CONFIDENTIAL

From: Lieutenant Commander Denys W. Knoll, U.S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer, Sixteenth Naval District.
To : The Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence).

Subject: Intelligence Report, Sixteenth Naval District, during period March 12 to May 3, 1942.

1. In accordance with orders of the Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, (Captain K. M. Hoeffel, U.S. Navy), I relieved Lieut. Comdr. M. E. Cheek, U.S. Naval Reserve, as District Intelligence Officer of the Sixteenth Naval District on March 12, 1942. Lieut. Comdr. Cheek departed Fort Mills, P.I., with selected members of Admiral Rockwell's staff, on or about March 14, 1942, in the U.S.S. Permit.

2. The Navy Department has received a great deal of information concerning the operations in the Philippines prior to April 9, 1942, when Bataan surrendered. Some information subsequent to this date and covering the period until my departure from Corregidor on May 3, 1942, has undoubtedly not been furnished. Colonel Stuart Wood, U.S. Army, intelligence officer with General Wainwright's staff, became stranded in Mindanao during his attempted evacuation via a Catalina plane and the other officers who had knowledge of some of the information which is furnished in the following pages are presumed to be prisoners of war, namely, General J. M. Wainwright and Captain K. M. Hoeffel. Some information concerning operations prior to April 9, 1942, will be furnished as it is felt it may amplify prior reports.

3. Colonel Wood worked in Bataan with combat intelligence prior to assuming his duties on General Wainwright's staff subsequent to General MacArthur's departure about March 11, 1942. His information concerning the Japanese forces used for the Philippine offensives is considered to be very accurate and most interesting in view of the exaggerated accounts which have appeared in the press. It is quite generally agreed that the Japanese forces in the Philippines at any one time did not exceed 60,000 troops. Intelligence officers whom I have interviewed more or less agree on the number and have further agreed these

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forces were landed in the Philippines and distributed as follows:

First landing - 1/2 a division at Aparri.
1/2 a division at Davao.

Second landing- 1/2 a division at Vigan.
1/2 a division at Lingayen.

Third landing - 1/4 a division at Legaspi.
1/4 a division at Atimonan.*
1/2 a division at Davao.

Fourth landing- 1 division at Lingayen.

* Some reports stated this was a feint and as few as 1,000 troops were landed, and the remainder went to Davao.

The reference to the division above is based on the generally accepted 15,000 troops to a Japanese division, although it is known some are as low as 12,000. The last landing at Lingayen was composed of well trained and seasoned troops with the newest equipment. This division had the best fighting men of all the Japanese which were landed in the Philippines. When a lull developed at the end of January this division with its new equipment was taken out through Subic Bay and Lingayen and transferred to Burma, where they were again definitely identified through combat intelligence. During February a new division landed in Lingayen with older equipment which had undoubtedly been used in other campaigns in China. The troops were a good deal older and the majority of casualties which were examined by the Army had many old scars completely healed, the result of former injuries. The tanks and trucks this division possessed were a much older type with definite signs of previous hard usage. This information is from Army observers who saw them at close range and is more or less substantiated by reports from observers behind the Japanese lines.

4. For the first few months on Corregidor Naval personnel were in general ridiculed and questioned as to what the Navy was doing to help the Philippine situation. When General Wainwright took command he immediately impressed us

all with the seriousness of the food situation on Bataan. The use of submarines had been discussed by many Naval officers from January on, as the last resort. Their possible use was finally mentioned to General Wainwright. Conferences on this matter were held and requests to Admiral King, General Marshall and General MacArthur were originated in the hope that part of the vast supply of food in Cebu could be transported to Bataan in sufficient time to be of use. Admiral King's prompt answer to this despatch was one of the most encouraging despatches received on Corregidor. Subsequent to receipt of this despatch I heard no further comment from the Army as to what the Navy was doing for the Philippines. General Wainwright commented that it was evident the Navy was ready to do everything they could to help him solve his problems. The food situation on Bataan developed because of the apparent refusal of some quartermaster personnel to insure delivery of food to the fighting forces. Repeatedly the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps on Corregidor offered to send food and cigarettes to Bataan for the fighting forces but it was in turn refused by the quartermaster corps on Bataan, who claimed the lack of food on the front was primarily a distribution problem. The units behind the lines on Bataan in general had sufficient food while the fighting forces for the last two months received little else than rice. Investigations revealed that Philippine Army privates and corporals drove the quartermaster trucks which contained the food intended for the front lines. Suggestions were made for reliable petty officers or even officers to accompany these trucks to insure the delivery of food to the fighting troops. This was refused and the Philippine drivers continued to deliver the food, supplying their civilian friends along the road until frequently only rice reached the front lines.

5. At the end of January a lull developed in the fighting on Bataan, which continued until the end of March. The Japanese withdrew the greater percentage of their troops from the Bataan front and settled in the vicinity of San Fernando while certain units gave special attention to other parts of the islands. During this period the facilities at Batangas and Nasugbu were developed in order to

embark troops for use in the southern islands. The Japanese during this time made a special effort to seize all sugar centrals in the Philippines in order to acquire sources of alcohol for the operation of their military equipment. Attempts were made to put various mining activities on Luzon and Masbate in operation. A few hundred troops were sent to Mindoro to seize the sugar central at San Jose and this same unit placed one or two 155 mm guns to cover Verde Pass, near Calapan. Other units went to Culion and Puerta Princesa on Palawan, where they located and seized caches of aviation oil and gasoline which had been placed in these areas for use of U.S. Naval aviation. Some Filipinos in the above areas readily assisted the Japanese in locating the fuel. Many of the small harbor boats and barges which were left slightly damaged when Manila was evacuated were placed in operating condition for use in the Manila Bay area. With the aid of these vessels and barges the Japanese transported salvageable metal and other material from the Cavite Navy Yard and the Manila port area to Orani, from where it was transported by truck to Olongapo for eventual transportation to the Japanese Empire.

6. Continual reports were received from Manila in regard to the treatment of prisoners of war and internees prior to the fall of Bataan. The original crowded condition of Santo Tomas was partially corrected when some of the female internees were permitted to return home. There was an unconfirmed report to the effect that the majority of male and married internees were permitted to visit their homes during daylight about once every ten days. The food in Manila was reported to be ample but the prices had increased three or four times above normal. The Japanese had seized all rice which came into Manila from the north but permitted the rice and vegetables from southern Luzon to be brought in without restriction. There was complete lack of American canned goods by the middle of February. Madame Savory continued to operate the Restaurant de Paris and catered to a vast number of Americans and British females. Her main complaint contained in letters which reached Corregidor was that Japanese officers

frequently came in for meals for which they never paid. The Manila Hotel continued in operation and served regular meals. Reports from Manila indicated that the number of Japanese troops in the city averaged about five hundred.

7. Concentrations of troops were retained south of Parenaque (about 2 or 3 thousand). Another detachment of about one-half a division was quartered near Rosario, at the junction leading to Lucena on the Manila-Batangas highway. Various agents arrived at Corregidor from Manila and vicinity; no one of them was able to report a specific atrocity which had been observed by them or any of their assistants. It was generally believed that the lack of vast numbers of troops in Manila and the orderly occupation which had been arranged was responsible for the above. Lieutenant Sam Wilson, U.S. Naval Reserve, owner of the Wilson Building in Manila, site of the Japanese Consulate, had reported that the Japanese Consul General had been given every consideration on the outbreak of hostilities. The Japanese Consul General Nihro was given ample time to close his office; he completed this about 2:30 p.m. on December 8, 1941, over ten hours after the outbreak of hostilities. Upon leaving the office it was locked with a padlock by Lieutenant Wilson and one of the keys given to the Consul General. It is reported that Nihro, Secretary Vargas and a representative of the High Commissioner's office arranged for the orderly occupation of Manila by the Japanese. The military governor occupied the High Commissioner's mansion and the Consul General reoccupied his office at the Wilson Building, and it was reported that Miss Seals was permitted to return and manage the Wilson Building in her former capacity.

8. The Japanese Army occupied the Army-Navy Club, the University Club, the Elks Club and the Bayview Hotel. It was reported that Dr. Kneedler was released late in January in order that he might supervise the management of the Bayview Hotel. The Tamaraos Polo Club, the adjoining buildings, stables, and the courtyard of houses south of the Club were used as barracks by the Japanese

Air Force operating from Nichols Field. Various reports were received that revetments for small planes were being constructed along Manila Boulevard and the Manila Yacht Club near Pasay was being developed as a seaplane base.

9. During February and March the Japanese used Subic Bay as a base for two 5,000 ton cruisers, two to four second class destroyers, and six light mine layers. Two large mine layers were based at Nasugbu during the latter part of March. A squadron of seaplanes, with tender, based at Tara Island in Apo west pass for a short period. These planes bombed Corregidor for about three days. Vessels of the mine force appeared to be conducting mining operations between Lubang Island and Nasugbu. Reports were received that Japanese mines had been found on the north coast of Samar; on the shores of Negros and Panay, bordering the Visayan Sea; on the coast of Mindanao near Dapitan; and near Lebak in Mindanao and on various islands of the Calamian group north of Palawan. Reports, which were believed reliable, stated that extensive mining operations had been conducted in Lamon Bay, between southeast Luzon coast and the Polillo Islands. Indications were that the Japanese intended to develop the east coast of Luzon, near Infanta, and Atimonan as a base and harbor for use during the southwest monsoon and rainy season on Luzon. The operations of mining vessels in the Visayan Sea indicated that the Japanese were attempting to mine all the eastern and northern approaches to Iloilo and Cebu. The naval vessels based at Subic Bay were used for the blockade of all approaches to Manila. This blockade was normally maintained by two light mine layers or second class destroyers, which cruised slowly seaward off Corregidor, just beyond the range of Corregidor's guns.

10. During January the Japanese moved artillery or mortars to Cavite Province in the vicinity of Naic. This consisted of at least one 240 mm gun and six or eight 155 mm guns. Corregidor's efforts to silence these batteries with counter-battery was partially successful. The enemy guns were emplaced behind ridges

and were generally fired between 8:30 and 11:00 a.m., when the morning haze, together with the rising sun, made it impossible to locate the gun flashes or smoke. Some of these batteries remained at Cavite Province and fired on Corregidor until the end. Monkey Point was frequently shelled with little damage. These guns attempted to damage vessels of the inshore patrol when they were anchored in South Harbor. They inflicted few casualties for the amount of ammunition expended. The excessive range made the fire very inaccurate. During April these guns opened fire on Corregidor whenever the anti-aircraft guns opened fire during bombing attacks.

11. The following people were sent and brought valuable information to Corregidor during March and April: Lieutenant Jimines, Philippine Army; Captain Trujillo, Philippine Army, the leading political worker for President Quezon in Cavite Province; and Major Barbour, U.S. Army, who went behind the enemy lines from Iba in March and remained until May 1 in the vicinity of Ft. Stotsenberg. Corregidor was in daily communication with these agents on Luzon. One of the assistants of Lieutenant Jimines was Rosalia, a Philippine movie actress, who, in addition to living with Jimines, collected some valuable information from Japanese officers whom she entertained. Captain Trujillo conducted his operations from the basement of Aguinaldo's home at Cawit. One of his assistants was an American who married a niece of Aguinaldo and this assistant had been employed at the Cavite Navy Yard.

