakfast after day break in the morning. This caused a further shortening of the fighting day. There were no K rations in those days, and with the reduced ration it was essential that no meals be missed, if any physical strength was to be preserved.

During the night of 9-10 February, an attempt was made to either reinforce, resupply, or evacuate the troops left by the Japanese. Much was made in one communique of a reinforcing attempt, but resistance did not increase after the attempt and some barges did reach shore so I am convinced that it was an attempt to evacuate. Supporting artillery fire had been planned to cover the water just in the event of such a contingency. At the same time that artillery fire was brought to bear, necessarily unobserved, a request was made for an air strike. There were still perhaps three or four P-40s in the theater, no one in the lower echelons knew, that could be made available, and in this instance they were. On a pitch black night, there was no reliable account of just exactly what happened, but there were additional barges on the beach the next day. On the afternoon of 9 February, Japanese planes had dropped bamboo tubes containing explicit instructions, couched in schoolboy Japanese, to withdraw. The time of the tide, hour of moonrise, and methods of making rafts or supports were described. Many of the Japanese did attempt to swim north to Moron. The 17th Pursuit Squadron, which had taken over defense of the beach from the mouth of the Silaiim River north made use of the movement to obtain some valuable marksmanship training. They took five prisoners in addition, the only ones taken in the entire action.

It was interesting to note in connection with prisoners the advent of psychological warfare, at least as far as our force was concerned. Attached to USAFFE Advance on Bataan were two Japanese-Americans who spoke fluent Japanese. A sound truck had been rigged up and was to be placed within hearing of the entrenched Japanese force. There were several flies in the ointment when this apparatus was placed at the disposal of the

regiment with instructions to use it. In the first place, there was no script, which had to be prepared by the regiment. In the second place, it was the responsibility of the regiment to emplace the truck, cover the two interpreters, and insure that they were not captured. From the regimental point of view, we had had unpleasant experiences with prisoners to date. First, one had attempted to blow up himself and a battalion headquarters with a hand grenade. Several of our men had been found on an earlier position with their hands wired behind them, bayonet wounds in their backs, and face down in a stream of water. To top off treatment of our own troops, in this particular action one man had been found wired up by his thumbs with his toes just touching the ground, his body in an advanced state of decomposition. There was no desire on the part of the Scout soldier to take prisoners. Further, the enemy had been just about wiped out, and it appeared that nothing would be gained by attempting to induce him to surrender. A passive resistance to the use of the sound truck developed and there were sufficient delays so that it was not used. Any prisoners taken would have been killed by the Japanese anyhow when Bataan was eventually overrun.

The last Japanese in the pocket almost escaped as it was. Contact between battalions on the front had been maintained all along according to the reports of battalion commanders. On the morning of 13 February a Japanese breakthrough was reported. The reserve battalion was hastily disposed to cover the jungle trails leading to the main road. The break-out was quickly stopped and all remaining Japanese were killed. It appears in the light of later incidents, that this was the traditional Banzai charge of the survivors.

Graves registration personnel brought in to clean up the area after the withdrawal of combat troops counted 2500 dead in the three landings. Some escaped by swimming, others broke away, totalling about 56, but these were accounted for some days later when they attempted to raid kitchens in the area.

There is little doubt that this was an attack of major proportions designed to isolate half of the Bataan Peninsula, and place the enemy in a strong position from which he could certainly cut off the supply areas

and bring artillery fire to bear on Corregidor.

Of the few instances in Bataan when the defending force had any degree of success, this particular action marked the last Japanese assault prior to the final breakthrough some six weeks later, and it was necessary to bring in additional troops for the final effort.

There are several lessons pointed up by this action. It is unfortunate that they were not brought to the attention of our own troops at the conclusion of this particular fight. First, special consideration must be given to establishing and maintaining communications in the jungle. The very nature of the terrain reduces the capabilities of the equipment and climactic conditions force extraordinary maintenance measures.

Second, it is vital that there be effective coordination between units. Small gaps may result in a penetration on a small scale. Actual contact must be maintained.

Third, elaborate plans and preparations must be made for supply of elements in contact with the enemy. Enemy employment of close air support was not a problem in this action, nor was it widely used in subsequent actions in the Pacific, and as a result certain practices grew which might not and probably would not be practicable in the face of even a small amount of hostile air.

Fourth, it is essential that there be a better supporting weap on for troops committed in the jungle. The recoilless rifle may be a solution although I am inclined to doubt it. The problem of safety for friendly troops in the vicinity of a gun position will be accentuated in the jungle with its restricted field of vision.

Fifth, water discipline and medical discipline as it applies to taking the necessary precautionary measures against the malarial mosquito must be enforced. Education must be the answer since troop dispositions will norm lly preclude the close command supervision that is essential to meet this problem.

There still appears to be one big question. Why didn't some Japanese commander say "Forward March" when his force had landed. The resistance was never great at any time during the first six days after

landing. Bataan would have fallen not later than 7 February if such action had been taken on the part of the attacker. Further, he would have had the choicest bird of all in General MacArthur, in their eyes. My only explanation is that this example is just another instance of the Japanese outfumbling us, not the first time, and certainly not the last.

E N D E N D

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

LUZON 1:25,000

BAGAC NE, NW, SE, SW

MARIVES NW, NE

Situation: Evening 30 January, 1942

C+GS 200-9

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

CENTRAL LUZON

BATAAN

SCALE 1: 200,000

STATUTE MILES



— FRONT LINE BEGINNING 26 JAN 42

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