12. These agents reported that the Cavite Navy Yard was in operation with forced labor. The marine barracks and Caridad School quartered troops who trained for the occupation of Corregidor with daily landing operations on the sandy beaches of Cañacao Bay. The Japanese officers lived in the Masonic Temple at Cavite and the hospital at Cañacao. The boat shop and machine shop at Cavite Navy Yard were placed in operation and were used to construct landing boats. The lathes of the Ammunition Depot were also placed in operation. The

two 680 boats which were sunk during the bombing of Cavite were raised and placed in commission. Frequent attempts were made to raise the SEA LION. Some reports said the remains of the SEA LION had been raised intact from the forward battery aft. This report could never be confirmed. The Japanese raised about twenty-one small inter-island boats varying from 500 to 1,500 tons which had been scuttled by the Army engineers in the shallow water at the mouth of the Pasig River. The latter boats had been reported as destroyed by dynamite charges during the evacuation of Manila; subsequent investigations revealed that one of about twenty-three vessels had been effectively destroyed. The remainder were scuttled in haste by opening sea cocks, when the vessels had less than six feet of water under the keel. The majority of these vessels were in operation in Manila Bay. They were secured at night to Pier 7 in Manila and at the piers in the Cavite Navy Yard. Lieut. Jiminez sent a list of all the vessels that the Japanese had placed in commission. It was figured that the Japanese had sufficient small vessels to transport about 12,000 troops to Corregidor without placing more than 500 troops on any one vessel. These vessels, after the fall of Bataan, were equipped with 155 mm guns in the bow to be used during the course of a landing. 'Rosalia' reported that one of the ranking Japanese officers stated that the Japanese were ready to lose 12,000 troops in order to permit at least 200 to get ashore on Corregidor. This officer apparently boasted that, with the aid of artillery from Bataan, any landing that could be made would quickly overwhelm Corregidor.

13. Subsequent to General MacArthur's departure, General Wainwright was especially concerned about the food and fuel oil situation. Next in importance was the evacuation of the Army Nurses. General Wainwright was intensely pleased when the submarines were directed to bring in some food from Cebu. The inter-island steamer Liegaspi had made a few successful blockade runs from northern Panay to Corregidor. There were considerable reserves of food at Cebu in February. General MacArthur had transferred about 60 Naval officers and a

group of Army personnel to Iloilo, Cebu and other points in the Southern Islands to organize natives, collect food for the troops on Luzon and supervise the development of docking facilities in the Southern Islands. There were about four or six inter-island ships at Cebu and a medium sized inter-island tanker at Iloilo. When General MacArthur left he promised General Wainwright a squadron of bombers for a few days. These bombers were to be sent from Australia to Mindanao. From Mindanao they were to obtain control of the air between Cebu and Corregidor with the assistance of the six remaining fighter planes. The ships were loaded and ready at Cebu and Iloilo. General Wainwright continued to request information as to when the planes could be expected. They were finally promised for the end of March. The planes left Australia simultaneous with the fall of Bataan. The planes arrived in Mindanao simultaneous with the Japanese occupation of Cebu. One of the flying fortresses bombed Manila near the Tamaraos Club the Sunday morning following the fall of Bataan. There was every possibility that the food from these ships could have prolonged the campaign on Bataan. The troops on Bataan during the last few days pleaded continually for some air support. The sight of a few flying fortresses would certainly have heartened them all considerably. The arrival of the bombers in accordance with a promise was as usual just too late and General Wainwright was deeply moved. With the fall of Bataan, a signal was received from Australia addressed to General Wainwright. It read, "Very sorry. Do your best. MacArthur," or words to this effect. A few days later a much longer signal was received which praised the defense on Bataan and the work of General Wainwright. The first short message caused considerable comment and was referred to as "the kiss of death" by various people in General Wainwright's headquarters.

14. Following the failure of obtaining the desired food from Cebu, General Wainwright directed that all the food belonging to the Army and Navy be inventoried, pooled and rigidly rationed. Prior to this; the Navy had issued food and fed personnel with the food obtained by the Navy prior to hostilities, in

addition to food which had been obtained from Manila prior to evacuation. The The Fourth Marines had given their small reserve of food to the Army when they took over the beach defenses on Corregidor under General Moore. The Navy had adequately rationed the food and were enjoying coffee, sugar, jams and canned fruit when similar items with the Army had long been exhausted. Comdr. George H. Williams, SC, U.S.N., and Lieut. (jg) K. R. Wheeler, SC, U.S.N.R., deserve the highest praise for the able manner in which the food situation was handled during the entire period. Army personnel complained continually that the Navy had coffee and jam when they had none. A consolidation of food reserves was frequently suggested in January and February, when the Navy had hoped to exchange some of the coffee, sugar and jam for some of the ham and potatoes which the Army then possessed. The bakery functioned until the end, and the Navy gave all the flour available to the bakery for making bread and rolls. Although bombs and shells frequently damaged the bakery, there were no direct hits and the fires which frequently threatened destruction were successfully controlled.

15. The Japanese had good ideas of how much food there was available. Estimates made at the end of April, 1942, indicated that sufficient food was available to continue with about 50 per cent normal ration until the middle of August. Additional caches of food continued to be uncovered in various parts of Fort Mills.

16. The Japanese aggravated the food situation on Bataan by forcing civilians through the front lines at night. During February and March when a lull in fighting prevailed it was estimated that a couple hundred Filipino women and children each night were forced through the front lines at the point of guns. The front lines had to permit entrance or shoot the Filipinos and give further opportunity for Japanese propaganda in Manila. It was estimated at one time that there were as many as 60,000 Filipino civilians behind the lines on Bataan eating food originally intended for the troops.

17. During the same lull Filipinos went through the front lines and ranged as far as Fort Stotsenberg in search of carabaos. Approximately three hundred carabao were driven back from Japanese areas and brought behind the lines. No Japanese patrols were encountered, since the majority of troops were then quartered near Tarlac and San Fernando for a rest. These carabaos were slaughtered after about ten days when sufficient time had elapsed to insure that they had not been poisoned by the Japs.

18. A despatch was sent to the Chief of Naval Operations which contained information that Bataan was about to fall. This was originally written with the statement that the fall would occur in two days. It was reworded at the request of the Commandant because it seemed too pessimistic. During March and the first week in April, I was in daily telephone communication with General King's office and with Intelligence on General Wainwright's staff. General Wainwright's staff had been on Bataan for the initial months and they had a keen appreciation of how much more the troops could survive.

19. In the last weeks before the surrender of Bataan the fighting troops had lost on an average of thirty-five pounds, they had become prematurely gray and haggard and a great percentage had had malaria, dengue or dysentery; while the troops behind the lines and the personnel on Corregidor had lost an average of twenty to twenty-five pounds. The coordinated Japanese attacks with airplanes, artillery and infantry easily breached the front lines. The initial attack was made about two miles west of the junction of the first and second corps, against General Wainwright's former command. This was undoubtedly a feint and was successfully repulsed with some casualties to the enemy. The next thrust was at the junction of the first and second corps, favoring the eastern corps. The front lines of the eastern corps easily disintegrated before the first attack in force had developed. Within twenty-four hours a few Japanese small tanks were as much as five miles behind the front lines in the eastern sector.

These units appeared to be strong patrol units and about 25 per cent of the Japanese force, which it had been intended to use, accomplished their mission before the remainder of the force had reached Bataan. General Wainwright's former Corps withdrew in order and established new front lines; the Japanese respected these troops and concentrated on the eastern corps.

20. The front lines were breached in the area assigned to two Philippine units which had been recruited about December, 1941. With the initial attack many of these troops immediately disappeared, leaving their uniforms (khaki shirts and trousers) and ornament behind them. The Japanese troops occupied our own foxholes and used the U.S. machine guns and ammunition to support their attack. Further pressure was then brought to bear on the extreme eastern end of the front which easily crumbled. Between these two thrusts were troops who were formerly Army Air Force aviation technicians and had been sent into the front lines when planes were no longer available. This group of two or three thousand men were the first American troops which were surrounded and captured; before they had time to retreat and re-form the front line. All available troops with the artillery, ordnance, quartermaster, etc., took rifles and went forward in an endeavor to reestablish the front lines and join up with the western corps. A junction was never made and Bataan fell with Japanese troops and American troops wildly distributed throughout the eastern part of Bataan.

21. Late on the evening of April 7, 1943, General King came to Fort Mills for a brief visit with General Wainwright. General King was crying when he left and returned immediately to Bataan. Some time on April 8, General King went forward with some members of his staff to meet the Japanese Comander and arrange terms. It was believed that General King might return to his headquarters on Bataan before a surrender was announced. There is no information to justify statements that the Japanese demanded a complete surrender of the Philippines when Bataan surrendered. General King undoubtedly expected this

to occur, but he never returned to his headquarters after his conference with the Japanese. The fact that Bataan had surrendered gradually passed among the troops. Late on the night of April 8, I was speaking with General King's headquarters. Major Charles Shearn, the assistant to Colonel Lincoln, G-2 to General King, informed me that General King had been gone all day and that he had expected word from him as well as expecting him to return. The remaining staff were then very much alarmed because of the lack of information. The last report stated the American troops did not want to surrender, many were complaining that the American public would never forgive them, they still expected assistance but admitted their physical ability was about exhausted. Many troops had not slept for days and were so weak they could not carry a regular rifle. The telephone line to Bataan was cut during this conversation, and when further inquiries were made, it was indicated this was the last telephone conversation with Bataan and General King's office. No further information was received at Corregidor other than that General King never returned and no one knew the terms of the surrender or where General King was taken.

22. Simultaneous with General King's visit, information was received that General Lim, who commanded the sector where the breach occurred, had been absent from his command for about forty-eight hours. This was never adequately confirmed and later reports were received that General Lim with many other generals from Bataan had been seen at Camp O'Donnell as a Japanese prisoner-of-war.

23. Many people escaped from Bataan to Corregidor by small boat, swimming, or improvised rafts. Some of these people were interviewed at Corregidor. One Army officer stated that there was a great deal of confusion along the roads on eastern Bataan. Some Filipino troops had been shot by the Japanese after the surrender had been accomplished. This officer believed that many troops with both forces failed to realize the campaign was over and many individuals were killed because of the confusion. It was reported that Japanese officers

accompanied by American Army officers rode the running boards of automobiles which proceeded along the roads of Bataan flying a Japanese and an American flag. These officers told all Americans and Filipino troops to lay down their arms and to start walking north along the main roads. As the troops walked north along these roads isolated units of Japanese troops gathered the prisoners-of-war at different points and directed the prisoners to remove their shoes and give them to the Japanese. The prisoners were not closely watched and some people who escaped to Corregidor reported they had been forced to join two or three groups of prisoners before escaping. Individuals who failed to obey Japanese orders were treated very roughly. A common act was to drop the butt of a rifle on the toes of any individual who showed unwillingness to obey an order. Many prisoners refused to obey orders and they were generally taken away by a special Japanese guard. The apparently reliable troops which were interviewed could not state any details about specific atrocities which they had witnessed. There were many claims that atrocities had occurred, but except for the shooting caused by the confusion, the individuals who escaped to Corregidor did not have a great deal of accurate information. Many had apparently left their units and proceeded to the rear without coming in contact with the Japanese.

24. As indicated above, General Wainwright and his staff were convinced that once the front lines on Bataan had been breached the campaign would end in a few days. Orders had been issued to Mariveles, when Capt. Hoeffel took charge, that all Naval equipment would be ready for demolition on short notice. The afternoon of April 8 a long conference was held with Capt. Hoeffel and it was pointed out where the front had been breached, where Japanese tanks were located, where the various units were believed to be located and other points of interest, including information just received from G-2 with General King. Captain Hoeffel immediately realized that the situation was serious and a conference with General Wainwright was arranged. Attending this conference were

General Wainwright, Gen. Beebe, Capt. Hoeffel, Col. Wood, Lt. Col. Pugh, and myself. General Wainwright readily admitted the seriousness of the situation. He was surprised when Capt. Hoeffel suggested bringing the Naval personnel from Mariveles to Corregidor. Considerable discussion ensued. It was pointed out that these troops would join the Fourth Marines as Beach Defense. They would bring some food, fuel oil, and small boats with them, which could be of use. It was not clear why General Wainwright hesitated about bringing these personnel to Corregidor except he desired to avoid any criticism for showing partiality to one unit more than another. After some discussion General Wainwright stated he was prepared to absorb 12,000 troops from Bataan into the defenses of the island forts. Permission was given to bring all American Naval personnel, food, fuel oil, and small boats to Fort Mills when the fall of Bataan was imminent, provided that the Naval personnel joined the Beach Defenses under General Moore, U.S.A., and Col. Howard, U.S.M.C. General Wainwright added that he would also send for all the Philippine Scouts, since they were individually the most outstanding troops he had ever seen in action. About 2230 April 8, 1942, a message was received from General Wainwright directing Captain Hoeffel to carry out his plans for demolition of Naval equipment at Mariveles and bring his personnel to Fort Mills before sunrise on April 9. Instructions were immediately issued to Captain Sackett by telephone. At about 0400 April 9, 1942, all demolition had been completed. Comdr. Hastings and Lieut. Eschler later stated that sufficient demolition charges had been placed in all compartments of the Dewey Dry Dock to insure its complete destruction against possible further raising by the Japanese. The Canopus was sunk, through flooding from the seacocks, in fifteen fathom of water in Mariveles Harbor. The work of demolition was expeditiously accomplished and it surprised everyone to see all the Naval personnel at Fort Mills before sunrise. It was next to impossible to bring only American Naval personnel to Corregidor at night. All Filipino naval reserve personnel and civilian personnel attached to the air base contractors also

arrived although it was contrary to General Wainwright's orders. The civilians agreed to work and dig additional tunnels and were thus permitted to remain. The Filipino naval reservists had fearlessly carried out their duties as cooks and boat crews during all the enemy action and they were permitted to remain. The water supply on Corregidor was adequate and not quite as bad as some recent stories have indicated. Additional wells had been dug at the entrance to Maliuta Tunnel, an excellent fresh water well had ample supply in San Jose barrio. Some of the water was quite brackish, but the salt content seemed very desirable because of the heat and humidity. Personnel coming from ships with distilled water, thought the water very salty, but there were few complaints from people who used it continually. The supply was rationed. The drinking water was boiled prior to being used. Stoves had been placed at the entrances to the tunnels and a few stoves were available for use just inside the entrance when enemy action was too severe to do cooking outside. Members of the Filipino naval reserve were outstanding in their performance of duty. They made the limited food very palatable and the meals at 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. were always ready to be served on time no matter how severe the bombing and shelling had been during the day.

25. Two days after the fall of Bataan, Captain Trujillo of the Philippine Constabulary arrived during the night by banca from Kawit. He brought with him about ₱650 worth of quinine and medicines which had been collected from drug stores in Manila. Captain Trujillo had previously been Quezon's political boss in Cavite province. The "Voice of Freedom" in its broadcast had mentioned the scarcity of quinine and drugs. In addition, Captain Trujillo on a previous visit had been requested to collect what he could. He refused reimbursement for these supplies. He gave some information concerning the Japanese. He claimed Aguinaldo was not sympathetic to the Japanese. Manila was quiet and relatively free of Japanese troops. Japanese had built barricades in the center of the road, whenever major highways intersected. From his description

they were similar to the barricades and machine gun emplacements which had existed in Shanghai and Singapore at the intersection of major highways. Japanese officers who had been entertained by Rosalia claimed they could hold the Philippines for two years. The Filipinos around Pampanga had been causing the Japanese the most trouble. It was his belief that all the wealthy Filipinos and the Spanish mestizos were pro-Japanese and should be held under suspicion. The strongest anti-Japanese element were members of the political party which had recently opposed the re-election of President Quezon. Pier Seven in Manila was the only pier undamaged. The Japanese had strongly barricaded Pier Seven and were using it as a store house for Army supplies such as ammunition, gasoline and food. Much of the food had been obtained by looting all the Chinese grocery stores in and around Manila.

26. Guerrilla bands of American and Filipinos conducted raids against Japanese oil storages with incendiary bullets. Large storages were reported to be located along the railroad tracks west of Lucena. Much of this fuel had been brought in through Legaspi or Batangas. Two guerrilla bands operated in northern Luzon. They originally were one unit which had formed near Baguio. After organization there was considerable friction between the leaders as to who was in charge. Eventually two units developed and one unit claimed to be the enemy of the other. Charges and counter charges were received with respect to these units, because each claimed the one was recruiting men from the other organization. It was necessary to direct each where to operate in order to prevent a pitched battle between the two guerrilla bands, each with an American leader who had been well known around Baguio. The entire story of the fued between these units will be one of the interesting side-lights of the war in the Philippines.

27. Before the fall of Bataan, Major Barbour volunteered to proceed to the vicinity of Iba in a Philippine Army Q-boat and obtain information concerning

Japanese movements. He returned about May 1, 1942, by banca down Manila Bay from Orani along the Bataan shore to Corregidor dressed in a Filipino straw hat and shirt. He reported many of the large churches in northern Luson had been taken over by the Japanese as military headquarters or ammunition storage places. Around Fort Stotsenberg, the Japanese preferred to sleep away from the main buildings at night although some buildings were used in the day time. Various Filipinos claimed the Japanese had landed at least six tanks on the shores of Lingayen Gulf a few months before the war and these tanks had been stored near Fort Stotsenberg. Among the Filipinos encountered, he reported at least twenty per cent were pro-Japanese and he accordingly had to flee whenever a group joined him. A few from each group would start sneaking away when they saw him and he had been warned by other Filipinos that they were Japanese agents.

28. The attitude of most Filipinos was that they would help the Americans as much as possible, for the present they were taking the path of greatest security to themselves and could rally immediately to any U.S. expedition which arrived in force. It was the consensus that the Japanese kept very few Filipinos as prisoners-of-war. It was indicated that they were releasing all Filipinos so they could return home and help convince the Philippines that the Japanese were only trying to keep Americans out of the islands.

29. Major Barbour stated that as far as he knew the Japanese had not moved the thousands of injured from the temporary hospitals on Bataan. One report stated they had taken about one hundred injured who were dying and had placed them on a heap and burnt them with the aid of oil. The Filipinos who witnessed this stated there were many screams and moans after the fire had been started. Another report from Major Barbour was believed accurate concerning the treatment of disobedient prisoners. About one hundred twenty-five American troops had been bound and thrown into a barn on northern Bataan. The individuals had refused to obey Japanese instructions. This barn was subsequently strafed with

machine guns and then set afire by the Japanese. There seemed good justification that a few incidents as this had occurred in the days immediately following the fall of Bataan. Most of the prisoners had been forced to walk to the prison-camp near Tarlac or at Camp O'Donnell just north of Clark Field. Many prisoners were weak from tropical fevers and lack of food. These individuals who fell behind too often were shot and left at the side of the road. One group of Americans was taken to Manila and placed in old Bilibid prison in retaliation for the placing of some Japanese there at the start of the war. Others were taken to the new Bilibid prison at Muntinlupa, south of Manila on the road to Laguna province. Various reports were received that some American troops had been paraded through Manila in their underwear. Some stated this was the group which was taken to Bilibid and other Filipinos stated this had not occurred.

30. The afternoon of April 9, 1942, the same day Bataan surrendered, artillery started to shell Corregidor from the exact location of the field hospital at Little Baguio. General Wainwright issued orders there would be no general counter-battery until time had elapsed for the injured to be removed from the former field hospitals. The mine sweepers Finch, Tanager and Quail had to fire at batteries along the Bataan shore in order to reach South Harbor. During this action the tug Keswick commanded by Lieut. (jg) Donaldson was hit and had to be beached on the northeastern beach of Corregidor. Lieut. Donaldson remained on board until the entire crew had been safely taken ashore in repeated trips with a wherry. As he left the ship and was rowing ashore, he was hit in the shoulder with what was probably a 75 mm shell and instantly killed. He had previously been awarded the Navy Cross for meritorious conduct during the bombing of Cavite Navy Yard. From April 10 until the fall of Corregidor, the Japanese used two observation balloons to spot their artillery fire. Various batteries were fired every day. The heaviest shelling between April 10 and May 3 was on April 29, the Emperor's birthday. There was almost continuous shelling from about seven in the morning until sunset. It was estimated that the Japs had

a minimum of two hundred fifty pieces of artillery along the shore of Bataan. Each battery of four guns was set to fire on a specific objective on Corregidor. It was believed that once an invasion was planned all the artillery had been spotted in, to be effective accordingly. Some few guns were 240 mm and these fired what seemed to be delayed-action shells. The use of these shells gradually destroyed many magazines which were located too near the surface on Corregidor. After April 15, counter battery was used daily but for every shell fired from Corregidor the Japs fired four in return, the majority landing with excellent accuracy near the gun being fired. The Jap control of artillery through observation balloons beyond the range of Corregidor's guns was most effective. Daily bombings occurred from eight in the morning until sunset at intervals of two hours. Groups of planes from three to nine came over, using Nichols Field as a base. Agents stated that the majority of pilots sent from Nichols Field were under instruction and Corregidor was used as a training target. Glide bombers seldom appeared except during the later afternoon when they initiated their attack from the westward, taking advantage of the setting sun. High level bombing was usually from an altitude of 20,000 feet or higher. The number of planes destroyed was few; [redacted] much below the number claimed in the communiques. The firing of anti-aircraft was next to impossible to do in the last weeks, since each anti-aircraft gun was well spotted in from Bataan and the crews had to serve the guns under enormous handicaps. Many of the guns were not damaged, but the ammunition had to be thoroughly protected from the enemy artillery, since much which had been left ready for use had been destroyed by artillery fire. After every intense shelling, at least three ammunition dumps would continue burning and exploding for a couple hours thereafter. The majority of trees and shrubbery on Corregidor had been destroyed. In the late afternoon after a day of shelling and bombing Corregidor would be enveloped in a cloud of dense dust such that the visibility was less than a mile and neither the shore of Bataan nor planes overhead could be seen.

31. During all this bombardment the Fourth Marines and the Naval personnel from Mariveles who had joined the Beach Defenses were an inspiration to everyone. These troops remained in their trenches, dugouts, and foxholes; ate their food and slept there with no complaint. They took on a haggard expression, but never for a moment did they indicate a loss of hope. The Naval personnel throughout remained together as a unit, one supported and worked with the other. Frequently the Army had cases of individuals who wandered from their assigned post and joined some other unit without authority. The Naval personnel from Mariveles joined the Beach Defenses and remained where they were assigned. They made the best use of what was available. The Army units frequently crowded Malinta Tunnel until it seemed not another man could crowd in. After the fall of Bataan, many Army individuals who had escaped to Corregidor hid away in parts of Maliuta Tunnel and never again reported into any command or had any desire to assist in the defense of Corregidor. The defeatist spirit which accompanied the fall of Bataan was most evident in many Army enlisted personnel, many of whom were in the service a very short time. On a whole the Navy personnel, the Fourth Marines and the older well-trained Army personnel were the individuals who inspired the weaker ones to 'carry on'. The defeatist spirit which permeated Corregidor was brought to the attention of General Wainwright and he immediately approved the request that a letter be addressed to the troops over his signature that Corregidor could and would be held. This letter was written by Col. Wood, Lt. Col. Pugh and myself. It was generally disseminated and seemed to do a lot of good. If the Japs had attempted a landing on Corregidor simultaneous with the fall of Bataan or within forty-eight hours of its fall, it is believed Corregidor and the fortified islands could have been taken with much less effort than was needed a month later. If the Japs had attempted a landing on Corregidor in January before the Fourth Marines had developed the Beach Defenses, Corregidor would have fallen before Bataan. The personnel who manned the artillery were also assigned to the Beach Defenses prior to the arrival of

the Navy and the Fourth Marines. The Fourth Marines have received little if any credit for the Beach Defenses, Tank traps, barricades and barbed wire which they erected once they had been assigned to the Beach Defenses of Corregidor.

32. Early in January the Navy was alarmed at the number of civilian Filipinos which was on Corregidor and who were not attached to the Armed Forces. Repeated objections were made but the only excuse received was to the effect that these people were lavanderos and house boys of officers attached to Fort Mills. Their homes and many of these Filipino families continued to exist in part of the barrio San Jose in Bottomside on Corregidor. Not until the fall of Bataan did the Provost Marshall establish sentries at the various docks and landing beaches to challenge anyone who attempted to land on or leave the island. The lavanderos were never removed up to May 3. The majority of the Army officers in Malinta Tunnel had freshly washed and ironed clothes until Corregidor fell. The Navy and Marine Corps washed what few clothes they had retained in a bucket and hung them out to dry at night. Their clothes were not pressed nor as clean as the Army because of a lack of the necessary facilities, including soap, etc. During January, February, and March the barrio San Jose in Bottomside was progressively destroyed and burnt. This was done in order that an incendiary bombing might not produce a conflagration sufficient to separate Topside and Middleside from the Malinta Tunnel and the remainder of the fortress. Recent pictures of this area were released by the Japanese and appeared in the press with comments that this damage was done by Jap bombing before Corregidor surrendered. Bombings did destroy about all other buildings except the bakery, but the region of the Barrio San Jose was levelled by controlled burning. A few homes in the northeastern part of the barrio were not destroyed and these were used by the lavanderos and house boys who remained on the island. Some of these Filipinos were very probably Japanese agents. Frequently at night strange lights and occasional rockets were fired from various parts of the island. During February

and March rockets were fired from various places along the Cavite shore and it was believed done as a part of Japanese psychological warfare. Rocket displays had not been uncommon since the beginning of the war in the Manila area. It frequently proved to have no relation to an activity. It does prevent the troops on beach defense as well as many others from getting the necessary rest, when it continues night after night.

33. Some reports from Lieut. Jimenez indicated that the Japanese had fairly good information concerning the amount of U.S. ammunition which was available and the amount of food which remained. During April it is believed that the only way they obtained this information was from some of the civilian Filipinos who continued to live on Fort Mills. It was the Navy's belief from the beginning of the siege that no one except members of the Armed Forces should remain on the fortified islands, especially after the fall of Bataan. There is some indication that all civilian Filipinos were evacuated from the fortified islands just prior to their surrender.

34. The day following the fall of Bataan, the Philippine Army Q-boats, without orders, proceeded to seaward of Corregidor through the swept channel. These boats encountered the blockade destroyers and some shooting followed. The Q-boats dispersed, one made shore near Nasugbu, and one ventured to Corregidor. It was never clear just who was responsible for them. At one time the Army said the Navy was and at other times the Army said the Navy could use them by making a specific request. The Q-boat which returned to Corregidor disappeared a few nights later and was believed to have proceeded up the China Sea coast of Bataan. The commanding officer of the submarine who took the last group from Corregidor reported that near the entrance of Lingaylu Gulf he encountered what appeared to be a sail boat on patrol, but on closer scrutiny it could have been the Q-boat which hadescaped. It was suitably camouflaged. After his description of this he was advised that such a Q-boat had left Corregidor and proceeded toward northern Luzon.

35. The work of the nurses and doctors was exemplary. In addition the chaplains displayed a fearlessness which was always an inspiration, especially when they went to the aid of the injured, with a pharmacist mate during the continued shelling and bombing. The nurses on Bataan, where the majority were on April 8, were given short notice to leave. On the morning of April 9 it was feared they had failed to reach Mariveles. Finally about ten o'clock they reached Corregidor. The majority of them had been working continously for the last forty-eight hours and more. Their coveralls and hands were stained with blood. On the way to the dock at Mariveles they had stopped to care for some of the injured. One nurse who had been in the receiving section of hospital number two for the entire campaign stated her records showed approximately 27,000 patients had been treated for injuries or tropical illnesses during the campaign. It was further estimated that a minimum of nine thousand bed patients were on Bataan when it surrendered. Of this amount it was estimated that at least fifty per cent were seriously ill and would die because of lack of attention by the Japanese.

36. General Wainwright repeatedly reminded me that the American people would never forgive him if he did not make an effort to evacuate some of the American Army nurses from Corregidor. It is believed about ninety-six or more Army nurses were there. He wanted some other means than submarine. The use of Catalina planes was mentioned. After he had thought it over he referred the matter to Captain Hoeffel who strongly recommended against it. This discouraged the General for a bit. The following day the General sent for Comdr. Bridget, since he was the senior Naval aviator present, and myself. The possibility was reviewed from the standpoint of cruising range and weather. The General was assured that the weather would not interfere since the typhoon season was over and the northeast monsoon was about to be replaced by the Southwest monsoon. Night conditions were particularly calm with a smooth sea. Comdr. Bridget assured the General it could be done. The planes were requested and in a few days they were en route. The General decided to handle it all by Army

communications because of Captain Hoeffel's original objections. The entire evacuation at Corregidor was unusually successful, so much so General Wainwright and Captain Hoeffel were convinced it could be easily repeated so long as Lake Lanao remained in U.S. hands.

37. During the movement of these planes, radio silence was never broken by the planes. This distinctly impressed the Army because during General Royce's flight from Australia to the Philippines the planes continued an almost uninterrupted conversation in plain language concerning their mission and destination. We were greatly alarmed lest the landing of these bombers in Mindanao would be greeted with a destructive raid by the Japanese from Davao. The Navy Catalina planes adhered to radio silence and thus accomplished the evacuation without Japanese interference.

38. The Japanese frequently used plain language between their planes and their base at Takao. Frequently when the remaining radios were not effective preparations were made for a raid after hearing the planes leave Takao when they stated the number in the flight and their destination. An Army man who understood Japanese collected this information in Malinta Tunnel, and it was unusually helpful and accurate.

39. General Wainwright stressed the need of opinions from young officers as well as the old whenever he desired information. He reminded us that unless we were ready to take chances we would never win the war. He frequently stated that if Comdr. Bridget had not taken the Naval Battalion to Langaskagawayan Point, the Western Corps on Bataan would have been flanked and Bataan fallen sooner. For every older officer whom the General questioned, he asked for a similar opinion from a younger officer. He liked the Navy and took an interest in their problems. The General and his staff regretted that they were not permitted to take the offensive when the Japanese started to land at Lingayen Gulf in December.

40. General Wainwright indicated he had word from Washington he could leave Corregidor if he wanted to or if he would. I have heard him state at least twice with firmness that if the Japanese can take this 'Rock' they will find me here no matter what orders I receive. On May 3 when I said, "Goodbye," he was not certain how much longer Corregidor could hold out. He marvelled that everyone and everything had held up as long as it had under the incessant shelling and bombing. In the last week all repairs had to be accomplished at night when the Japanese could not detect the activity from observation posts on Bataan. Any activity in daylight attracted a heavy barrage in the immediate vicinity.

41. General Wainwright appeared to have one wish and that was for the end of the war that an aerial beacon with a perpetual light should be placed on the top of Mount Bataan as a symbol of the sacrifices and suffering which the men on Bataan had endured in the name of democracy, freedom and liberty. The airlines of the world will pass this way and he wanted to make sure that the fight was never forgotten, if he returned alive or not.

42. After the nurses left on the night of May 3, 1942, it is believed that about thirty-four American Army nurses remained. The other nurses were about thirty-five Filipino girls who had been recruited as Army nurses in December, 1941.

43. Except for Navy Nurse Ann A. Bernatitus, the Navy nurses had remained with the Canacao hospital which moved to Santa Escalastica College on Pennsylvania Avenue in the Malate section of Manila. On March 8, 1942, there is information which indicated twelve Navy nurses were moved from Santa Escalastica to the British-American internment camp at Santo Tomas University in Manila in order to assist the hospital staff. Recent reports state some of the American Army nurses who remained on Corregidor are also attached to the hospital staff at Santo Tomas. Some reports were received from Manila, stating that the Navy

doctors and nurses were being treated well. Dr. Roberts and Dr. Davis were reported seen on the streets of Manila with a Japanese bodyguard. There was no information concerning the patients who had sufficiently convalesced to be released when Manila was occupied by the Japanese.

44. The messages received from agents in and near Manila were very valuable. They reported each small boat which the Japs were able to salvage, giving the name and tonnage, and this checked very well with records which were obtained from the Navy Port Director's office. The Japs mounted field pieces in the bows of these salvaged vessels to assist in the invasion of Corregidor. Messages warned us that the Japs planned to take Fort Frank the night of March 23 and start the Bataan offensive about April 10. The night prior to the expected attack on Fort Frank, a concentrated fire from the guns of the fortified islands destroyed about 75 per cent of the boats, barges and landing equipment which the Japs had assembled in coves south of Fort Frank along the Luzon coast.

45. All agents reported the movement of all ships among the islands. The Japanese which finally landed at Iloilo and Cebu were sighted well in advance but there was an inadequate supply of troops and equipment to oppose these landings. Prior to landing at Iloilo and Cebu, various Japanese transports and supporting ships made the usual large number of feints at various points in the vicinity of the main objective. Normally, after twenty-four to forty-eight hours of feints, the invasion in force materialized at Iloilo and then Cebu. The troops which occupied Iloilo and Cebu were accompanied by Japanese civilians with their families. The civilians accompanied by troops endeavored to commandeer the business establishments in Iloilo and Cebu and then move in with their families and continue the business as a Japanese enterprise. These tactics were successful in few instances. The opposition they received caused the many fires which ravaged the business sections of Iloilo and Cebu subsequent to their occupation. During the occupation of the Southern Islands, there were

continuous requests for air support, ammunition and guns with instructions as to where to drop this equipment by parachute. The last signals received from Iloilo and Cebu indicated that groups were holding out in the hills with sufficient food but a scarcity of ammunition.

46. Some of the last reports received from General Sharp in Mindanao stated that the troops which landed on Mindanao in April were Moros from Jolo. These Moros had been drilled by Japanese troops after their original landing on Jolo in December. The history of the Southern Islands has always contained tales of feuds between Mindanao Moros and Sulu Moros. This procedure of the Japanese was to a great degree responsible for the Moro uprisings which have subsequently been reported from Mindanao. During the previous the Moros around ZamboAnga had been very active. The small group of Japanese troops returned to their ships to sleep because of the sniping and killing which the Moros successfully accomplished on Japanese sentries at night in the ZamboAnga area.

47. The Japanese endeavored to adhere to their established doctrine in the timing of invasion operations. All thrusts against Bataan and the fortified islands were planned to take advantage of the phase of the moon, the time of moonset relative to the time of sunrise, combined with a favorable high tide in the early morning hours. The Fourth Marines computed the times of possible landings in advance and established special lookouts during the possible periods of activity, which amounted to about four to six days for each month.

48. The Inshore Patrol maintained a log of all the activity at the duty officer desk in the Navy tunnel on Corregidor. These logs were brought out via the submarine on the night of May 3 and were mailed to the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. They contain a chronological history of all the items of interest including information concerning air raids and the damage caused. The duty officers were normally regular Navy officers and the data recorded therein is the best available data concerning naval operations in the

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Manila Bay area from December 25, 1941, until May 3, 1942. These logs were maintained in journals and are the only complete records which were maintained.

49. The morale of Naval personnel and the Fourth Marines continued on a high plane throughout the campaign. This was always noticeable when compared with the average Army personnel. Naval personnel who had been on the Asiatic station, especially on sea duty, seemed to display unusual determination and devotion to duty. The weaker individuals were continually buoyed up by the more cheerful personnel. The evening on which General MacArthur departed with Admiral Rockwell and Captain Roy, the tunnels occupied by enlisted men were visited to ascertain their possible reactions. Pointed comments were overhead which indicated that this exodus had no effect upon the morale of the Naval personnel. A few definite comments included statements that 'we still have General Wainwright and the Naval officers who have taken an interest in our welfare; we have not lost anything as yet', and words to this effect. All the officers and men who continued to have regular duties whether they were inside the tunnels, outside, or both, never showed signs of weakening or 'tunnelitis', as some people have called it.

50. As intelligence officer, charts of the Pacific Ocean were matched together to form a large uniform scaled map of the Pacific Ocean of dimensions approximately 14 feet by 20 feet. This chart was erected in the commandant's office of the Navy tunnel. On the chart the Japanese bases and airfields were clearly marked, the supply routes were indicated with red twine. About twice a week a general discussion was conducted reviewing all the latest communiques and information of interest. It was surprising to see that many people did not have an adequate appreciation of the distances involved in the Western Pacific. Many had never seemed to realize that their original geography had always portrayed the Far East and Southwest Pacific on a small scale with much less detail than North America, western Europe and the Mediterranean. The same lack of perspective

and appreciation has been noted in the general American public since my return. There is a small appreciation of the size of China, the Japanese empire and the innumerable islands of every dimension in the western and south Pacific. The American public as well as the younger Naval officers who have been on the Asiatic Station must fully appreciate the tremendous areas which must be reclaimed in order to bring the Japanese empire to ultimate defeat.

51. The excellent training and indoctrination which Naval personnel on the Asiatic Station received for an entire year prior to the outbreak of hostilities was a distinct asset during the first few weeks of the war in the Philippines. Everyone quickly passed through the initial stages of fear and hysteria and then performed their duties in an outstanding manner. It was frequently impressed upon us how well the Naval personnel kept together and took care of one another, especially after the bombing of Cavite Navy Yard. After the initial bombings of Nichols Field, many of the technicians scattered far and wide. They were stopped and questioned on the streets and readily gave replies that Nichols Field was finished, while their officers had to call time and again at every conceivable place in order to locate pilots and technicians to man the planes which remained. The Army personnel handled guns carelessly and the promiscuous shooting at all hours in Manila can only be attributed to the great lack of preliminary training for this emergency. It is fully appreciated that many of the Army troops had just arrived in the Islands and had been in the Army for relatively short periods. The willingness with which the Naval personnel adapted themselves to the new conditions, their outstanding performance of duty under every emergency, will never be forgotten by the officers who saw them in action during the entire campaign. This also applies to the many Filipinos who returned to the Navy from the Fleet Reserve and gave full assurance that they equalled the Philippine Scouts in fearlessness and loyalty. The Filipinos who had been trained and served with U.S. forces for long periods, proved to be the equal in ability of any body of troops in action. The cruises

which had been made to the Southern Islands during 1941 were invaluable experiences for Naval personnel. The majority of the Navy knew the Philippines and fully appreciated the situation. Others who had been to China or had visited Japan did not underestimate the capabilities of the enemy in quite the same manner as people who had never been there.

52. It was a distinct disappointment to the Navy and the Marines when General MacArthur gave the citation which is now War Department General Order Number Fourteen, of March 9, 1942. The Navy and Marines were completely ignored in this citation even though they had done outstanding work in every instance. Various officers on the USAFFE staff were questioned and they assured us it was not an oversight. The general reply was that the Marines and Navy received all the glory in World War I and this was a chance for the Army to get a little glory. When General Wainwright assumed command he immediately questioned this apparent oversight and it is not known what was told him. He repeatedly assured us the Navy was going to receive due credit and the citations, now War Department General Orders Number Twenty-one and Twenty-two, of April 30, 1942, are a result. In accordance with the later citations, the Adjutant General of the U.S. Army has already awarded the Army Citation Device with Oak Leaf Cluster to Navy individuals who have applied for it in writing to the Adjutant General.

53. The Navy in the Far East has received little if any credit for the tasks which were accomplished with much antiquated equipment during the early months of the war in the Western Pacific. It was a disappointment to attend various public lectures during the winter of 1942 and hear speakers who were Naval officers say they were reviewing what the U.S. Navy had done during the first year of the war, and in at least one instance the work of the Houston, Marblehead, Asiatic destroyers, Inshore Patrol in the Philippines, Fourth Marines and other units was completely ignored. It may have been an oversight, but when the entire story can be told, the record will prove that, as a unit, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet and Naval personnel on the Asiatic Station discharged their duties in

keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval Service. The American public should eventually be advised in order that credit may be given where it is due. General MacArthur's Army and Air Force have been repeatedly extolled. When the sacrifices and devotion to duty of the U.S. Navy is equally brought forward, this should help to sell many War Bonds. The Navy personnel on Corregidor purchased over $600,000 worth of bonds during the Bataan-Corregidor campaign. When 2000 fighting sailors can do this, in a period of four months, the American public has a long way to go to equal this when they live in surroundings equivalent to peace.

54. One incident seems to stand out as one very important incentive to the troops in the Manila Bay area. They were forced to fight a retreating campaign. They saw the American flag hauled down frequently with appropriate ceremony at Cavite, at Nichols Field, at Fort McKinley, at the Manila Hotel, the Army-Navy Club and the High Commissioner's Mansion. This was impressive and not the American way. Many of these same people were able to look back towards Manila through binoculars from the fortified islands and Bataan. Flying from staffs where the United States flag formerly flew were the largest Japanese military flags which were available. The troops frequently commented about this and it was something they all hoped to avenge until the very end.

55. After General Wainwright took command, the communiques which were released were normally prepared by Colonel Stuart Wood, whom I frequently assisted. We endeavored to state the reasonable facts with a minimum of propaganda. Every effort was made to omit unusual claims of superiority for our forces over the Japanese. This was based upon the fact that there had been but two real offensive actions prior to the fall of Corregidor. The remainder was a war of nerves with each side making claims concerning the violent daily actions which were being waged. After about two or three weeks, specific orders were received from Headquarters in Melbourne to the effect that all information would be submitted to Melbourne where all subsequent communiques were then issued.

56. During January and February frequent discussions were indulged in by the regular Navy officers. These explored all the possibilities of what might be done to alleviate the situation. The possible use of submarines to supply fuel and food had been repeatedly suggested, together with the occasional use of patrol planes for bringing in vital medicines and supplies and evacuating the many trained submarine technicians and other trained enlisted personnel who were not being effectively employed and were distinctly valuable to an expanding Navy. Captain Hoeffel frequently called these the "Knoll plan" and after he became Commandant they were used successfully. No submarine or patrol plane was lost performing these missions which were extremely hazardous but at the same time effective.

57. Comdr. Fenno desired to take at least fifteen men with him when the gold was evacuated in January. Various officers requested permission to accompany him but it was not granted for reasons which have not been revealed. Lt. Comdr. A. E. Harris, U.S.N., was one of these officers, and he had had orders to leave Manila via the first available transportation, when hostilities started December 7, 1941; his services were not needed.

58. Another suggestion for possible use of aircraft was discussed with Col. Savage of the Air Corps, but this was never tried. The Philippines required more fighter planes and such could not fly non-stop to Mindanao from Australia after the fall of Amboina. It was accordingly hoped that the possibility of flying fighter planes pick-a-back on flying fortresses in a suitable cradle was worthy of test. To eliminate the excessive weight, one fortress could carry the plane without the engine, while a long range transport brought in the engine and some of the fuel and ammunition. This was never forwarded since the supply of aviation fuel diminished and there was no means of bringing in more. This may eventually prove practicable for some operations, since the British Overseas Airways at one time conducted extensive experiments with pick-a-back planes attached to the upper wing of their larger flying boats.

59. During various sightseeing trips in the Philippines, a few trips were made to the eastern coast of Luzon from Atimonan to Lopez and the vicinity of Lamon Bay. On each visit I noted a strong Japanese influence, a goodly number of Japanese merchants and Japanese literature was in evidence. The vague reports which were received concerning operations around Lamon Bay have interested me accordingly. The location has ready access to the Pacific Ocean and has many possibilities for development as an advanced base for the Japanese. Manila is connected to this area by a modern concrete highway and the railroad from Manila to Legaspi is along the coast of the Bay. It is only about 200 kilometers from Manila, but away from the observing eyes of foreigners. The area is easy to defend from inland due to the mountain ranges to the eastward. The approach by highway through Quezon National Park is easily guarded. This area will in general have favorable flying weather with a calm sea during the southwest monsoon, when Manila Bay area and the western ports of all large islands have much unfavorable weather. Many parts of the Bay are ideal for a submarine base and refuelling base for the fleet. A good air field was maintained by the Philippine Bureau of Aeronautics on Alabat Island. The fortification of the Polillos and Alabat Islands can be readily accomplished. The area is about midway between Formosa and Davao as well as between Okinawa and Palau. Various adjacent areas seemed adaptable to development of more air fields. This region is away from the normal communication lanes and may escape immediate detection. This and other possibilities should not be overlooked when operations against the Philippines are conducted. Reports from geologists indicate deposit of coal on the Polillos as well as to the southward on Luzon Island near Daet. One geologist in the Philippines believed there may be some oil deposits along this eastern fringe of Luzon. The long sloping sandy beaches are also well adapted to drill with landing boats. The entire possible development of Lamon Bay area is based on vague reports from Philippine agents, while still on Corregidor.

60. The cooperation and coordination of Army and Navy Intelligence was always very satisfactory. There had been a distinct lack of this during General MacArthur's regime and the Army in general attributed it to Colonel Willoughby with whom everyone seemed to have difficulty. General Wainwright's G-2 was Colonel Stuart Wood, U.S.A., assisted by Lt. Col. John Pugh, U.S.A. Col. Wood had spent three years in Japan and was a most intelligent officer and a Japanese language student. Lt. Col. Pugh was aide to General Wainwright and assisted us in keeping well-informed concerning General Wainwright's wishes. Daily conferences were held. During my tour of duty there appeared to be less than the normal amount of friction between the Army and Navy on all matters. This was undoubtedly due to the strain of the immediate emergencies. Colonel Wood and Lt. Colonel Pugh at one time assured me that General Wainwright intended to reward Captain Hoeffel and myself for the successful work which had been accomplished by him through the assistance of the Navy.

61. This report should contain some information concerning the work of a few individuals, which came to my attention and should be recorded.

62. Captain Hoeffel was highly respected by all personnel. He took an interest in their welfare and by long walks was well acquainted with every part of Fort Mills where Navy personnel were assigned. He never complained of his assignment. He had very cordial relations with General Wainwright. He daily discussed the entire situation with me for hours at a time and assured me he valued my suggestions and recommendations over any other Naval officer on Corregidor. When I was ordered out of Corregidor, he gave me messages to his family and then expressed his deep appreciation to me for my assistance to him on every problem. He seldom discussed a problem with anyone but me and took me into his confidence completely. When Admiral Rockwell was about to leave and Captain Hoeffel was informed he was to relieve, I was immediately requested to assist him because Captain Hoeffel stated my knowledge of the location of Japanese and Allied bases

together with my relations with the Army on matters of meteorology were all very valuable to him. All the Naval personnel on Corregidor felt that Captain Hoeffel performed a difficult task in an outstanding manner, and it was difficult for us to leave him and many others when orders were received.

63. Lieut. S. A. Leahigh, U.S.N.R., relieved Lt. Comdr. Baron, U.S.N., as issuing officer under the supervision of Lt. Comdr. F. H. Callahan and Lt. Comdr. M. H. McCoy, U.S.N. Lieut. Leahigh was naval censor and frequently had some difficult problems. At one time some of the Marine officers addressed private letters to Congressmen and Senators recommending that West Point and Annapolis be abolished because of the performance of duty of Academy graduates in the war to date. V.M.I. was cited as the outstanding military academy in these letters. These letters were destroyed by burning. One Lt. Colonel with a responsible assignment in the Fourth Marines wrote many letters to various individuals and it was necessary to burn most of his letters because of their contents.

64. Lt. Comdr. A. E. Harris, U.S.N., became very nervous during the later weeks of the siege, and it was feared that the mental strain was weakening him considerably.

65. Lt. Comdr. H. H. Taylor, U.S.N., was First Lieutenant of the Navy Tunnels and his duties were always performed with thoroughness. Long discussions were held with him on gas defense and the tunnels were all fitted with double curtains in preparation for a gas attack, which was considered probable if Corregidor offered strong resistance during a landing. Comdr. J. D. Wilson, Lt. Comdr. Taylor, Lt. Bowers and myself made all the arrangements for gas defense in the Navy tunnels.

66. Repeated inquiries have been received concerning Comdr. S. C. Cheever, U.S.N. Comdr. Cheever never came to Corregidor. Some reports state he was

seen in Mariveles about December 26 and then returned to Manila. Lieut. (jg) W. M. Pearce, U.S.N.R., came to Corregidor with the censorship unit about January 1, 1943. Lt. Pearce told me that on the evening of December 28 or December 29, while he was at the Bay View Hotel, a Naval officer jumped from a window on the sixth or seventh floor and was killed when he hit the street along the east side of the building. His further inquiries at the Hotel indicated that the officer was Comdr. Cheever. Lt. Pearce told me this story while on Corregidor.

67. Lt. Comdr. F. H. Baltzly was very ill and had failed very much prior to hostilities. There was no definite information as to where he went after the bombing of Cavite Navy Yard. One report stated he was seen near Quezon City.

68. Lt. Comdr. A. M. Bryan, (SC), U.S.N., was gradually becoming mentally unbalanced. He continued to bother Captain Hoeffel and myself with wild stories and apparently had continual hallucinations.

69. Lt. J. R. Lippincott, (SC), U.S.N.R., had continued relapses of malaria and was very debilitated with indications of mental instability.

70. Comdr. McCracken, Comdr. George Brook, Lt. Comdr. Smith, Lt. Comdr. Morrill, Lt. Comdr. Roth, and Lt. Comdr. Davison all performed outstanding duties as commanding officers of vessels assisting the Inshore Patrol.

71. Lieut. Bill Greene, U.S.N.R., an intelligence officer commissioned in Manila, was one of the outstanding officers in the Reserve. He took charge of evacuating all vessels from Pasig River during bombings of Manila, in order to prevent future low level bombings in the Walled City. Lt. Greene was last heard from in Tacloban, Leyte, through a special code after Cebu had fallen. He spoke Chinese and some other languages fluently. He intended to hide with natives.

72. Lt. Stearns, formerly an agent with the Canadian Pacific Lines, was last known to be in the Southern Islands near Cebu.

73. Lt. Sam Wilson, U.S.N.R., the owner of Wilson Building, and Lt. Comdr. F. L. Worcester, of Zamboanga, were last heard from in Mindanao, when the latter was well acquainted in Bukidnon and Zamboanga. They had indicated that they could arrange to live with the natives. Lt. Wilson's family remained in Manila.

74. Lieut. Les Moote, U.S.N.R., was a newspaper publisher and was last known to be in Iloilo. His family were in Manila.

75. Lieut. Mason Lowe, U.S.N.R., a former sewing machine salesman, was last known to be in Iloilo and he had been successful in getting messages and clothing from Manila to Iloilo, through Philippine boatmen who operated from the Southern Islands to Tabangos and thence to Manila. Lieut. Lowe arranged for his lavandera to come to Iloilo in this manner. He spoke many Filipino dialects and intended to live among the natives.

76. Lt. (jg) Warren Garwick, U.S.N.R., formerly in charge of the Country Club at Baguio was last known to be in Tacloban, but had travelled through Samar during March and April. His family remained in Baguio; he knew the islands well and intended to hide with the natives.

77. Lt. (jg) W. M. Pearce, U.S.N.R., formerly a salesman for Colgate Palmolive Peet, was an excellent officer, who performed all his duties willingly and capably. His spirit and general cheerfulness were a distinct asset to the entire unit.

78. Lieut. T. J. E. Crotty, U.S.C.G., an explosive expert, was an unusually energetic officer, who performed all duties with thoroughness and was always ready to volunteer for special duties. He was a distinct credit to the Coast Guard and an outstanding leader at all times.

79. Major R. H. Ridgely, U.S.M.C., managed the supplies and equipment for the Fourth Marines. He worked continually and performed unbelievable tasks with ease. His duties at headquarters were in a great part responsible for the successful manner in which the Fourth Marines continued to function.

80. Captain R. F. Ruge, U.S.M.C., was assistant intelligence officer with the Fourth Marines. He was a most efficient officer who had a full appreciation of all details and performed an outstanding service at all times to his command. Col. Howard and Col. Curtis had complete confidence in Capt. Ruge and relied upon his judgment. He frequently requested permission to lead a raiding party to Olongapo or Cavite province but was refused by Col. Howard.

81. Col. Sam L. Howard, U.S.M.C., took a keen interest in his men and during the last few weeks became unusually nervous concerning the entire situation. In the last few days he seldom slept and became unduly pessimistic and put faith in every rumor, of which there were many.

82. Col. Don Curtis, U.S.M.C., worked very energetically and gave Col. Howard every assistance. He, to a great extent, was a stabilizing influence to Col. Howard in the last few days.

83. Lieut. J. E. Bullock, (SC), U.S.N., was a past master at the art of barter and was continually uncovering new material and supplies. He was fearless and continued during bombings and shelling to procure supplies for the Navy. In the Southern Islands he was last known to be at Tacloban Leyte with the above-mentioned officers. The commanding officer at Tacloban was then Colonel Cornell, U. S. Army.

84. Lt. Comdr. Davis, U.S.N.R., navigator of the Canopus relieved Lt. Comdr. Hawes as commanding officer of the Pigeon. The Pigeon continued to do excellent repair work and together with the Canopus was mentioned for the outstanding machine work which was performed for the Army on Bataan and Corregidor after

the majority of the shops on Corregidor had been levelled by bombing and fire.

85. Lieut. Doug. R. Fisher, U.S.N.R., was probably the most outstanding Reserve officer on the station. He was capable and efficient. He gave excellent indications that he possessed all the necessary qualities of leadership combined with excellent judgment.

86. Lt. Comdr. Harrison, U.S.N.R., formerly with the San Francisco Fire Department, took charge of all the small boats at Mariveles and later at Corregidor. He was loud in his praise of all the Philippine Naval Reserve whom he had as boat crews in the 680's, etc. He performed his duties thoroughly and efficiently.

87. Lt. Comdr. A. Hede, U.S.N., took charge of the Naval personnel which came from Mariveles. His leadership permitted these units to join in the Beach Defenses with a minimum of effort.

88. Chaplain F. J. McManus, was always an example of courage and determination. He gained the admiration of all hands since he remained in the field with the men at all times, and accompanied the pharmacists mates to attend the injured as much as he was able. He performed his chaplain duties in keeping with the highest traditions.

89. Comdr. W. W. Hastings and Lieut. C. J. Weschler, my first cousin, deserve the highest praise for their continued service at the Dewey Dry Dock in Riveles. The PT-boats and Q-boats continued to be effective weapons because two officers continued to work frequently day and night during the heavy bombings of Riveles.

90. Comdr. W. P. Portz, U.S.N., was senior Navy officer in the Southern Islands after Captain Desses' illness. Comdr. Portz kept us continually informed and completed all the arrangements for handling submarines at Cebu. The last word

from him stated the codes and ciphers were being destroyed and he was proceeding inland with General Chynoweth.

91. Lt. Comdr. E. V. Dockweiler, U.S.N., worked with Comdr. Fortz at Cebu and was last believed to have reached Mindanao via Negros when Cebu was occupied. Repeated reports stated that many old haciendas were going to take and hide personnel in the interior. It is not known how many, if any, took advantage of this. It is probable some will eventually be located at these large haciendas.

92. Lt. W. P. Scott, U.S.N.R., was aide to Captain Hoeffel. In the last few weeks he occupied a desk in General Wainwright's tunnel. The staff rightfully believed him to be eavesdropping and thus intentionally permitted him to pick up misleading information. About this time Lieut. Scott became unusually morose and gave full indication that the strain was affecting him.

93. Lieut. R. K. Anderson, U.S.N., performed a distinct service during the days immediately following the bombing of Cavite Navy Yard. He commandeered equipment from Engineers Island and shops along the Pasig River, there supervised the repair of the Seadragon in order that he could put to sea in a seaworthy condition. To accomplish this he worked day and night. At night under tarpaulins in order to preserve the blackout. After these repairs, he supervised the repair of the U.S.S. Peary and made her seaworthy, sufficient to reach Australia. Lieut. Anderson was last believed to be in Mindanao after escaping from Cebu to Negros.

94. Lt. J. R. Davis, U.S.N., performed difficult tasks in order to insure a water supply to the Navy at Monkey Point after their water tower had been damaged by bombing. He later went to Cebu and eventually reached Mindanao.

95. The outstanding Marine officers in the field were undoubtedly Colonel C. T. Beecher and Lt. Col. S. M. Freeny who supervised the beach defenses on

the northeast side of Corregidor where the Japanese landing is believed to have been effected. The leadership and example of these two offcers were easily outstanding. Army officers who served with these units had the highest admiration for the manner in which these officers accomplished their mission.

96. Repeated inquiries have been received concerning Lieut. A. D. Gray, U.S.N., an aviator attached to the Patrol Squadrons. It is believed he was hospitalized with dengue about December 15 and there was some report that he was released from Santa Escolastica about the time the Japanese occupied Manila. He never reported at Mariveles or Corregidor.

97. Captain W. H. Wilterdink, (SC), U.S.N., came to Mariveles and obtained permission to return to Manila in December. Some reports were received that he went to Australia with the hospital ship about December 26. There was no further word received concerning him.

98. Lieut. Baumgardner, U.S.N.R., formerly with the RCA Radio in Manila, was sent to Cebu, where he and Lt. Comdr. A. E. Grove, U.S.N., erected a station from salvaged material. Lt. Baumgardner reached Mindanao and repeatedly requested transportation to Australia. He reported that he became separated from Lt. Comdr. Grove in the hills behind the city of Cebu. Some reports stated Lt. Comdr. Grove was with Comdr. Fortz in Cebu.

99. Beginning in early March, the Japanese in Manila appeared to release drift buoys from the vicinity of the breakwater in Manila. These buoys consisted of a bamboo pole with a red or white flag attached, and attached to the underwater end was a suitable weight to make the pole float upright. Buoys of this kind were noted every few days and the majority would float through North Channel while at least one was recovered cautiously to make certain it was not a floating mine or some sort of trap. The later reports, which have been received, would seem to indicate that smoke pots were floated through the North

Channel in much the same fashion when the Japanese screened their preparations on Bataan prior to the landing operations against Fort Mills. The direction and drift of the current was obtained with these buoys, which was quite evident at the time although the eventual use of this information was not clear.

100. After the fall of Bataan a few Japanese landing boats successfully routed the point of Bataan near Cochinos Point and Horn Point and escaped into Marivales and Manila Bay without encountering the mine field or drawing fire from shore batteries on Corregidor. Immediate investigation revealed a conflict of orders between searchlight control and the artillery with beach defense.

101. As Officer in Charge of Weather Central, Cavite Navy Yard, a short report follows. As a result of the Batavia Conference in June of 1941, a uniform system of codes and ciphers was adopted for use between the British, Dutch, Australians and New Zealanders in the Far East, and the same system to be used by the United States in these areas upon the outbreak of hostilities. The entire system was functioning prior to December 7, 1941, and the Weather Central started the use of these ciphers on this date. The entire procedure with codes and ciphers was forwarded to Pearl Harbor and San Francisco. The United States Forces' refusal to use these systems for operations into the South Pacific has caused unnecessary lack of coordination, which is now about to be corrected. The U.S. Army and Navy in the Far East used it effectively.

102. The conference of U.S. Meteorological Activities convened in Manila in August, 1941, accomplished the necessary coordination which functioned until the fall of Corregidor. In accordance with Admiral Hart's suggestion, I was chairman of this conference.

103. A visit to Singapore in July, 1941, revealed that Malaya had a weather service with two good forecasters, but the communication equipment available

was in no way able to handle an ordinary amount of operational traffic. The two good tropical forecasters were Mr. J. Grimes and a Mister John who managed to reach Ceylon with their Director, Comdr. H. H. Moorhead, Royal Navy, Retired, when Singapore fell. As a result of Batavia and this visit, all necessary weather information was received via Singapore from British Borneo and Malaya.

104. Dr. Boerema, the Director of the Netherlands East Indies weather service, remained in Batavia when Java was occupied. The Netherlands East Indies had an excellent service which has been very helpful to all operations. Weather information was received until Java fell.

105. Dr. Evans, the Director of the Hongkong Observatory, was in Kowloon when Hongkong surrendered. As a result of Batavia and the visit to Singapore, regular broadcasts in cipher were received from Hongkong. Prior to this, Hongkong had sent no weather since England's entry into war.

106. Father E. Gherzi, a Jesuit, and Director of Zi-Ka-Wei Observatory at Shanghai, sent daily broadcasts in the clear until December 7, 1941. Much of the information contained in these broadcasts was a result of a personal friendship with Father Gherzi. Father Gherzi assured me that when the Japanese occupied Shanghai completely his weather service would stop and Zi-Ka-Wei would become a seminary only with attached Chinese orphanages. Rev. M. Burgaud, S.J., Father Gherzi's superior, told me essentially the same. He stated the Japanese had approached them with a request to continue their missions in the interior because the missions helped prevent the spread of Communist doctrine, which the Japanese feared. Father Gherzi is of Italian parentage, had always enjoyed the best relations with the U.S. Navy and was greatly disappointed when Italy entered the war. It is believed he will help the United Nations wherever and howsoever he can against the Japanese whom he detested.

107. The recommendations of the conference in Manila were not approved by President Quezon until Secretary Vargas had conducted an investigation to insure that no U.S. Army and Navy representatives had said anything against independence in 1946 and the commitments of the Commonwealth would in no way affect their independence in 1946. Father M. Selga, S.J., Director of Manila Observatory, informed me that this investigation was conducted by four young constitutional lawyers attached to Vargas' office. The recommendations were approved and placed in effect.

108. When the Weather Central was destroyed by bombing and fire at Cavite, it was moved to the Manila Observatory. During all my relations with the Jesuits at Manila Observatory, they were most cooperative. The Weather Central was operated with equipment salvaged from the Pan American terminal at Cavite and Father Selga's equipment. All remained at the Observatory when Manila was evacuated on December 25, 1941. Father Selga willingly changed his entire organization to meet the needs of United States Forces. The service was undoubtedly seized intact by the Japanese when Manila was occupied. Father Selga knew all his employees personally, had helped train most of them and was very solicitous concerning their loyalty, and the security of his service. He took every possible step to enforce necessary censorship upon the outbreak of war. He and his staff will be ready to contribute weather service to the United States when necessary and possible.

109. Regular broadcasts and necessary forecasts were sent from Manila and later from Corregidor until Corregidor fell. These messages were addressed to Pearl Harbor, San Francisco, Darwin, Melbourne, -- (Batavia and Singapore until they fell). At least two signals were received from Pearl Harbor stating the information was being used and was valuable. The Director of the Australian Service in Melbourne later told me that the daily messages from Corregidor were used and were an inspiration to his whole staff.

110. Forecasts were given regularly to Major General H. H. George, U.S.A., on Bataan and to members of General MacArthur's staff. Captain H. H. Whitfield, U.S.A., and I developed a special code after January 2, 1942. Captain Whitfield flew to every weather station still in U.S. hands and gave them the code with instructions. The Bureau of Posts radio stations throughout the island, which we still controlled, had instructions to send every message with the indicator "Noel" to me on Corregidor. Ten to twelve reports were thus received until Mindanao and the southern islands were captured. The Bureau of Post Radio station on Corregidor continued to operate with other stations not under Japanese control until the end. Enlisted men attached to the Weather Central assisted with the computation of ballister wind and performed their duties meritoriously, especially during the heavy shelling and bombing.

111. The efficient manner in which the Naval Radio continued to function until the very end is due in a large part to two radio electricians, viz., Radio Elect. E. G. Schweizer and Radio Elect. T. E. Turnipseed, U.S.N. These two men worked continually in complete harmony under the direction of Lt. Comdr. F. H. Callahan. During all the bombings and shellings when antennae were always being destroyed, the radiomen, under the direction of the radio electricians, repaired the damage. Frequently, in order to keep NPO on the air, they continued to make repairs, climb poles and string additional antennae while a raid was in progress. A special antenna was finally strung in the tunnel and this was tested with Honolulu and a signal received. At various times a listening post would report that the Japanese aviators were commenting bitterly when they continued to hear NPO on the air during and following a heavy raid. Antenna wire was exhausted, and damaged pieces were brazed together. At night as many antennae as available were hung down the sides of cliffs and between trees with the hope that at least a few would be available during the entire day which was to follow. The communication personnel as a unit performed all their duties in an outstanding manner and commanded the respect and admiration of everyone on Corregidor.

112. Frequently at night small boats were sent out to reconnoiter along the Bataan and Cavite shore and locate possible concentrations of equipment and boats which might be used for landings on the fortified islands. When Army personnel with an officer were sent on such a mission, it was often necessary to send them out two and three times because they would fail to realize that they were to accomplish a primary mission or a secondary mission and not resort to independent thinking when they saw a Japanese boat or another suspicious object. One Army officer who had been commissioned in Manila was fearless and anxious to perform special duties of this nature. On a few of these tasks he jeopardized other units' security by his independent actions. Many people were continually anxious to do something and with the younger officers it was repeatedly noted that they failed to appreciate the necessity of fulfilling their primary or secondary mission. Other reports were received that the Army Air Forces in the Philippines were also confronted with this dangerous problem.

113. Upon my arrival in Australia a few short comments were written in event that some statement might be requested by the press. While in Melbourne, Frank J. Cuhel, of the Mutual Broadcasting Company, contacted me and after seeing these comments requested that they be broadcast to the U.S. Enclosure (A) was released by the Naval Censor and Colonel Diller on General MacArthur's staff, and subsequently broadcast from Melbourne by a recording after I had departed from Australia.

114. Enclosure (B) is a copy of the statement of account of the special Welfare Fund sent to the Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, on December 20, 1941. The balance with receipts were received from Lt. Comdr. F. J. Grandfield, U.S.N., on March 12, 1942. Upon receipt of this fund, a ledger was prepared with receipts attached to justify all the expenditures. The ledger with the receipts and the balance of the fund was turned over to Comdr. A. R. McCracken, U.S.N., who relieved me as Intelligence Officer on May 3, 1942. The question

of bringing the balance to Australia was considered, and Captain Hoeffel finally decided to distribute twenty pesos to each person with the Naval Forces just prior to the fall of Corregidor. This was in accordance with the recommendation of Admiral Rockwell when he departed.

115. Captain Hoeffel decided that some written organization should be promulgated and accordingly enclosure (C) was prepared for the information of all Navy personnel and General Wainwright. Prior to this there had been no written orders or an approved organization at Fort Mills or Mariveles.

116. The records of personnel were ably prepared under the supervision of Lt. Comdr. T. C. Parker, U.S.N. Following the evacuation of Manila and the bombing of Cavite Navy Yard there were few, if any, records which remained. New forms were mimeographed and each man was interviewed and the records available on May 3, 1942, were the equivalent of a regular service record. For this long tedious work Comdr. Parker is deserving of much credit.

117. General Wainwright and General Beebe were most anxious to have a channel in the mine field south of Corregidor. One reason was to afford entrance for the converted cargo carrying destroyers which had been promised. The Army failed to realize that these destroyers would have to refuel if they proceeded at the high speeds which had been indicated that they would use. In addition General Wainwright hoped equipment could be sent to Mindanao in order that one island could be held. At the request of General Wainwright, I prepared enclosure (D) for Captain Hoeffel and forwarded it to General Wainwright. It is enclosed for information.

118. This report has been prepared from notes which were recorded upon my return to Washington. To the best of my knowledge it is accurate and wherein it does conflict with other reports, there is a good possibility that the disagreement can be cleared. No direct criticism of an individual or unit is

intended. The majority of all personnel reacted very favorably under the strain of the siege and the reduced rations. Some of this information may help to locate individuals and thus eventually account for the many who are now prisoners-of-war and in whom we who were evacuated have a very special interest. Throughout the entire siege it was repeatedly evident that military leaders can only be selected with certainty on the field of battle.

DENYS W. KNOLL,
Lt. Comdr., U.S. Navy,
Headquarters Cominch.

CONFIDENTIAL

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March 12, 1942

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT "EMERGENCY WELFARE FUND - COMMANDANT, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT".

RECEIPTS from:-

Dec. 20, 1941, Secretary of the Navy -($50,000) (SecNav despatch 201955 of Dec. 1941)	₱100,000.00
TOTAL.....	₱100,000.00

EXPENDITURES

Voucher No.	To whom	Amount ₱
1	Lt.Comdr. M. Cheek, USNR	25.00
2a	Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PEARY	500.00
2b	Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PILLSBURY	500.00
3a	Lt. J. Bulkely, U.S.N.	300.00
3b	Capt. H.J. Ray, U.S.N.	2000.00
4	Navy Mess Fund, Ft. Mills, P.I.	9991.10
5	Inshore Patrol Mess, Ft. Mills, P.I.	612.98
6	U.S. Navy Mess, Ft. Mills, P.I.	1257.34
7	First Class Navy Mess, Ft. Mills, P.I.	578.44
8	Topside Naval Detachment, Ft. Mills, P.I.	1565.70
9	C.P. Officer, U.S.N., Ft. Mills, P.I.	487.78
10	Navy Unit Mess, Ft. Mills, P.I.	1104.90
11	Capt. J.H.S. Dessez, U.S.N., for Cebu personnel.	2000.00
12	Capt. J.H.S. Dessez, U.S.N., for Cebu personnel.	2000.00
13	Supply Officer, 16th Naval District.	641.40
14	U.S. Army Q.M.- for Lt. Fabian account	7.42
15	Capt. H.J. Ray, U.S.N., for distribution	26000.00
	TOTAL EXPENDITURES.....	₱45572.06

CASH ON HAND December 20, 1941.....	₱100,000.00
EXPENDITURES.....	₱45,572.06
BALANCE ON HAND, March 12, 1942.....	₱54,427.94

To the best of my knowledge and belief this is a true statement of account of this fund which was received with no record except the enclosed receipts from Lieutenant Commander F.J. Grandfield, U.S. Navy, on this date.

Denys W. Knoll,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy.

Enclosure "B"

CONFIDENTIAL

C O P Y

May 2, 1942.

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT "EMERGENCY WELFARE FUND - COMMANDANT, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT".

RECEIPTS:-

Cash on Hand March 12, 1942	₱54,427.94
Received from Lt. Fabian, USN	7.24
TOTAL RECEIPTS	₱54,435.36

EXPENDITURES:-

Voucher No.	To whom	Amount ₱
16	Navy Units, Ft. Mills, P.I.	1,185.60
17	Navy Units, Ft. Mills, P.I.	1,204.32
18	Navy Units, Ft. Hughes, P.I.	200.00
19	Navy Units, Ft. Mills, P.I.	1,060.80
20	Delinquent Bills, Navy Personnel, Philippines	262.80
	TOTAL EXPENDITURES	₱3,913.52

- -

CASH ON HAND March 12, 1942	₱54,435.36
EXPENDITURES	₱3,913.52
BALANCE ON HAND, May 2, 1942	₱50,521.84

- -

To the best of my knowledge and belief this is a true statement of account of this fund to date. There is one outstanding obligation to the Quartermaster, Ft. Mills, P.I., of approximately ₱2,800.00, which was authorized by Admiral Rockwell and bill has not been rendered and may not be due to the emergency.

Very respectfully,

Denys W. Knoll,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy.

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May 3, 1942.

RECEIPTS:

Cash on hand May 2, 1942.....₱50,521.84

Received from Lt.Comdr. Bryan fund previously given to Captain J.H.S. Dessez, USN., by Captain Ray, USN - Voucher #3b..... 2,000.00

BALANCE ON HAND May 3, 1942..... ₱52,521.84

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To the best of my knowledge and belief this is a true statement of account of this fund to date. There is one outstanding obligation to the Quartermaster, Ft. Mills, P.I., of approximately ₱2,800.00, which was authorized by Admiral Rockwell and bill has not been rendered and may not be due to the emergency.

Very respectfully,

Denys W. Knoll,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy.

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

ND16/A3
Serial #5

March 20, 1942.

From: The Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.
To : SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

Subject: SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT ORGANIZATION.

1. The SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT will be organized as follows, with the below named officers assigned duties as indicated:

HEADQUARTERS SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Captain Kenneth M. Hoeffel, U.S.N.	Commandant

Staff

Commander Raymond G. Deewall, U.S.N.	Senior Aide and Operations Officer
Lieut. Comdr. Fort H. Callahan, U.S.N.	Communications Officer
Lieut.Nathaniel M. Dial, U.S.N.	Secretary
Lieut. Warwick P. Scott, U.S.N.R.	Aide

INSHORE PATROL

Captain Kenneth M. Hoeffel, U.S.N.	Commanding

NAVAL FORCES DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS
(All shore based district personnel not in MARIVELES AREA.)

Commander Raymond G. Deewall, U.S.N.	Commanding

NAVAL FORCES MARIVELES AREA
(All shore based district personnel in MARIVELES AREA.)

Commander Earl LeR. Sackett, U.S.N.	Commanding

OTHER DISTRICT ACTIVITIES

Lieut.Comdr. Fort H. Callahan, U.S.N.	District Communication Officer
Lieut.Comdr. Thomas C. Parker, U.S.N.	District Personnel Officer
Lieut.Comdr. Denys W. Knoll, U.S.N.	District Intelligence Officer
Lieut. Stanley A. Leahigh, U.S.N.R.	District Censorship Officer
Comdr. Thomas H. Hayes, MC, U.S.N.	District Medical Officer (Additional Duty).
Lieut.Comdr. George H. Williams, SC, U.S.N.	District Supply Officer.
Ensign Robert W. Granston, SC, U.S.N.	District Disbursing Officer
Comdr. James D. Wilson, CEC, U.S.N.	District Public Works Officer
Colonel William T. Clement, U.S.M.C.	District Legal Officer

2. By copy of this letter, the above officers are directed to report for the duty indicated.

(Sgd) K. M. Hoeffel
K.M. Hoeffel

Enclosure (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

1st endorsement
ND16/P16-4/00 DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS
Serial #17 SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

March 20, 1942.

From: The Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.
To : Lieutenant Commander Denys W. Knoll, U.S. Navy.

1. Reported.

(Sgd) K. M. Hoeffel
K.M. HOEFFEL

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RESTRICTED NAVAL FORCES, DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS,
FORT MILLS, P. I.

ND16/A3/F16-4/00 March 22, 1942.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : Officers Attached District Headquarters.

Subject: Assignment to Duty.

Reference: (a). Comdt. 16th Naval District Serial No. 5, Mar. 20, 1942.

1. By reference (a), shored based district personnel not in Mariveles Area are ordered to report to the Commanding Officer, Naval Force District Headquarters, Fort Mills, P. I., for duty.

2. Assignments to duty are as indicated by the following roster of officers:

Signal Numbers, Rank and Name		Duty	Battle Station
1037	Comdr.R.O.Deewall	*Comdg.Officer	Force Headquarters.
2019	Lt.Cdr.H H Taylor	Exec.Officer	Gas Defense.
2127	Lt.Cdr.F H Callahan	*Comm.Officer	"A" Tunnel.
2428	Lt.Cdr.E E Paro	*Submarine Material Off.	C.O. Headquarters, Guard Battalion.
2477	Lt.Cdr.T.C.Parker	Personnel Off.	Guard Batt.Reserve.
2485	Lt.Cdr. A E Harris	First Lieut.	Guard Sector Officer.
56749 (USNR)	Lt.CdrL L Lyons	Asst.1st Lieut.	Guard Sector Officer.
2807	Lt.Cdr.M H McCoy	Asst. Comm. Officer	Communications "D" Tunnel.
3608	Lt.Cdr. D W Knoll	*Aerological & Code Officer.	Officer in Charge Coding.
4130	Lt. T K Bowers	*Ordnance Off. Asst.Pers.Off.	Guard Batt.Reserve.
4297	Lt. D S Gothie	*Asst.Ord.Off. C.O., "A" Co.	"A" Co. Headquarters.
4363	Lt. N M Dial	*Liaison Off.	Liaison Officer.
------ (USNR)	Lt.F.Schoenwolf	Asst.Comm. Officer	Guard Co., "A" Tunnel.
------ (USCG)	Lt.T.J E Crotty	Adjt. Hdqrs. Guard Batt.	HDQRS.,Guard Batt.
87127 (USNR)	Lt.W.P Scott	*C.O.,"B" Co.	"B" Co. Hdqrs.
107367 (USNR)	Lt.D R Fisher	*Code Board	Guard Batt Reserve.
------ (USNR)	Lt.H J Rosenthal	Asst.Comm.Off. "A" Tunnel.	Guard Co.,"A" Tunnel.
71924 (USNR)	Lt.M.W.Taylor	Asst.Comm.Off. "A" Tunnel.	Guard Co., "A" Tunnel.
72559 (USNR)	Lt.S. A Leahigh	*Intelligence Censor.	Batt. Operations
------ (USNR)	Lt.F C Henry	Guard Batt.	"B" Co. Hdqrs.
------ (USNR)	Lt(jg) C F Letson	*Asst.to Exec.Officer	Plat. Leader, "C" Company.
------ (USNR)	Lt(jg) C R Finn	Asst.Comm.Off.	Guard Co."A" Tunnel.
113588 (USNR)	Lt(jg) M H Willis Jr	*Boats & Crews	Guard Batt Reserve.
------ (USNR)	Lt(jg) H S Morton	*Asst. 1st Lt.	Batt. Staff
------ (USNR)	Lt.(jg) W M Pearce	*Coding News Bulletin.	Coding Board.
------(USNR)	Lt(jg) F X Golden	"B" Co. Guard Batt.	Plat. Leader "B" Company.

Signal Numbers, Rank and Name	Duty	Battle Station
------ (USNR) Lt.(jg) I S Crum	*Coding	Plat.Leader, "A" Company.
------ (USNR) Lt(jg) L Nestle	*Company "C"	"C" Co.Sub.Comdr.
------(USNR) Lt(jg) G T Trudell	Company "A"	Plat Leader,"A" Co.
------ (USNR) Ensign W J O'Brien	Company "A"	"A" Co.Sub.Comdr.
------ (USNR) Ensign R E Cook	Asst. Comm. "A" Tunnel.	Guard Co., "A" Tunnel.
------ (USNR) Ensign N W Lauchner	Treatment, Army Hospital.	
------ (USNR) Ensign R E Raschick	*Batt. Hdqrs.	Batt. Staff.
------ (USNR) Ensign W R Lloyd	*Boat Officer	Guard Batt.Reserve.

RESTRICTED
ND16/A3/P16-4/00

NAVAL FORCES, DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS,
FORT MILLS, P. I.

March 22, 1942.

Subject: Assignment to Duty

Signal Number	Rank and Name	Duty	Battle Station
------ (USNR)	Ensign J.B Gordon	Asst.Comm.Off.	Guard Co.,A Tunnel.
------ (USNR)	Ensign A G Beale	Trans.Off.	Transportation
------ (USNR)	Ensign H F Conley	Asst.Comm.Off.	Guard Co.,A Tunnel.
------ (USNR)	Ensign J C Metcalf	Asst.Comm.Off.	Guard Co.,A Tunnel.
------ (USNR)	Ensign W A Berry	*C.O., "C" Co.	Plat.Leader, C Co.
12152 (MC)	Lt. C F LeComte	Med.Officer.	Dressing Station.
9621 (SC)	Lt.Cdr. G H Williams	*Supply Off.	Guard Batt.Reserve.
9933 (SC)	Lt(jg) K R Wheeler	Asst.Sup.Off. C.O., Co. "C".	Co. "C" Headquarters
9963 (SC)	Ensign R.W.Granston	Disbursing Off.	Batt. Supply.
10147 (CEC)	Comdr.J.D Wilson	*Public Works Officer	Utilities, Gas Defense.
79250 (CEC) (USNR)	Lt.G H Greenwood	Public Works	Gas Defense, "A" Tunnel.
10483	Bos'n C H Taylor	"A" Company	Plat.Leader, "A" Company.
------	Bos'n P Miller	"B" Company	Plat.Leader, "B" Company.
11120	Rad.Elec.E G Schweizer	Radio "D" Tun.	Battalion Radio
11139	Rad.Elec.T E Turnipseed	Radio "D" Tun.	Ordnance Supply.
12201	Pay Clerk C A Hanson	Asst.Dis.Off.	Asst.Batt.Supply.
12222	Pay Clerk J H Walker	Asst.Dis.Off.	Asst.Batt.Supply.

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U.S. ARMY HOSPITAL DETACHMENT, BATAAN

8456	Lt. Comdr. C.M.Smith (MC).	
9272	Lieut. C. M. Fraleight (DC).	
------ (USNR)	Lieut. (jg) E.R.Nelson (MC)	
	Nurse Anne Bernatitus.	

DETACHMENTS

BEACH DEFENSE DETACHMENT WITH 4th MARINES, FORT MILLS.

------ (USNR)	Lt.Comdr. J. L. Littig, Officer in Charge.	
10431	Boatswain B. C. Hart.	
10741	Gunner I. F. English.	

BEACH DEFENSE DETACHMENT, FORT HUGHES.

1419	Comdr. F. J. Bridget, Officer in Charge.	
2983	Lieut. J. L. Welch.	
------ (USNR)	Lieut. H Mac Gowan.	
------ (USNR)	Lieut. V. C. Prewitt.	
10712	Gunner E. G. Byers.	

U.S. ARMY TRANSPORTATION SERVICE DETACHMENT

------ (USNR)	Lieut.(jg) T.E.Donaldson, Officer in Charge.
------(USNR)	Ensign J. M. McGrath.
------ (USNR)	Ensign H. G. Whitman.
------ (USNR)	Ensign R. L. Clatt.

3. The personnel of the above detachments are attached to the commands indicated for duty and tactical employment. Their records are carried by District Headquarters and they will be handled administratively by that office.

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NAVAL FORCES, DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS,
FORT MILLS, P. I.

ND16/A3/P16-4/00 March 22, 1942.

Subject: Assignment to duty.

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4. By copy of this letter, the above named officers, except those on duty with detachments, are directed to report for the duty indicated.

(*) Assigned additional duty by the Commandant Sixteenth Naval District.

(Sgd) R. G. Deewall.
R. G. DEEWALL.

ND16/P16-4/00 FIRST ENDORSEMENT.

NAVAL FORCES, DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS,
FORT MILLS, P. I., March 22, 1942.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : Lieutenant Commander D. W. Knoll, U.S. Navy.

1. Reported.

(Sgd) R. G. Deewall
R. G. DEEWALL.

CONFIDENTIAL

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April 25, 1942.

From: Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.
To : Commanding General, Philippine Forces.

SUBJECT: Landing Area on Mindanao.

References: (a) U.S.C. & G.S. Charts Nos. 4708, 4606, 4652.
(b) U.S. Coast Pilot, Philippine Islands, Part II.

1. A study of the island of Mindanao has been made in order to locate a favorable landing area for 80,000 troops with equipment.

The selection has been governed by the

a. Most probable save approach for such an expedition.
b. Most favorable location where aircraft can easily support the landing operation.
c. Favorable sandy beach where small boats may land and which ships can approach and anchor without too many rocks and shoals.

2. The south coast of Mindanao offers the most readily accessible beaches to any convoy approaching from the Pacific Ocean or from the south.

3. The Illana Bay area of southern Mindanao is within one day's steaming from the Pacific Ocean and any place in this area is within short range of U.S. controlled air fields in Mindanao.

4. The coast from Lapitan Point to Tapian Point has many sandy beaches favorable for landings; especially the coast from the mouth of the Malabaug River which trends southeasterly for about 9 miles to Tetian Bay and is mostly sand, lined with trees and bushes. The water to the East of a line extended from Port Baras to Bongo Island is suitable for anchorages of all ships of a convoy in forty-five fathom or less with generally sandy bottom.

A landing at this place is close to Malabaug where the main highway between Catabato and Dansalau leaves the coast. Polloc Harbor is close to this landing area and should be used for landing equipment at the Parang pier. Parang is also on the main highway from Catabato to Dansalau.

There are limited anchorages in the vicinity of Catabato, which are not suitable for large vessels. There is a wharf, 725 feet long, at Catabato, which can be used for landing equipment from boats or lighters.

Winds, Currents, and Weather:

During the southwest monsoon, May to September, inclusive, the wind freshens after mid-day and varies from the southwest to west and northwest. Rain falls in abundance and heavy thunderstorms occur.

The currents in this area run with great velocity and cause a heavy sea when there is any wind. Due allowance must always be made for the tidal currents, and great care exercised in coasting in this vicinity, especially in the night time. The heavy currents set north, northwest and west according to the configuration of the coast.

The average daily wind in this area is five knots from the west southwest.

Enclosure (D)

The average maximum wind is twenty knots from the west southwest.

This area is well south of the normal typhoon activity area and experiences little unucual weather except thunderstorms during the late afternoon or early spring.

Landings in this area should be planned for the night hours during the southwest monsoon season. At night the normal land breezes will tend to counteract the southwest prevailing wind and cause calm conditions with slight chances of rain or thunderstorms.

K. M. Hoeffel.